Historical background

Iraq is the site of a number of the earliest civilisations, including those of the Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, and Assyrians. The capital of the Abbasid caliphate was established in Baghdad in the eighth century and the city became a famous centre for learning and the arts. Since then Iraq has moved through periods of Ottoman control and British administration, finally gaining independence in 1932. In 1933 a revolt by the small Christian Assyrian community culminated in a governmental military crackdown and loss of lives, setting a precedent for internal minority uprisings in Iraq. Domestic politics remained turbulent, with many factions contending for power. Late in 1936, the country experienced the first of many military coups that were to characterise Iraqi politics over the next fifty years.

In 1958 Iraq was declared a Republic and Islam the national religion. In 1963 members of the Iraqi Ba'ath party, a socialist group whose overall goal was Arab unity, dominated the regime that seized power. Iraq took an active part in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (as it had also done in 1948). In early 1974, years of border conflicts with Iran culminated in heavy, armed clashes along the entire length of their border. At this time, Iraq's acquired wealth from its oil revenues enabled the establishment of modernisation programs and improved public services throughout the country. By 1979, the year that Saddam Hussein came to power, Iraq was the most highly developed state in the region.

Websites:

Middle Eastern Political Geography, 1UpInfo Encyclopaedia, http://www.1upinfo.com/encyclopedia/I/Iraq-history-the-ascension-of-saddam-hussein.html

History of Iraq, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Iraq

Politics

The Iraqi Ba'ath party was one of the tools with which Saddam Hussein maintained a tight grip on his country. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party was founded in Syria in the 1940s by a small group of French-educated Syrian intellectuals - Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim. The word Ba'ath means 'renaissance' in Arabic. The party's ideology is pan-Arab, secular nationalism. A committed Ba'athist should see individual Arab states as regions or provinces of the larger Arab nation. The party is secular, and in the beginning, was steeped in socialist ideology.

The Iraqi Ba'ath party was founded in 1951 and had 500 members three years later. Though the Ba'ath party was formally the institution that ruled Iraq, actual power was in the hands of a narrow elite united by family and tribal ties, not ideology. During the 1970s surnames were abolished to attempt to disguise this - identification cards and birth certificates recorded only the individual's first name and father's name.

In the late 1980s, the party claimed more than 1.5 million members, about 10 percent of Iraqis. The party had a highly regimented structure. At the lowest level, the village, it had cells of between three and seven people, rising up to regional commands and a national command. In the 1980s, the socialist ideology of the party accommodated itself to capitalism. Nationalised industries were privatised. Iraqi businessmen trying to take advantage of the country's oil wealth often pursued their ambitions through the party.

Website:

Kafala, Tarik, 'The Iraqi Ba'ath Party', BBC News Online, 25 March 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/2886733.stm

Ethnicity, religion, and society

Although about 95 percent of Iraq's population is Muslim, the community is split between Sunnis and Shi'ites; the latter group, a minority in the Arab world as a whole, constitutes a majority in Iraq. Estimates of the number of Shi'a vary from 54 to 70 per cent. The Sunnis believe that after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, leadership should be in the hands of the community at large, while the Shi'a believe the descendants of the prophet should lead.

The most important exception to the Arab character of Iraq is the large Kurdish minority, estimated at 19 per cent of the population. The Kurds are a distinct group of people who have inhabited the Middle East for as long as there have been written records. Most live in an area located at the intersection of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia. The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, mostly in the Sinjar Mountains west of Mosul. According to official government statistics, Turkomans and other Turkish-speaking peoples account for only 2 to 3 per cent of the population. The Turkomans are village dwellers living in the north-east along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. Prior to the 2003 US-led invasion, Christians made up nearly 4 per cent of the population of Iraq.

Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, the mother tongue for the Arab majority. Kurdish is spoken in northern Iraq; the Turkomans converse in Turkish; and Farsi is spoken by some tribal groups. The Assyrians, descendants of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, speak Aramaic.

Given the richness of Iraq's religions and ethnicities, it is not surprising that Iraqi society is composed of sizeable and distinct social groups whose differences and divisions have been only slowly and fitfully challenged by the emergence of a strong, centralised political regime and state apparatus. Moreover, there are regional and environmental differences between the scattered mountain villages, whose economic base is rain-fed grain crops, and the more densely populated riverside communities to the south that are dependent on intricate irrigation and drainage systems for their livelihood. Just before the Iran-Iraq War, the sharp cleavage between the rural and urban communities that formerly characterised Iraqi society started to break down as a result of policies instituted by the government. The war accelerated this process. Continuous fighting has devastated large areas of the rural south, which triggered a massive rural migration to the capital.

Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many activities. Rights and obligations centre on the extended family and the lineage. The family remains the primary focus of loyalty; and it is in this context, rather than the broader one of corporate loyalties defined by sectarian, ethnic, or economic considerations, that the majority of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a matter of course. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners since they are believed to be more reliable than persons over whom one does not have the hold of kinship ties.

Websites:

1UpInfo Encyclopaedia, Middle Eastern Political Geography http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/iraq/iraq25.html

International Crisis Group (ICG): 'Iraq Backgrounder: What lies beneath', 1 October 2002 http://www.icg.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400786_01102002.pdf

Geography and economy

Iraq is located in the Middle East. It is bordered by Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, Syria to the north-west, Jordan to the west, Saudi Arabia to the south-west, and Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to the south-east. The country can be divided into four main topographical regions: (1) the north-eastern highlands, which include the Zagros Mountains; (2) the upland between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which is mostly desert; (3) a marshland region just above the convergence of the two rivers; and (4) the extensive, barren, rock and sand desert region in the south and west, which constitute part of the Great Arabian and Syrian Deserts. Around 38 per cent of the total land area is desert. The principal rivers are the Tigris and Euphrates.

Iraq has an arid climate with hot, dry summers from May to October and cold winters from December to March. Most of the rainfall occurs from December to March. In Baghdad the average annual precipitation is 140 mm (6 inches), whilst in the north-east, where it is highest, it varies from 400 to 600 mm (16 to 23 inches) annually. Elsewhere, rainfall is low and unreliable. The prevailing winds are the Sharqi or Sirocco, a south-easterly dry, dust-laden wind, and the Shamal, a north-westerly dry, cool wind. Average temperature in Baghdad ranges from 4ºC to 16ºC (39ºF to 61ºF) in January, to 24ºC to 50ºC (75ºF to 122ºF) in July or August.

The oil industry dominated Iraq's economy, traditionally accounting for nearly 95 per cent of the country's revenues. Oil exports, which suffered during the Iran-Iraq War, improved during the late 1980s, only to be severely decreased by the sanctions of the Gulf War. Aside from petroleum production and refining, Iraq has a small, diversified industrial sector, including the production of chemicals, textiles, cement, food products, construction materials, leather goods, and machinery. New industries have been started in electronics products, fertilisers, and refined sugar. Agricultural production, which employs about a third of the workforce, has been severely hampered by the import restrictions arising from sanctions, and is not sufficient to meet the country's food requirements. Iraq's chief crops include wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates (Iraq is one of the world's largest producers), and cotton. Cattle and sheep are also raised.

Iraq is highly dependent on foreign economic aid, from both Western and Arab countries. Sanctions have reduced both exports and imports needed to run the agricultural sector effectively, contributing to a sharp rise in prices. More than two decades of war, national mismanagement and sanctions have left Iraq with debts of an estimated US$262 billion.

Websites:

1UpInfo Encyclopaedia, Country Study and Guide: Iraq http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/iraq/iraq25.html

Altapedia Online, Countries A-Z http://www.atlapedia.com/online/countries/iraq.htm

The CIA World Factbook 2007 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

Jubilee Research: Briefing on Debt in Iraq http://www.jubileeresearch.org/databank/Briefings/iraq170403.htm

OXFAM Briefing Paper No. 48: 'A Fresh Start for Iraq: The case for debt relief', May 2003 http://publications.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam/display.asp?K=20040623_2316_000028

Political violence prior to the 2003 US-led invasion

Iraq was an autocratic state that allowed no political dissent. Of vital importance to the maintenance of Saddam Hussein’s regime was the vast and infamous security apparatus that he controlled directly through his youngest son Qusai. The government's security apparatus included militias attached to the President, the Ba'ath party, and the Interior Ministry. These played a central role in maintaining an environment of intimidation and fear.

Iraqi people were afraid of expressing any opinion that could have been deemed negative of the government, anywhere, to anyone. The Iraqi government has been known to carry out random arrests of thousands of citizens, subjecting them to inhuman treatment, in order to flush out any opposition. According to Human Rights Watch, 'Arbitrary arrest is a powerful tool for the repression of political dissent. The knowledge that the knock on the door could come at any hour is enough to inspire terror in most people. But it is only one, and in fact the most gentle of those that the Iraqi regime is known to employ.'

The United Nations Security Council created a special commission on human rights in Iraq in March 1991 and requested its chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to make 'a thorough study of the violations of human rights by the government of Iraq.' The Special Rapporteur Max Van der Stoel reported on 26 March 1992 that violations of human rights by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein were 'one of the worst since World War Two - comparable in gravity to crimes of the Khmer Rouge (in Cambodia) or Idi Amin (in Uganda).' Reports from the commission have listed the following human rights violations:

'Summary and arbitrary executions, orchestrated mass executions and burials, extrajudicial killings including political killings, in particular in the northern region of Iraq, in southern Shi'a centres and in the southern marshes;

Political opponents were expelled or forced to flee Iraq regardless of their ethnic or religious background. Such persecution dates back to the 1950s, with stronger trends in the 1970s and 1990s. One such example is the Iraqi Communist Party. In terms of organised political opposition inside Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party was one of the organisations that bore the brunt of the repression by successive governments, as leading figures and cadres of the Party were tortured to death or executed. However, in Iraq the ethnic or religious group with which you were affiliated was enough to subject you to the wrath of the regime. Two groups in particular have suffered under Saddam Hussein’s rule: the Kurds living in northern Iraq and the Shi'ites living in and around the southern marshes of Iraq. The persecution of these groups continued throughout his rule, and intensified in the aftermath of international conflicts.

Websites:

Iraqi Prospect Organisation http://www.iprospect.org.uk/

Human Rights Watch Iraq http://www.hrw.org/mideast/iraq.php

Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Iraq's human rights http://www.unhchr.ch/

Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program List of Iraqi Intelligence Agencies http://fas.org/irp/world/iraq/index.html

Population movements up to March 2003

Population movements as a result of conflict and political violence have characterised Iraq’s social landscape for decades. They fall into three main categories: internally displaced people; refugees inside Iraq; and Iraqi exiles.

'Operation Iraqi Freedom'

On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to back a US-British resolution (no. 1441) requiring Iraq to reinstate weapons inspectors after a four-year absence. One month later Iraqi officials in Baghdad presented the UN with a 12,000-page dossier disclosing Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction, as demanded by the UN resolution. On the basis of this report, the United States accused Baghdad of being in 'material breach' of the UN resolution. Despite intense diplomatic efforts, on 5 March 2003 the foreign ministers of France, Russia, and Germany released a joint declaration stating that they would 'not allow' a resolution authorising military action to pass the UN Security Council. With China, France, and Russia opposed to an attack, the US and UK abandoned hope of gaining Security Council support for a second resolution authorising war on Iraq. On 20 March 2003, shortly after the 48-hour deadline for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq had expired, America launched its first series of air strikes on Baghdad. Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court on 5 November after a year-long trial over the killings of 148 Shias from the town of Dujail in the 1980s. On 30 December 2006, the former Iraqi leader was hanged in northern Baghdad for crimes against humanity. In a statement, Iraq's Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki, said the execution had closed a dark chapter in Iraq's history.

Website:

Saddam Hussein executed in Iraq, 30 December 2006, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm

Political progress

On 28 June 2004, with the declared end of occupation by U.S.-led coalition forces and the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.-led coalition transferred sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG). U.S.-led forces remain in Iraq under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on June 8, 2004, creating the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and giving the MNF-I “the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,” working with the IIG.

With the transfer of sovereignty, the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) was instigated and remained in effect until “the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution”. The TAL contained a bill of rights for Iraqi citizens, including the right to freedom of expression and association, religious beliefs, and freedom from discrimination on ethnic, religious or other grounds. The law also stipulated that all citizens are equal before the law, and enjoy freedom from arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention, unfair trials and torture.

On January 30, 2005, Iraq held elections for twenty government bodies, including a Transitional National Assembly. The U.N.-assisted elections were declared a success, but they took place under conditions of extreme insecurity and political turmoil that, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), made it impossible for every eligible voter to freely make a choice.

The parliament that emerged from elections in December 2005 re-elected Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani to a second term in April 2006. He heads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq. The first non-Arab to head an Arab state, he has promised to work with all ethnic and religious factions to rebuild Iraq. President Talabani asked Shia politican Jawad al-Maliki to form Iraq's first full-term government since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Mr Maliki was the compromise candidate of the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance, the winners of parliamentary polls in December 2005. Kurdish and Sunni parties opposed the alliance's first nominee, interim Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari, who withdrew his candidature after four months of political deadlock. Mr Maliki is the deputy leader of the Dawaa Party, a Shia Islamist grouping. Mr Maliki helped to draft Iraq's new constitution, approved by voters in October 2005.

Websites:

Iraq, World Report 2005, Human Rights Overview, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/pdf/iraq.pdf

Iraqi Elections: Human Rights Concerns, Questions and Answers from Human Rights Watch, 23-1-05, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/21/iraq10058.htm

Country Profile: Iraq, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791014.stm

A security vacuum

Despite reaching a number of political landmarks, the Iraqi Government has been unable to restore law and order and the general climate across large parts of the country is one of impunity. Growing violence and armed opposition to authority has been most pronounced in areas where there is still a degree of ethnic and religious diversity. Violence is a critical, all-pervasive characteristic in the lives of people in many parts of Iraq. Both Sunni and Shi’a armed groups carry out direct attacks against civilians through suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, abductions, extrajudicial executions, large-scale insurgency attacks, and other criminal activities. No distinction is made between combatants and civilians. Everyone is a target – young and old, rich and poor. While civilian casualties are often concentrated in and around Baghdad, violence is common across many of the southern and central governorates. In addition, the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), Iraqi Special Forces, as well as insurgents, have been implicated in serious violations of the laws of armed conflict, as well as violations of human rights. These events have seriously impeded efforts to restore a sense of normality to ordinary people’s lives.

The level of violence in different areas of Iraq does currently vary a great deal. Security in Iraqi Kurdistan is better than in other parts of the country, and reconstruction efforts there, which started in the 1990s, are also much more advanced than in the Centre and South. The insurgency - and counter-insurgency operations - is concentrated in central Iraq. Violence in the South of the country is acute but more sporadic than in the Centre.

Estimates or counts of casualty figures range from 67,000 to 655,000 deaths as a direct or indirect consequence of the US-led invasion of 2003, the majority being young men. In 2006, an average of 94 civilians was killed violently in Iraq each day. According to Iraq’s Health Minister, for every person killed about three have been wounded.

Websites:

"IRAQ EMERGENCY SITUATION", Trends in violence, Humanitarian needs, Preparedness, a study conducted by NCCI and Oxfam GB, 2 May 2006, http://www.ncciraq.org/IMG/pdf/NCCI_-_Iraq_Emergency_Situation_-_Final_Report_-_2nd_May_2006.pdf

ICG, 'Baghdad: A Race Against the Clock', 11 June 2003 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1826

ICG, 'War in Iraq: Political challenges after the conflict', 25 March 2003 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1684&l=1

Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional, cluster sample survey, Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, Les Roberts, The Lancet, www.thelancet.com, Published online October 11, 2006, http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf

Civilian deaths due to insurgent/military action and criminal violence, Iraq Body Count (IBC), http://www.iraqbodycount.org/

UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1 November – 31 December 2006, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf

Iraqi official: War dead 100,000, BBC News, 2006/11/10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6135526.stm

Official: 150,000 Iraqis Killed Since 2003 Iraqi Health Minister Says Three Injured For Every Person Killed Since U.S.-Led Invasion, CBS News, VIENNA, Austria, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/09/iraq/main2165206.shtml

Critical humanitarian needs

Iraq's current needs and responses should be viewed not only in the context of the latest conflict, but also in terms of two decades of decline and suffering. The public infrastructure in Iraq, heavily damaged during the 1991 Gulf War, has been disintegrating ever since through years of neglect, due to a shortage of spare parts for maintenance and repair, and funds to pay staff salaries. Water and sanitation facilities have suffered greatly for more than a decade due to serious energy shortages caused by damage to the electricity grid.

Even prior to the latest conflict, sixteen million Iraqis were dependent on food aid under the UN Oil for Food Programme and rates of chronic malnutrition in Iraq were worrying (11 per cent in the north and 23 per cent in the centre and south of the country). Since the imposition of sanctions, healthcare in Iraq has suffered from a lack of equipment and drugs needed to treat acute and chronic illnesses. Healthcare has also become increasingly centralised - the Oil for Food Programme put the Iraqi government in control of the distribution of humanitarian supplies - and less sensitive to the specific needs of different groups of the population.

Operation Iraqi Freedom compounded the shortfalls of the already weak infrastructure that the Iraqi people have endured since sanctions were imposed. With a devastated infrastructure, and conflict and civil disorder undermining relief and reconstruction efforts, Iraqis face immediate threats to their health, nutrition, livelihoods and security. In the long-term, establishing social and economic justice and security will be essential for lasting peace in Iraq so that the lives of the Iraqi people can resume a sense of normalcy, and those that want to return can do so.

The security vacuum that has characterised post-war Iraq to date has led to a breakdown in essential services including electricity and safe water, and shortages in medical supplies and access to treatment facilities. Apart from the damage to physical infrastructure, the professional class has been targeted resulting in a dire shortage of doctors and medical specialists, as well as teachers and university staff. According to the Brookings Institution, 12,000 out of 34,000 doctors have left Iraq, 250 have been kidnapped and 200 killed since 2003.

Up to 8 million people are classified as being vulnerable, according to an estimate based on information gathered by the Iraq UN Country Team: 2 million are estimated to be refugees/asylum seekers; nearly 2 million are estimated to be IDPs; and 4 million are estimated to be acutely vulnerable due to food insecurity. There has been a severe decline in standard of living, and a massive increase in the rate of unemployment – some estimates put the figure as high as 60 percent. 54 percent of the population is living on less that 1 US Dollar a day and 15 percent of those on less that 0.5 US Dollars a day. Acute malnutrition rose from 4.4 percent in 2003 to 9 percent in 2005. Inflation stood at 70 percent in July 2006. Only 32 of the population has access to safe drinking water, even fewer people have effective sanitation, while in some parts of Iraq, levels of electricity are at an all time low. While several immunization campaigns have been successfully undertaken by the Ministry of Health, generally speaking, health services are in a catastrophic situation and even basic health needs cannot be met.

The World Food Programme’s (WFP) most recent reckoning of food insecurity in Iraq, released in May, 2006 before inter-communal violence and humanitarian access became markedly worse, estimated that over 4 million Iraqis were already food insecure and an additional 8.3 million people, or nearly 32 percent of Iraq’s population, were at risk of food insecurity if not provided with a daily ration under the Public Distribution System (PDS). This is an increase from the estimated 2.6 million which were found to be ‘extremely poor’ in WFP’s 2004 Baseline Survey. Many Iraqis are forced to sell their PDS rations to buy fresh food, medicine or pay for house rental. Research undertaken inside Iraq in November and December 2006 suggested that problems with the PDS were serious and increasingly widespread, particularly in the central governorates.

As NCCI explains, the combination of military operations, sectarian and political violence, criminality and lawlessness, has devastating humanitarian consequences for Iraq’s civilians in terms of death, injury, illness, displacement, denial of fundamental human rights, destruction of homes, vital facilities and infrastructure, as well as for humanitarian actors seeking to meet their needs – in terms of a decrease in available resources, ability to respond in a timely manner, and to access populations in need.

Websites:

Guardian Unlimited Timeline: Iraq timeline: July 16 1979 to January 31 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html

OXFAM: Iraq War and Peace http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education/resources/iraq/

ICG, 'War in Iraq: Political challenges after the conflict', 25 March 2003 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1684&l=1

Reliefweb - http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=ACOS-635P5D&rc=3Save the Children

The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, July 9, 2007, http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

UNAMI Human Rights report, 1 January – 31 March 2007, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Jan%20Mar%202007%20EN.pdf

"IRAQ EMERGENCY SITUATION", Trends in violence, Humanitarian needs, Preparedness, a study conducted by NCCI and Oxfam GB, 2 May 2006, http://www.ncciraq.org/IMG/pdf/NCCI_-_Iraq_Emergency_Situation_-_Final_Report_-_2nd_May_2006.pdf

New displacement within Iraq

There had been estimates that 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' would cause displacement of more than 1 million people within Iraq and across Iraq's borders. However, while there was considerable movement of populations within Iraq, at the time relatively few people sought refuge internationally, and the majority of those that did were nationals of other countries resident in Iraq. However, displacement, both within Iraq and internationally has since spiralled.

The conflict inside Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion has resulted in the largest displacement in the region since the displacement of Palestinians in 1948. According to the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 1 in 8 Iraqis has been forcibly uprooted, and according to UNHCR estimates, 40,000-60,000 are leaving their homes on a monthly basis. Homogenization is occurring at an alarming rate in many parts of the Centre and South of Iraq and many IDPs are being displaced more than once.

A report issued by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) covering the first part of 2007 states that the number of displaced people is increasing at an average of 80,000-100,000 a month. The IRCS, the only humanitarian relief agency on the ground, said the nearly 67 percent increase in the number of displaced families since last January of 2006 "is intensifying an already unstable situation". According to the report, by the end of June 2007 there were over one million people that became displaced since the latest conflict, of whom 37.5 percent were children under 12; 32.8 percent were women and 29.7 percent were men. Topping the list of areas with most IDPs was the capital Baghdad with 41,969 families; second was Mosul Province with 15,063 families; and third was Salaheddin Province, about 200km north of Baghdad, with 12,781.

According to the Global IDP Database Project, initially the largest new population displacements were the result of fighting between the US-led Coalition Forces and Iraqi insurgents, particularly in and around Fallujah and Najaf. The US attack on Fallujah is estimated to have displaced more than 200,000 of the city's 390,000 population. In addition to Fallujah, continuing waves of displacement were caused by fighting between US-led military forces and Iraqi insurgents in the country in 2004, in and around the cities of Najaf, Kufa, Kerbala and Samarrah. Across the country, small numbers of people were also forcibly displaced by the Coalition Forces for reasons of ‘national security.’, despite the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities, Coalition Forces, and combatants, as outlined in Guiding Principle 5, to take measures to protect civilian populations to "prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons".

A second cause of displacement has been the continuing return of hundreds of thousands of Kurds to northern Iraq who are reclaiming property and land confiscated from them by the former regime under its "Arabisation" policy, without proper arrangement for the Arab tenants who currently occupy them. Either as a direct result of Kurdish return movements, or out of fear of revenge attacks, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are reported to have fled. Many have sought refuge in non-Kurdish areas north and north-east of Baghdad. At the same time, other Kurds who spontaneously returned to the north have been unable to reclaim their properties and are now secondarily displaced. Likewise, refugees from Iran and Saudi Arabia have also returned and many of them have become internally displaced in the centre and south of the country.

Since the bombing of the Shi’a Al-Askari shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006, sectarian violence has been the leading cause of displacement, in the form of indiscriminate attacks and retaliations. Other reasons for the increase in the number of IDPs are general lawlessness, lack of basic services, unresolved property disputes, and continued fighting between insurgents and the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I). The total number of people displaced inside Iraq has reached 2 million.

Websites:

IDMC, Iraq page http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B9?opendocument&count=10000

Iraq: Number of IDPs tops one million, says Iraqi Red Crescent, Date: 09 Jul 2007 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LRON-74XGA4?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=ACOS-635P5D, Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)

The challenge of unresolved property disputes

As of 31 May 2007, the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), an independent agency of the Government of Iraq, previously known as the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC), had received 132,038 claims, of which 34,649 have been decided. The Commission is responsible for settling claims by people who lost property as a result of actions of the former regime during the period from 1968 to April 2003. Successful claimants whose cases have been resolved have started to receive the title deeds to their properties, and the CRRPD has begun to make payments of compensation. The CRRPD has offices in every governorate in Iraq and a staff of over 1,400 to process the claims, which are decided by one of 35 Judicial Committees at first instance and, in case of appeal, by a Cassation Commission in Baghdad.

On 6 February 2007, the High Commission on the Implementation of Article 140, regarding the status of Kirkuk, announced Orders Nos. 3 and 4, which were intended to commence the process of relocating Arab families that moved to Kirkuk during the “Arabisation” campaign of Saddam Hussein. The Orders, which require approval by the executive branch, offer compensation to relocated families. The announcement by the Commission was followed by demonstrations in Kirkuk by opponents of the measure, who claimed it was tantamount to forced displacement. In response, Commissioners clarified that the relocation and compensation mechanisms were strictly voluntary and that 7,000 families had reportedly registered for relocation. More than 50,000 Kirkuk-related claims have been filed with the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes to date.

Concerns remain as to how adequately the claims can be addressed, taking into account the needs and rights of the different communities, and identifying solutions for the relocated Arabs in the north. There is also concern that prolonged delay in processing property claims could lead to an escalation of inter-ethnic violence, political instability and further displacement.

Websites:

IDMC, Iraq page http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B9?opendocument&count=10000

Iraq: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (S/2007/126), Date: 07 Mar 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6Z8KTN?OpenDocument Source: United Nations Security Council

Iraq Property Claims Programme (IPCP), Ongoing Programme, IOM Iraq, http://iom-iraq.net/ipcp.html

Refugees inside Iraq

Sectarian violence and the deteriorating humanitarian situation have severely affected Iraq’s refugee communities that number some 50,000 people. Palestinian, Syrian, and Iranian refugees have been targeted in deliberate discrimination and attacks. The refugees are reported to have faced increasing searches, destruction to property and arbitrary detention.

In particular, the situation and security of around 34,000 Palestinian refugees has deteriorated drastically. It is thought that more than 500 Palestinians have been murdered. Thousands of Palestinian refugees have been displaced inside Iraq and hundreds more have tried to flee to Jordan and Syria, where many are waiting on the border in camps. There is currently one camp on the Syrian side of the border, one in no-man's land, and one on the Iraqi side of the border. The total number of Palestinians living in these camps, some of whom are in critical need of medical attention, is estimated to be 1,400. Their condition is becoming increasingly desperate as the summer heat intensifies.

Websites:

Iraq: Situation Report - Week in Review, 1 - 15 Jan 2005, UNAMI, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-697HN6?OpenDocument

Iraq: No man's land refugees, UNHCR, 10 Dec 2004, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JMAN-67JJ2M?OpenDocument

UNHCR update on the Iraq situation, UNHCR, 30 November 2006, available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/LSGZ-6W2F7S?OpenDocument&RSS20=18-P

Nowhere to Flee, Human Rights Watch Vol.18, No4 (E), September 2006, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq0706/iraq0706sumandrecs.pdf

Iraq-Syria: Plight of Palestinian refugees in border camps worsens, Date: 27 Jun 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EDIS-74KKU2?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=ACOS-635P5D, Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)

Exodus from Iraq

There are an estimated 1.4 million Iraqis seeking refuge in Syria, and a further 750,000 in Jordan, despite the fact that neither Syria nor Jordan is signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Jordan and Syria consider Iraqis as “guests” rather than refugees fleeing violence. By comparison, other countries with common borders with Iraq - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Iran - have allowed in very few Iraqis.

To enter Jordan, Iraqi refugees must be over 40 or under 20, must prove they have sufficient funds to support themselves in the kingdom and, most importantly, must hold a new 'G' generation passport. Iraqis in Jordan are not recognized as refugees by the Jordanian government and therefore most are living illegally in the country, unable to work lawfully and in constant fear of deportation. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for Iraqis to enter Jordan or to renew their visas to remain in country. Once in Jordan, children are not allowed to attend public schools and Iraqis have to pay for most basic services.

Syria has been the most open country to Iraqi refugees, allowing them to enter without stringent visa requirements, to come and go, to settle freely and to access basic services, although it has begun imposing restrictions, such as charges for healthcare that used to be free. Syria continues to receive about 2,000 Iraqis a day and about 30,000 a month end up staying. Some residency conditions have now been imposed: refugees can stay a maximum of three months and then they have to renew their residency by leaving the country and returning. As with Jordan, the basic entry stamp precludes legal employment, placing an increased financial burden on families. Those who have managed to find work are working in diverse fields: barbers, bakers, beauticians, imams, art dealers and others. However, many, if not most Iraqis in Syria are unemployed. Some are able to draw on Iraqi pensions, others arrange for agents in Iraq sell off property.

Up to 150,000 Iraqis have settled in Egypt. Wary of the massive influx experienced in Syria and Jordan, the Egyptian authorities have reportedly closed their door to new Iraqis and have not granted those Iraqis who have made it to Egypt any official status or access to social services. Iraqis who have made their way to Egypt have arrived on one-month tourist visas that they extend in Cairo for additional months. During 2006 it became more difficult for Iraqis to obtain Egyptian visas through travel agencies in Baghdad, forcing Iraqis to go to Jordan or Syria. Unlike Syria and Jordan, Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but it signed the Convention with reservations on all provisions granting refugees the right to work and access public services. Iraqis are able to obtain asylum seeker’s cards from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which are similar to the temporary protection cards the UNHCR offers in Lebanon. Many Iraqis in Egypt have run out of savings and have fallen into an illegal status and fear having to return to Iraq. Although one NGO provides legal aid and another provides some meagre financial assistance, Iraqis are mostly left to fend for themselves, just as in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

There may be more than 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon. Iraqi refugees find it next to impossible to obtain an entry visa to Lebanon so have entered the country illegally, often assisted by smugglers. They are thus at threat of arrest and conviction for ‘illegal entry’, regardless of their status with UNHCR. Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacks effective legislation regulating asylum.

Websites:

Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: Cause for Concern in a Pivotal State, By Nathan Hodson, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, Number 13, April 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=269

Iraq: Plight of refugees worsens as Syria, Jordan impose restrictions, Date: 17 Jun 2007 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/DHRV-74A7AZ?OpenDocument Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN),

Iraqi refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: A field-based snapshot, Date: 11 Jun 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/AMMF-743HLA?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=ACOS-635P5D Source: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

Iraq: The World's Fastest Growing Refugee Crisis, 07/05/2007, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9679

Egypt: Respond to the needs of Iraqi refugees, 04/12/2007, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9974

Iraqi refugees in Lebanon: continuous lack of protection, by Samira Trad and Ghida Frangieh, FMR Iraq Special Issue, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/Iraq/15.pdf

Rebuilding society

National NGOs - non-existent prior to 2003, with the exception of the autonomous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan - now number in the thousands. According to Iraq’s Ministry of Civil Society (MoCS), in July 2006, 11,670 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) were working in Iraq. Of those, by November 2006, the Ministry determined that 2,775 were registered and legitimate. While perhaps only a fraction of these are humanitarian organisations, they, along with the national staff of INGOs, are continuing to strive to meet the needs of the people of Iraq, have critical knowledge of local areas and needs, and some degree of access.

Those involved in the reconstruction of Iraq must harness the capabilities, knowledge and expertise of the Iraqi population through a commitment to grass-roots approaches that strengthen and build on the capacities of Iraqi civil society. UN officials and Iraqi political groups warned against the summary dismissal of 400,000 people employed in tainted institutions, such as the military and police, without even the semblance of vetting or an explicit promise of a future in the new Iraq. These warnings were given little heed and the ensuing consequences are now being harshly felt.

There is a critical need to rebuild trust amongst Iraq's ethnic, religious, and tribal groups. The new government must overcome long-standing resentment arising from the oppression of Iraq's Kurdish ethnic minority and the Shi'a religious majority. It must bridge religious and ethnic divisions, uphold human rights and prevent further persecution of vulnerable groups. The challenge is to build a democracy that can represent all Iraq's peoples, find durable and inclusive solutions for IDPs and refugees, refrain from oppression, and ensure Iraq's wealth is more equally shared. Re-establishing policing and the rule of law, and instilling accountable and representative structures throughout all institutions, will be a central part of this process.

Websites:

University of York, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, 'Take grass roots approach to reconstructing Iraq' http://www.york.ac.uk/admin/presspr/pressreleases/prduiraq.htm

ICG, 'Baghdad: A Race Against the Clock', 11 June 2003 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1826

Iraq's Displaced Voters, The New York Times, January 25, 2005, Erin Mooney, Deputy Director, Balkees Jarrah, Senior Research Assistant, The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/25/opinion/l25iraq.html?ex=1108011600&en=2da68d16c8a0f895&ei=5070&n=Top%2FOpinion%2FEditorials%20and%20Op-Ed%2FLetters

Reconstructing Iraq, Middle East Report N°30, International Crisis Group, 2 September 2004, http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2936

What Can the U.S. Do in Iraq?, Middle East Report N°34, International Crisis Group, 22 December 2004, http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=3196&l=1

Critical areas of concern

Vulnerable groups

According to a study undertaken by NCCI and Oxfam GB, those who are vulnerable and require humanitarian support can be grouped into six different categories:

Displaced populations

All of these categories need protection, shelter, food, water, medical care, as well as reconstruction and livelihood opportunities. Within these categories, three groups in particular need special attention: children, women and ethnic/religious minorities.

The response of the international community

Since 2003 at least 88 Iraqi and international aid workers have been killed in targeted attacks. By the end of 2003 virtually all international organisations had withdrawn their expatriate staff from Iraq. The Iraqi Red Crescent Society, through its 18 branches and extensive network is the only agency able to operate openly nationwide.

Security concerns have meant that new approaches are being developed and adapted, such as remote support and partnerships with local actors, cross-border operations and dependence on local agency and partner staff. By being resourceful and flexible, NGOs, and national NGOs in particular, stress that despite the very insecure environment and the numerous constraints faced by aid workers in the field, a humanitarian response in Iraq is on-going and possible. In order to better address humanitarian needs in Iraq, NGOs have activated a field-based emergency network that will improve the quality of aid response by centralising and securing information on existing networks, improving field linkages, and easing aid workers access. The humanitarian response can be further improved with the support of all stakeholders, including the whole international community.

Political resolution to the causes of the crisis must occur in parallel with assisting the lives and livelihoods of all Iraqis. Ass NCCI explain, recognition of and actions to assist vulnerable communities are in place, but as conditions have worsened, the consistency, frequency, content and quality of assistance has not been able to keep pace. The ability to respond is also constrained by a lack of neutral and flexible funding. The 2007 Global Needs Assessment by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) ranks Iraq as among the 15 most severe humanitarian crises in the world, yet Iraq is the second least funded (per affected person) of those most severe crises. With growing acknowledgement by the international community that there is indeed a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, this issue has taken a more important place in the discussions about humanitarian aid in Iraq.

Websites

Books and reports

Baram, Amatzia.Between Impediment and Advantage: Saddam's Iraq.Between Impediment and Advantage: Saddam's Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998.

Baram, Amatzia. 'The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and Responsibility'.Middle East JournalMiddle East Journal 54(2) (Spring 2000): pp. 194-223.

Baram, Amatzia. 'Two Roads to Revolutionary Shi'ite Fundamentalism in Iraq'. InAccounting for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of MovementsAccounting for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Martin E. Marty and Scott

Appelby (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994, pp. 531-590.

Brown, Sarah Graham.Sanctioning Saddam.Sanctioning Saddam. London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1999.

Brown, Sarah Graham, and Toensing, Chris.Why Another War? A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis.Why Another War? A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis. 2nd edition. Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), December, 2002. - http://www.merip.org/iraq_backgrounder_102202/iraq_background2_merip.pdf

Butler, Richard.Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security,Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, 2000.

Cockburn, Andrew and Cockburn, Patrick.Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein,Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, 1999.

Coughlin, Con.Saddam: King of TerrorSaddam: King of Terror, Ecco, 2002.

Dammers, Chris, 'Iraq', in Janie Hampton (ed.),Internally Displaced People: A Global SurveyInternally Displaced People: A Global Survey, London 1998

Dabrowska, Karen.Iraq: The Bradt Travel GuideIraq: The Bradt Travel Guide, USA, 2002.

Farouk-Sluglett, Marion.Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to DictatorshipIraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1990.

Forced Migration Review: Special Issue: Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: the search for solutionsForced Migration Review: Special Issue: Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: the search for solutions. June 2007, http://www.fmreview.org/iraq.htm

Ghareeb, E.,The Kurdish Question in IraqThe Kurdish Question in Iraq, 1981.

Hamzah, Khidr Abd Al-Abbas.Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons AgendaSaddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, 2000.

Hansen, Greg, Briefing Paper:Taking Sides or Saving Lives: Existential Choices for the Humanitarian Enterprise in IraqTaking Sides or Saving Lives: Existential Choices for the Humanitarian Enterprise in Iraq, Humanitarian Agenda 2015 Country Study, Feinstein International Center, June 2007, http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/HA2015IraqCountryStudy.pdf

Hiro, Dilip.Iraq: In the Eye of the StormIraq: In the Eye of the Storm, 2002.

Hiro, Dilip.Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf WarsNeighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars, 2001.

Hoskins, Eric, Das, Rupen, Doebbler, Curtis, Dyregrov, Atle, Galanis, Kali, Koc, Mustafa, Nutt, Samantha, Raundalen, Magne, and Sutton, Tara,Our Common Responsibility: The Impact of a New War on Iraqi ChildrenOur Common Responsibility: The Impact of a New War on Iraqi ChildrenReport of International Study Team. Toronto: War Child Canada, 20 January 2003. - http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/wv-irq-26jan.pdf

Ismael, T.Y.,Iraq and IranIraq and Iran, 1982.

Karsh, Efraim.Saddam Hussein: A Political BiographySaddam Hussein: A Political Biography, 1991.

Khalil, Samir.Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern IraqRepublic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, 1989.

Mackey, Sandra.Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam HusseinReckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein, 2002.

Makiya, Kananis.Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern IraqRepublic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Revised Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Marr, P.,The Modern History of IraqThe Modern History of Iraq, 1985.

McDowell, David.Modern History of the KurdsModern History of the Kurds, 1996.

Mylrorie, Laurie.Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War Against AmericaStudy of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War Against America, 2001.

NCCI and Oxfam GB, "IRAQ EMERGENCY SITUATION", Trends in violence,Humanitarian needs, PreparednessHumanitarian needs, Preparedness, May 2006, http://www.ncciraq.org/IMG/pdf/NCCI_-_Iraq_Emergency_Situation_-_Final_Report_-_2nd_May_2006.pdf

NCCI,Iraq Humanitarian Crisis Situation and NGOs ResponsesIraq Humanitarian Crisis Situation and NGOs Responses, May 2007, http://www.ncciraq.org/spip.php?article1742

Pollack, Kenneth M.Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading IraqThreatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, 2002.

Ritter, Scott.Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem - Once and For AllEndgame: Solving the Iraq Problem - Once and For All, 1999.

Roux, G.,Ancient IraqAncient Iraq, 1965, reprinted 1976.

Sasson, Jean P.Rape of Kuwait: The True Story of Iraqi Atrocities Against a Civilian PopulationRape of Kuwait: The True Story of Iraqi Atrocities Against a Civilian Population, 1991.

Simons, G. L.Iraq: From Sumer to SaddamIraq: From Sumer to Saddam, 1994.

Spencer, William.Iraq: Old Land, New Nation in ConflictIraq: Old Land, New Nation in Conflict, 2000.

Timmerman, Kenneth.Death Lobby: How the West Armed IraqDeath Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq, 1991.

Tripp, Charles.History of Modern IraqHistory of Modern Iraq, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Zaidi, Sarah, Benjamin, Elisabeth Ryden, Clements, Charles, McCally, Michael, Pellett, Peter, VanRooyen, Michael, Waldman, Ronald Jay, and Ghaemi, Hadi,The Human Costs of War in IraqThe Human Costs of War in Iraq. Brooklyn, NY: Centre for Economic and Social Rights, 2003. - http://www.cesr.org/iraq/docs/humancosts.pdf.