Map

UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=44103ccb0&page=publ

Summary

The roots of forced migration in contemporary Somalia lie in former colonial divisions, clan conflict and fierce competition over the economic and political resources of the post-colonial state. When Somalia gained independence in 1960 it was handicapped by a lack of political legitimacy and a weak economic base. Excessive militirisation and aid dependency, superpower patronage and the centralisation of control in the hands of the dictator, Siad Barre, was the pattern throughout the 1970s. The nationalisation of economic assets, the effects of a major drought in 1974, and of military defeat in 1978 in the Ogaden war resulted in the wholesale alienation of the population from the Barre regime. Armed opposition to Barre began in earnest in 1988 in north-west Somalia. Some 400,000 Somalis fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti as a result of the conflict. The overthrow of Barre in 1991 propelled Somalia into a prolonged period of civil war. At the height of the conflict in 1992 some 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighbouring countries, and 2 million were internally displaced. Large numbers returned to their homes during the remainder of the decade, despite high levels of conflict in particular regions of the country.

Accompanying the dissolution of the Somali state has been a gradual process of regional reconstruction. Somaliland and Puntland in the north of the country are relatively stable and conflict-free. By contrast, areas of the southern regions are subject to violence and continued population displacement. In 2002 an estimated 350,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) remained in Somalia, the result of fifteen years of conflict and the continuing violence in the southern regions of the country. The formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 has not, to date, resulted in peace. Renewed conflict has broken out over the legitimacy of the new regime.

The population displacement of the last two decades in Somalia is due to a complex combination of clan-based conflict, including the destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods as a weapon of war and to the effects of climatic change. Flooding and drought have produced famine and population displacement on a massive scale. In 1997 flooding forced 122,000 mainly Somali refugees to flee their camps in north-eastern Kenya. The floods made more than 200,000 homeless. Today Somalia is one of the principal refugee-producing countries in the world. It was amongst the top twenty countries of origin for asylum applications in twenty-eight mostly industrialised countries from January to June 2002. It was also amongst the top ten countries of origin for asylum applications to the European Union during the 1992-2001 period.

Websites:

CIA World Factbook 2002 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Statistics http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics

Library of Congress Country Reports http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html

Historical background

Colonial interventions in the Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century resulted in the formation of five distinct geographical units inhabited by Somalis: the Côte Française des Somalis in present day Djibouti; British Somaliland in the north-west; the Ogaden, which was colonised by Ethiopia; Somalia Italiana in the south and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) under British rule as part of north-eastern Kenya. The five-pointed star of the Somali flag, expressing the aspiration for a united Somalia, became the basis for the Somali independence movement after the Second World War.

Somalia is often cited as a rare example of ethnic homogeneity in Africa, with a common language and religion that provided the basis for its relatively peaceful transition to independence in 1960. This common history and identification underplays the basis of Somali society in clan networks and the ethnic and linguistic diversity within the Somali population. Despite attempts to suppress clan identities, clanship has habitually resurfaced as a basis for political organisation and identification in the post-colonial period ( see Section 3.1 ). Somalia represents a case of the superimposition of the nation-state form upon diverse and fluid clan networks. In addition, minorities with distinctive religious practices and languages, notably in the inter-riverine and coastal areas, were socially marginalised and under-represented in governmental positions in the post-colonial period. The intensification of clan divisions and the widespread suppression of minorities have been the dominant features of the last two decades in Somalia.

Clan and nation-state

From the founding of the Somali Republic in 1960 there were difficulties over uniting the two areas of previously British-controlled Somaliland in the north-west, and Italian-ruled Somalia in the south. In April 1960 a joint meeting of the administrations of Somaliland and Somalia proclaimed that the two territories would be united. Discrepancies between the two administrations led to a now-independent Somalia issuing a decree of union between the two entities, although this was never legally formalised. Despite this, Somaliland and Somalia were de facto united in July 1960 as the Somali Republic. The new government was southern-dominated, one amongst several factors which quickly led to northern calls for secession. A referendum held in the north in 1961 showed clear evidence of opposition to the Union ( Drysdale 1992 ). Particular grievances arose in relation to the different administrations, legislatures, languages, and regional disparities between the north and south of the fledgling republic. An attempted coup d'etat in the north followed hard on in December 1960. Although this was unsuccessful it was a warning sign of the instability of the union and in particular of northern fears of attempted southern hegemony.

The conflict between the centralised character of the post-colonial state and the basis of Somali society in clan networks and previous colonial divisions are the central factors explaining the history of conflict and forced migration in Somalia. The multi-party democracy that was introduced with independence was particularly prone to clan factionalism. The 1960-4 period under President Abdirshid A. Shermarke consisted of a coalition of parties with the main lines of cleavage falling along both class and clan divisions. The Mohamed I. Egal and Abdirizak H. Hussein administrations of the 1964-9 period tended toward northern domination. The combination of class-based politics and clan factionalism accelerated after 1967 under the new government of Egal ( Samatar 1988 ).

A deteriorating situation, including economic stagnation, partial proletarianisation of rural areas, urban poverty, and continued dependence on overseas aid, was brought to a head with the assassination of President Shermaarke in 1969. Despite Prime Minister Egal's attempts to improve the situation, six days after the assassination the military assumed power in a bloodless coup. In many quarters the coup was seen as justifiable, given the scale of abuse and misuse of public power and resources by elected politicians ( Samatar 1992 ).

The rise and fall of Siad Barre

Any hopes for improvement under the military rule of Major General Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) were soon to be dashed. Suspension of the constitution and parliament, as well as curtailment of rights of association, were rapidly enforced. Barre's programme of national reconstruction under the banner of 'scientific socialism', consisted of a range of projects aimed at national revitalisation. The distinctive features of Barre's reign were the extent of militarisation first under Soviet and then US tutelage, and the centralisation of power in Barre's own hands. The negative features of the Barre regime included economic mismanagement, dependency on military aid, and a high external debt. There were some positive developments relating to Barre's social and political campaigns, in education and literacy for example ( Laitin 1977 ) and the position of women ( IRBC 1994 ). In addition to a cult of personality around Barre, there was the barely disguised hegemony of the Darod clan family in the so-called Ministry of Defence (MOD) alliance of the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante clans, which administered the state apparatus (Lewis 1994). This was despite the official campaigns condemning tribalism that Barre initiated in 1971 ( see Section 3.1 ).

The political manipulation of clanship was a central feature of the Barre regime. Competition for control of state resources intensified between the different clan factions. An abortive coup by the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darod was led against Barre during the Ogaden war of 1977 ( see Section 5.1.1 ). Barre faced a situation of combined crises on military and political fronts as opposition movements began to co-operate from the late 1970s onwards. The Majerteen Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) based in the north-east of the country was formed in the late 1970s. The Isaq-affiliated Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north-west was formed in the Gulf states and UK in the early 1980s. Both groups were singled out for persecution by Barre's MOD alliance.

While the SSDF weakened throughout the 1980s, the SNM continued to pose a threat to the dominance of the Barre regime. A peace agreement between Mengistu of Ethiopia (who supported the opposition in Somalia) and Barre meant that his forces could be safely ranged against the SNM. Pre-empting a strike by Barre, in 1988 the SNM briefly took control of Hargeisa and Burao in the north-west. In the government counter-attack, thousands of civilians were killed in aerial bombing. Non-MOD elements of the national army began to desert and form their own clan-based organisations. The Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in 1989. These three opposition groups, including the Ogaden-affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) converged on Mogadishu in January 1991. As Barre fled the capital on 27 January 1991, the dissolution of the Somali state accelerated.

The dissolution of the Somali state

From the fall of Barre to the current situation in Somalia there were four phases. The most intense period of conflict was during 1991-2 when the different clan factions (from the old regime and the newly emerged opposition militias) fought for control of land and resources in the south of the country. This resulted in the devastation of the inter-riverine areas. Increasing numbers of refugees left the country for neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia at that time, while the number of IDPs increased dramatically. The formation in 1991 of independent Somaliland in the north-west created an enclave of reconstruction and relative peace. Drought and famine in the inter-riverine areas, and the disruption of farming and livestock production as a result of conflict, caused thousands of deaths and further migration to aid camps in urban areas.

The phase of UN interventions that followed from 1993-5 was one of localised conflicts, specifically around Mogadishu. The humanitarian aim of the interventions was clouded by a lack of clarity over the role of UN forces. Their role in 'nation building' became a rallying point for united Somali opposition. Refugees continued to flee the country, and internal displacement became entrenched in particular regions of the country. The last UN troops left Somalia in 1994-5.

The post-intervention phase from 1995 to 2000 saw the emergence of regional administrations and the continued dissolution of the Somali state. Conflict continued unevenly in different regions of the country, causing internal displacement and steady refugee flows. Puntland in the north-east declared itself a regional administration in 1998, and in March 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) formed the State of Southwestern Somalia in the Bay and Bakool regions. Conflict erupted in Puntland in 2001. The southern regions remained the centre of conflict in Somalia in the late 1990s and into the new century.

The fourth phase was from the establishment of the TNG in 2000 onwards. Key warlords' opposition to the legitimacy of the TNG has resulted in renewed conflict and population displacement in particular areas in the south. By contrast, the process of reconstruction continues in Somaliland and Puntland. These issues are discussed in more detail in Section 2.

Websites:

Prunier, G., Writenet, 'Somalia: Civil war, intervention and withdrawal 1990-1995' http://asylumlaw.org/countries/index.cfm?fuseaction=showDocuments&countryID=207&offset=21

Sorens, J. P., and Wantchekon, L., Department of Political Science, Yale University, 'Social Order Without the State: the Case of Somalia' http://www.yale.edu/ycias/african/papers.htm

US Department of State, Background Notes http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm

Foreign Policy in Focus, Somalia http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n19som.html

The localisation of Somali politics

The distinctive feature of post-intervention Somalia is the dissolution of the state into a number of disparate regional components. Rather than a descent into the violence of the 1991-2 period, there was a gradual stabilisation of social forces after 1995 as new political parameters began to emerge. A renewal in economic activity from remittances, telecommunications, and livestock export encouraged the formation of regional administrations, particularly in the north-west. Somali warlords who had depended upon the spoils of foreign aid now looked to business enterprises to secure power and influence. With the weakening of the position of the warlords, new forms of 'pirate entrepreneurs' or local clan-based 'Mafiosi' emerged, spawned by the growth in trade and the lack of incentive to re-form a centralised state. As a result, the different regions within Somalia vary in relation to their political and economic stability and their potential for producing forced migration streams. Further fighting is inevitable but is unlikely to occur on the same scale and intensity as in the 1991-2 period. Southern Benadir, Gedo, and Kismayo appear particularly unstable and are likely to produce medium-scale refugee flows into the near future.

Website:

Menkhaus, K., and Prenderhast, J. 'Political Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia' http://asylumlaw.org/countries/index.cfm?fuseaction=showDocuments&countryID=207&offset=21

Somaliland

The region of the former British colony of Somaliland proclaimed independence in May 1991. Predominantly Isaq, the region has a distinctive history and ethnic coherence, which eased its separation from what remained of the Somali state. The early years of independence were plagued by internal conflicts. These were offset by improved livestock exports from 1993 onwards. Renewed fighting occurred in October 1994 between President Egal of Somaliland and Eidagalley militia who were occupying the Hargeisa airport. This sparked off a full-scale war, and the flight of thousands of refugees from the city, until December of that year. By March the war had spread to Burao. More than a year of fighting had pushed 90,000 refugees into camps in neighbouring Ethiopia and uprooted 200,000 within Somaliland. By the middle of 1995 refugees were gradually beginning to return to Hargeisa, and economic activity had also approached near-normal levels. Throughout 1996-7 peace was again gradually restored to Somaliland. A referendum held in 2001 overwhelmingly voted for the continued secession of Somaliland and for a new constitution.

Somaliland's estimated population of 3.5 million is formally independent from the conflict that continues to plague the central and southern regions of the country. The lack of international recognition prevents Somaliland from receiving multilateral financial assistance and entering into bilateral trade agreements with foreign governments. As a result Somaliland is currently unable to repatriate refugees successfully. The Saudi ban on livestock exports from Somaliland in September 2000 (allegedly due to the spread of 'Rift Valley fever') has also had a serious impact upon the economy.

Websites:

Government of Somaliland http://www.somalilandgov.com http://www.somalilandonline.com/

Puntland

Another example of state-building 'from below' can be found in the case of Puntland in the north-east. Following the name given to the Somali coast by sailors from ancient Egypt, the land of 'punt' consists of the former provinces of Mudug, Nugaal, and Bari. It is ethnically homogenous and is nearly totally populated by the Majerteen, the dominant Darod sub-clan. Since 1991 it has largely been at peace under the control of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Livestock is the main economic asset in the region. Garowe is the capital, and it has thrived economically since the fall of Barre.

In July 1998 a community conference of the three regions of north-east Somalia declared the formation of a Puntland state as a sub-unit of a future federated Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, it is not a fully independent state. It is also based upon clan boundaries rather than the former colonial boundary, which has been adopted by Somaliland. A form of democratic authority based upon the SSDF and 'traditional administration' has evolved in Puntland. Local committees of elders have been able to maintain and exercise control. Until recently Puntland has avoided the type of clan conflict which has affected all the other regions of former Somalia. Hostilities broke out in 2001 between the SSDF leader Abdillahi Yusuf and his presidential rival, Jama Ali Jama, disturbing what had been a peaceful transition to state-building in Puntland. Peace talks between the different factions were being held in Nairobi in May 2003.

Website:

All Puntland (Somali-language site) http://allpuntland.com

The central and southern regions

In contrast to the relative stability and coherence of Somaliland and Puntland, the central and southern regions of Somalia present a highly fluid and unstable mixture of elements. Mogadishu is divided between different clan factions of the Hawiye United Somali Congress (USC), notably Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). In the wake of Barre's departure in 1991, General Mohamed Farah Aideed (Hussein Aideed's father) took control of the south of the city, Ali Mahdi the north. Fighting between these rival factions has been a consistent factor from that time onwards. Ali Mahdi introduced Islamic courts in northern Mogadishu in 1994, a practice which later spread to southern Mogadishu. A Joint Peace Committee has developed to oversee the administration of business in the city (particularly relating to control of the airport and seaport). It later expanded to form the Benadir Authority. This is part of the broader process of establishing formal structures for evolving commercial and militia interests in Mogadishu.

From the advent of the TNG in 2000, a complex series of alliances have emerged between the Islamic courts, merchants, and the TNG administration, which are opposed to the warlord factions dominating Mogadishu. The security situation in Mogadishu, with its high levels of banditry and extortion, is continuing to pose difficulties for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The inter-riverine region is one of the most unstable areas in Somalia. The area is populated by the Digil and Rahanweyn clans, who were worst affected by the conflicts in the 1991-2 period. Following the examples of Somaliland and Puntland, in March 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) formed a new administration. Known as the State of Southwestern Somalia, this regional authority is located in the Bay and Bakool regions of the country. During 2002, fighting between different factions of the RRA engulfed Baidoa, the capital of the Bay region.

The far south covers all of Gedo and most of the Lower Juba region and is largely under the control of the Marehan Somali National Front (SNF). The south remains one of the least developed areas and the one most prone to clan and inter-clan conflict.

The Transitional National Government (TNG)

Following a number of failed peace conferences, in 1998-9 the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Djibouti proposed a Somali National Peace Committee (SNPC) to be based on representatives from Somali civil society. The SNPC opened at Arta, Djibouti in May 2000. In the event, the key Mogadishu warlords and the Puntland and Somaliland administrations were excluded from the proceedings. The Transitional National Government (TNG) that came out of the Arta conference was formed in October 2000 with a three-year mandate. A 245-member Transitional National Assembly was elected, which included representatives of minority and women's groups. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was appointed as interim president. An ex-Barre minister and a member of the Habr Gedir, on the surface he was well placed to mediate the Habr Gedir-dominated politics of Mogadishu ( see Section 5.1.2 ). The presence of ex-Barre ministers in the TNG provoked opposition from a variety of groups. The main factions ranged against the TNG include Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA). This coalition of interests is loosely organised (with Ethiopian backing) as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The lack of legitimacy of the TGN is evident in its weak territorial control of Mogadishu and the southern and inter-riverine areas. According to Le Sage ( 2002 ), a tight-knit nexus of clan-based, business, and clerical interests forms the core of support for the TGN.

In October 2002 the Somali national reconciliation process began with the convening of the Eldoret Conference in Kenya. The TNG, 350 Somali leaders, and representatives of civil society were invited to attend. The first phase of the conference on 27 October 2002 concluded with the signing of the Eldoret Declaration. This endorsed the principle of decentralisation for Somalia, a cease-fire, and guarantees for the security of humanitarian and development personnel. Since that time ceasefire violations have been commonplace. The second phase of the conference has been completed with the drafting of papers on different aspects of reconciliation and state-building. The third and final phase, the formation of a new Somali government, was due to occur some time after May 2003.

Websites:

Menkhaus, K. 'Somalia: a situation analysis', Writenet Paper No. 07/2000 http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/B320C6BD7FADA7DE852569FA00515929

Lewis, I. M., 'Mohamad Siad Barre's Ghost in Somalia', April 2002 http://www.waltainfo.com/conflict/articles/2002/april/article8.htm

International Crisis Group, 'Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia,' African Report No. 59 http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/somalia/reports/A400911_06032003.pdf

Somalia and the international community

The degree of internal support for the TNG is clearly limited. Yet the international community remains committed to the resurrection of a centralised, unitary state in Somalia. The history of UN interventions suggests that they have added to existing tensions as clan groupings have competed for aid and revenue from international organisations. After over a decade of 'statelessness' in Somalia, the TNG now occupies seats at the UN, the Organisation of African Unity, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab states ( Le Sage 2002 ). Material support from the international community for the TNG has been less extensive. The TNG has not benefited from bilateral recognition or from the receipt of substantial amounts of international assistance. Ethiopian backing for the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) also continues to destabilise the TNG. On the geopolitical level, the US 'war against terrorism' has fuelled suspicion of Somalia's links to international Islamic organisations.

In Somalia, the restoration of a centralised state based upon 'top-down' political structures is the preferred option for the international community. In terms of alternative scenarios for reconstruction in Somalia, a 'building-block' approach has already developed in particular regions. Puntland, for example, represents a federalist option, and Somaliland a separatist path, for future Somali development ( Spears 2003 ). Both regional administrations share a democratic, 'grass-roots' approach to the devolution of power, combining traditional shir (customary law based upon meetings of the clan elders) with contemporary constitutional models ( Bryden 1999 ). In practice, the UN has cautiously welcomed many of these local, 'bottom-up' developments. Which model will prevail in Somalia, centralised state or a diversity of federal administrations, is as yet uncertain.

Legal framework

In the absence of a centralised state in Somalia there is no functioning national constitution. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland adopted its own constitution in 1997. This was ratified by the constitutional referendum, which was held in May 2001. Somaliland's government includes a parliament, a functioning civil court system, executive departments organised as ministries, six regional governors, and municipal authorities in major towns. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, although there are indications that this does not apply in practice.

Puntland and the TNG both have working 'charters'. The charter of the TNG allows for freedom of expression and association, and for the separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government. The TNG charter prohibits torture and the Puntland charter prohibits torture except in those cases that are overridden by Islamic law. The TNG charter allows for freedom of speech and the press, rights that are also acknowledged in the case of Puntland and Somaliland. Again, the practical application falls far short, with several cases of the arrest of journalists by the TNG, and other violations of human rights.

As there is no national judicial system, many regions rely either on local clan-based courts, Islamic Shari'a courts, or the Penal Code of the pre-1991 Barre Government.

Websites:

US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, 'Somalia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices', March 2002 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8403.htm

Amnesty International, Somalia Report 2003 http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/som-summary-eng

Human Rights Internet, international treaties Somalia has signed http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2002/vol2/somalia.htm

Clanship

The Somali clan system has two main lineage lines, the Samale and the Sab. In genealogical terms the Digil and Rahanweyn clan families belong to the Sab, while the Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir clan families belong to the Samale. Although the clan families are not strictly territorially delimited, they do tend to occupy distinct geographical locations, i.e., the Isaq and the Dir in the north; the Digil and Rahanweyn in the agricultural areas in the south; the Hawiye in and around Mogadishu and the Darod in the south and in the north. The differentiation between Sab and Samale is reflected in the basic contrast between the nomadic pastoralism of the Samale and the sedentary farming of the Sab.

The different clan families are too large to function as viable political units. Below the level of clan families, clans are more significant aspects of social organisation and identification. Clans in turn are further subdivided. The Isaq clan family, for example, historically has been divided into eight main clan groupings - the Habar Awal, the Habar Yunis, the 'lidegall'lidagale, the Arab, and four Habar Ja'lo clans ( Lewis 1994: 202 ). These are further divided into sub-clans, primary lineage groups, and below this, dia-paying groups, whose function is to pay the 'blood wealth' involved in the settlement of feuds. An individual's participation is at the level of the primary lineage group, while the dia-paying group 'is the basic political and judicial unit of pastoral society' ( Lewis 1961: 6 ). Elsewhere however, Lewis remarks that any lineage acting as a separate political unit is capable of functioning as a dia-paying group, albeit on a short-term basis ( Lewis 1994: 22 ). The shir or meeting of clan groups is the traditional means of resolving disputes.

While clanship promotes short-term and unstable political alliances, it also acts as the primary source of stability and cohesion in Somali society. Clan networks provide a means of identification and support that are vital under insecure environmental, social, and political conditions. In general, the clan genealogical system functions as a pastoral mode of adaptation to a harsh physical environment (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2 ).

Minorities

The majority, some 85 per cent of the population, are ethnic Somalis, with Bantu and Arab minorities comprising about 15 per cent of the total. Individuals of Bantu descent mainly live in the farming villages in the south, while Arabs have traditionally occupied the coastal cities. Minorities (including a number of 'occupational castes') are not evenly distributed throughout Somalia but are concentrated in the central and southern regions, urban centres, and along the coastline and the Shabelle and Juba Rivers. Bantu minority groups (many of whom are the descendants of slaves imported into Somalia in the nineteenth century) were particularly targeted by the Hawiye and Darod, who seized the agricultural land from Bantu farmers in the inter-riverine areas during the 1990s ( Besteman 1999 ). This followed a long period of marginalisation of the Bantu under the colonial and Barre regimes. The Bantu lack direct clan ties to the dominant Somali clans and the protection from violence which this confers. The Bravanese, a minority with a distinctive culture and language who are situated on the coast south of Mogadishu, have been under Habr Gedir control since the mid-1990s. These and other minority groups were particularly vulnerable to displacement during the course of the civil war in the 1991-2 period, and constitute significant numbers of those who have been internally displaced or who sought safety across international borders as refugees ( see Section 5.2 ).

The Digil and Rahanweyn, as 'minority' clans, were also targeted with violence during the civil war and were victims of killings, lootings, and other human rights violations by the various militias, mainly Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA).

A precise definition of the position of minorities is difficult, given that the number of individuals claiming minority status has increased - or was created - because of the civil war and the experience of oppression that particular groups have experienced. The generic term 'Benadiri', for example (used to broadly describe the coastal population of Somalia between Mogadishu and Kismayo), although not in common use before the war, is now adopted by many Somali refugees as an indicator of minority status ( Perouse de Monclos 1997 ).

Websites:

Danish Immigration Service Report on Minority Groups in Somalia, December 2000 http://asylumlaw.org/countries/index.cfm?fuseaction=showDocuments&countryID=207

Cultural Orientation Net, 'Somali Bantu: Their History and Culture' http://www.culturalorientation.net/bantu/sbtoc.html

Religion

The vast majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, almost entirely of the Shaf'ite school. Islam is an important unifying factor for Somalis, particularly since there is no major schism within its Islamic faith. Along with clanship, Islam represents one of the cornerstones of Somali national identity. Islam spread to Somalia at an early stage (eighth century AD), reinforcing links with Arabia that were already established through migration and trade. There are remaining traces of pre-Islamic traditional religions, particularly in the inter-riverine area ( Cassanelli 1982 ). Amongst Somalis there is a strong tradition of tariiqa, or Sufi orders. The different tariiqas are religious brotherhoods that serve as centres of learning and religious authority. The best-known leader of the Salihiya tariiqa was Sayyed Mohammed Abdulle Hassan in the early twentieth century, who led the anti-colonial movement at the time.

In contemporary Somalia, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has presented a challenge to the tariiqa and the traditional veneration of saints. The development of Shari'a courts in parts of Mogadishu and Somaliland is of great symbolic importance. Ali Mahdi of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) was the first to adopt Islam in northern Mogadishu in 1994 as a means of securing legitimacy and restoring law and order. While Islam is not a unified force, al-lttihad (the Union) is one of the larger groupings and has been linked to 'terrorist' activity, particularly by the US government as part of their 'war on terrorism'. No military interventions have as yet been made in Somalia to curtail terrorist activity. The assets of the Somali telecommunications company Al Bakarat were frozen by the US administration in an attempt to curtail the transmission of funds to terrorist groups overseas. The operation of al-lttihad is currently believed to have been weakened after repeated attacks by Ethiopia ( Connell 2002 ).

Language

Alongside clanship and Islam, language is a key component of the Somali national identity that was promoted by elite groups in the post-war period ( Samatar 1988 ; Ahmed 1995 ). The Somali language is a member of a group of languages called Lowland Eastern Cushitic, and is a sub-group of the Cushitic language family. Somali has two major dialects - the standard dialect spoken by most Somalis and the Digil/Rahanweyn dialect spoken primarily in the inter-riverine areas. The settled Bantu communities in the inter-riverine area were long regarded as of different (and inferior) ancestral stock to the Somalis 'proper', the Samale. The standardisation of Somali script in 1972 reflects this historical division. Prior to this date English and Italian served as the official languages of government and the education system. The new script was based upon the dominant dialect and therefore entrenched the social position of the more powerful groups in the central and northern regions ( Cassanelli 1996 ).

The literacy campaigns of the 1970s were part of Barre's democratisation programme. Targeted at the nomadic population, these efforts did not accommodate the dialects spoken by the Digil and Rahanewyn. Despite this, some progress was made in the development of national literacy during the 1970s. Although warfare has disrupted the education system in recent years, figures supplied by the UN in 1990 indicated a literacy rate of 24 per cent of the population.

Websites:

US Department of State, Background Notes: Somalia http://state.gov/www/background_notes/somalia_0798_bgn.html

Cultural Orientation Net, 'Somalis, Their History and Culture' http://www.culturalorientation.net/somali/stoc.html

Geography

Somalia is situated on the north-eastern tip of the Horn of Africa, and borders Kenya in the south, Ethiopia in the west, Djibouti in the north-west, the Gulf of Aden in the north, and the Indian Ocean in the east. The Somalia state territory, as defined between 1 July 1960 and the end of January 1991, consists of 637,657 square kilometres (square miles) and is mostly flat, rising in the southern and central regions to a few hundred metres (square feet) above sea level near the Ethiopian border. Along the northern coast the mountains rise to some 2,000 metres (square feet).

Somalia is principally desert and is dominated by savannah scrubland. Broadly speaking, northern and southern Somalia share the same arid and semi-arid climate. There are three geographical zones in the north, and five in the south of the country. The extensive grass plains of the Haud in the northern region provide excellent grazing for herds. The nomadic pastoralism which over half the population practise takes place from the Haud, a broad, undulating terrain that constitutes some of the best grazing lands for Somali nomads and which is now part of Ethiopia. The Haud is used for grazing in the rainy seasons (spring and autumn) and then abandoned in summer and winter due to lack of water. This entails a complex series of movements in search of grazing-land between the different seasons. The Somali differentiate between four seasons, two wet and two dry: Gu (long rainy season) lasting from April to July, Hagaa (dry) lasting from July to October, Dayr (the small rains) from October to December, and Jilaal (long dry season) lasting from December to April.

The main geographical distinction between the north and south of the country is the presence of two perennial rivers, the Juba and the Shabelle, situated in the southern regions. In years of high flow the two rivers meet and provide water for the irrigated agriculture in the rich inter-riverine belt of land. Agriculture is mainly practised in this region and in the north-west of the country.

The population of the inter-riverine area is distinctive from the remainder of Somalia and is believed to be Bantu in origin. The coastal areas have long been home to Indians, Persians, Arabs, and Swahili traders. Population movement is highly fluid as a result of warfare, famine, and displacement from rural areas to the cities. The proportion of the population living in urban areas is growing, and is estimated at 28 per cent of the total population. As a result of decades of social unrest and the breakdown of physical infrastructure, life expectancy at birth is 41 years for men and 45.4 years for women. Infant mortality is 219 per 1,000 births for boys and 198 for girls.

Websites:

CIA World Factbook 2002 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html

The World Bank Group http://www.worldbank.org/data

World Health Organization http://www.who.int/country/som/en/

Economy

Somalia has also long been involved in intra-regional and external trade. The locations of modern day Berbera and Bossaso were significant trading emporia between 300 BC and 500 AD. The north-western area of Somalia is also the principal trading zone, both for local products and historically for import-export trade in the region. Trade is the second most significant element of the Somali economy after agriculture. Exports and remittances from labour migration to the Gulf states and further afield are the other vital components of the Somali economy.

Somalia's economy is rooted in agriculture. In 1990 agriculture accounted for about 65 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), of which livestock was responsible for over 50 per cent, crops 38 per cent, and forestry and fisheries about 1 per cent each. The remainder was accounted for by services in the urban sector. Tanning and craft production took place, in the coastal town of Brava for example, and very limited industrial production took place around Mogadishu. In general terms, the Somali economy is dominated by pastoralism (the herding of ruminant animals on bush land), agro-pastoralism (farming with pastoralism) and farming (cereal production and horticulture). Pastoralists raise camels, sheep, cattle, and goats. Camels provide meat, are a means of transportation of goods, and are sold as livestock. The principal agricultural region is in the inter-riverine region in the south, although there is also farm production in the north-west. The central and north-eastern zones are more suited to pastoral modes of adaptation ( Brons 2001 ). The control of banana production in the inter-riverine area became a central source of conflict between the different clan factions in the Lower Shabelle region in the mid to late 1990s. Large-scale dispossession of farmers in the inter-riverine areas has occurred due to warfare between different clan factions and the continuing effort to control resources in this region ( Besteman and Cassanelli 1996 ).

Today, Somalia is one of the poorest Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the world. Its economy has been crippled by the destruction of physical infrastructure during the years of civil war and clan conflict. The ban on livestock export by the Gulf states in the late 1990s has added to the overall economic insecurity in Somalia. There have been positive economic developments since 1991.The growth in telecommunications linked to the international banking system has been a particularly important development ( Perouse de Monclos 2000 ). The US-forced closure of Somali-owned Al-Barakaat banking and telecommunications systems in 2001, after charges of aiding terrorism, has had a damaging economic impact on the transfer of remittances to Somalia ( see Section 6.1 ).

Websites:

World Health Organisation http://www.who.int/country/som/en/

Africa Action http://www.africaaction.org/docs01/som0111.htm

Conflict-induced displacement

The history of forced migration in Somalia is directly related to the armed conflict that began with the Ogaden war in 1977. From being a major refugee-receiving country in the 1970s, the stream of refugees out of Somalia gained pace from 1988 onwards and escalated throughout the 1990s. Drought, flooding, and famine have combined with warfare to cause the mass flight of refugees and the large-scale displacement of Somalis inside the country.

Internal displacement

At the height of fighting in 1992, up to 2 million Somalis were internally displaced. By the end of 2002, rough estimates indicated that more than 350,000 Somalis were internally displaced, most of them women and children. This is approximately 5 per cent of the Somali population. About 150,000 of this number lived in Mogadishu, with approximately 15,000 in the port of Kismayo. The remainder were scattered throughout the country. An upsurge of inter-factional fighting during 2001-3 and a third consecutive year of drought in 2002 have pushed Somalia into a further cycle of population displacement.

The main causes of internal displacement have been the looting and destruction of food stocks, grazing lands, and trading roads. The destruction of the livelihoods of opposing clan factions has been a major instrument of the conflicts. The areas most affected have been in the south: Gedo, Bay, Bakool, the Lower and Middle Juba, and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Many IDPs come from the Bantu, Bajuni, and minority clans including the Rahanweyn. IDPs typically concentrate in urban areas such as Hargeisa (Somaliland), Bossaso (Puntland), and Mogadishu, where they mix with other indigent groups and refugees. They are typically located on the fringes of urban areas and are forced to make livelihoods through begging and casual work. As IDPs are dispersed amongst other groups, their living conditions are difficult to estimate. What evidence there is suggests high levels of undernourishment, disease, and vulnerability to human rights abuse. Most IDPs lack the protection of clans and effective social support. In reality, the de facto authorities throughout Somalia fail to protect the displaced and often divert humanitarian assistance intended for IDPs.

Websites:

Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council, Somalia, June 2003 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Somalia

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Internal Displacement Unit http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/partners/global.htm

Global IDP Database, 'Internally displaced women and girls lack protection', 2003 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/D00777446A9FCC69C12569910053C25A?OpenDocument

Global IDP Database, 'Displaced people from minority groups seriously lack protection', 2002 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/B12EF9EAD9406E94C12569910054BC43?OpenDocument

Global IDP Database, 'Displaced children lack protection', 2003 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/05A658225C529027C1256D44005A7B8A?OpenDocument

Global IDP Database: Resources http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults?SearchView&Query=somalia&SearchMax=50&SearchWV=TRUE&SearchOrder=1&SearchThesaurus=FALSE&Seq=1

Global IDP Database, 'Most IDPs have no access to drinking water and sanitation facilities', 2002 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/91865BAE73940A68C12569910058C442?OpenDocument

Disaster-induced displacement

Development-induced displacement

Barre's socialist experiments in the 1970s included the wholesale nationalisation of the economy and the marginalisation of pastoral producers. The attempt to control pastoral production resulted in disruptions to the traditional means of risk management. It was this factor which turned the 1974-5 drought into a major famine in the north and resulted in over 20,000 deaths. At the time, 10-15 per cent of the pastoral population were forced to register in relief camps. Widespread crop failures contributed to the effects of the drought. In line with the aim of domesticating pastoral producers, the Barre government transferred over 100,000 nomads from relief camps in the north to three sites in the arable areas of southern Somalia ( Ahmed and Green 1999 ).

The Somali diaspora

Refugees fleeing Somalia after 1988 added to the Somali migrant workers already living in the Gulf and Western Europe. In addition to the refugees who fled to Yemen, Djibouti, and Libya, there are now established communities of Somalis living in North America and Europe. In Europe, although the Scandinavian countries were the favoured destination for Somalis in the 1988-94 period, by the end of the decade the UK had vastly outstripped all other countries, accounting for 53 per cent of all Somali applicants to Europe in 1999: some 7,000 individuals. By the fourth quarter of 2002 Somalia was the third-largest country of origin for asylum seekers to the UK. The presence in the UK of established Somali communities going back to the nineteenth century is an important factor in explaining migration patterns. Today there are Somali communities in most of the UK's major cities. In Cardiff the organisation Support Somaliland aims to link the Somaliland community in Wales to their homeland. It has established links with the Academy for Peace and Development in Hargeisa. Other organisations, such as the Takawal Somali women's group based in East London, also aim to promote community development in both London and Somaliland.

E-mail and telecommunications have enabled Somalis to stay in touch with their relatives at home or in the diaspora. The Somaliland Forum is an internet-based organisation with a few hundred members dispersed across North America, Europe, and the Middle East. The growing Hawilad system of fax and e-mail companies for the transmission of remittance has been an important factor in the economic revival of Somalia in the last decade. It has been calculated that an average $200-500 million is transferred to Somalia through the Hawilad system (Perous de Monclos 2000). The diaspora has therefore played an important role in the economic regeneration of Somalia.

Websites:

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics

Somaliland Forum http://www.somalilandforum.com

Takawal Lifeline Somali Women's Group (London) http://www.tawakal.co.uk/

Vulnerable groups

Civil society

The development of grassroots initiatives in Somalia has been amongst the most positive developments since the collapse of the state in 1991. The absence of a centralised state has not resulted in a descent into anarchy in Somalia. Although the goal of a central state is kept alive by some Somali warlords and the UN, this no longer matches the political reality on the ground. The distinctive feature of developments since the final withdrawal of the UN in 1995 has been an enlarged role for the organs of civil society These include a wide and variable range of categories from elders, faction leaders, clerics, women's groups, and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The Guurti meetings of clan elders have emerged as a source of political stability and conflict resolution ( Brons 2001: 287 ). The Shiekh and Borama conferences in Somaliland in 1992 and 1993, the basis of state-formation, involved a large spectrum of different groups including minority clans, women, and religious leaders ( Farah and Lewis 1993 ). In Puntland, the Garowe Constitutional Conference in 1998 paved the way for state formation and mediation between clan elders and the leaders of the political factions.

After the demise of the centralised state and the weakening of the clan-based militias that followed, traditional forms of clan authority have re-emerged as the basis for the developing political administrations in Somalia. This in turn has generated disputes over the boundaries of the different regional authorities, as has been the case in relation to Somaliland and Puntland. In the south of the country, where the conflict over territorial rights as a result of land expropriation remains a key political issue, the role of bottom-up political developments has also been curtailed. During the period of UN interventions ( see Section 5.1.3 ), efforts by the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to sponsor District Councils were short-lived and largely unsuccessful, as they lacked the local support which have made clan-based initiatives more enduring.

Website:

Helder, B., Mukhtar, M. H., and Lewis, I. M., 'Building from below? A critical review of the District Councils in the Bay and Bakool regions of southern Somalia', April 1995 http://arlaadinet.com/History/D&MHistory/building_peace_from_below.htm

International community

In practice, the UN has begun to work with and not against the grain of the new political developments in Somalia, through its UN Development Programme (UNDP) for Returning Refugees and IDPs, in collaboration with the UNHCR and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The UNDP programme of 'quick impact' projects, covering areas such as sanitation and health, aims to aid the reintegration of refugees. UNDP is active in both Somaliland and Puntland in the areas of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration.

The World Bank in collaboration with UNDP has funded experts to participate in the Resource Mobilisation Reconciliation Committee of the Somali national reconciliation process. The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has also conducted workshops for Somali women representatives at the Eldoret Conference. UNIFEM is active in the different regions of Somalia, carrying out training sessions on human rights and international conventions. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) are also active in various projects in the different regions of Somalia.

The Trust Fund for Peace-building in Somalia receives financial contributions from UN Member States. The Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB), which was set up in 1993, consists of the main multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies, and NGO consortia. After the departure of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), eight UN organisations have maintained their humanitarian and rehabilitation roles in Somalia. The SACB provides one important means for the UN to keep in contact with the international donor community. The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal also promotes a series of projects designed to assist vulnerable households and communities in Somalia.

Websites:

Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia: United Nations Security Council, 10 June 2003 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2002/sgrep02.htm

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) http://www.unhcr.org/

United Nations OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 'Latest news from Somalia' http://irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=Somalia

United Nations Development Programme, 'UNDP in Somalia' http://www.so.undp.org/

UNDP Human Development Report 2002 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/

United Nations and Somalia http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/SOMALIA.pdf

United Nations documentation http://www.un.org/documents/

United Nations Population Fund http://www.unfpa.org/arabstates/somalia/dp200229.doc

UNICEF http://www.unicef.org

UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) http://www.unifem.org

International NGOs

Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/

CARE International in Somalia http://www.careinternational.org.uk/cares_work/where/somalia/

CARE: Somalia http://careusa.org/careswork/countryprofiles/somalia.asp

Christian Aid http://www.christian-aid.org.uk

Global IDP Project Database http://www.idpproject.org/about_the_database.htm

Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org

Oxfam: Somalia http://www.oxfam.org.uk/atwork/where/africa/somaliland.htm

Save the Children Fund (UK) http://www.scfuk.org.uk

Somali Red Crescent Society http://www.ifrc.org/address/so.asp

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: Somalia http://www.ifrc.org/where/country/cn6.asp?countryid=157

Electronic sources

AllSomaliaNews.com http://www.allsomalianews.com

ArlaadiNet.com http://Arlaadinet.com/

AsylumLaw.org http://www.asylumlaw.org

Banadir http://www.banadir.com

International Census Collection Online Catalog, University of Texas (Austin) http://www.lib.utexas.edu/pcl/icc/

NomadNet http://www.netnomad.com/

Qorahay Online (Somali-language site) http://www.qorahay.com/

Somalilander http://www.somalilander.org

Somaliland Net http://www.somalilandnet.com

Somali Press Online (Somali-language site) http://www.somalipress.com/

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