The slave trade

Slavery was one of the main objectives of the Portuguese explorers from the start. Slaves were supplied to Portugal and to other colonies such as Brazil and So Tom, initially with collaboration from the Kongo kingdom and later in alliance with the Ndongo state. The alliances between the colonialists and the local leaders deteriorated rapidly due to the increased involvement of the Portuguese in the political and economic affairs of the kingdoms and prominent leaders such as the Ndongo Queen Nzinga organised resistance to the colonial quest. However, slaves continued to be taken by the Portuguese through military intervention and were also supplied by competing warlords (Thornton: http://muweb.millersville.edu/~winthrop/Thornton.html).

It has not been conclusively established exactly how many slaves were exported from Angola. It is believed that Angolans accounted for 4 million of the 12 million slaves who survived the Atlantic crossing and landed in the Americas (Tvedten, 1997). For every slave who arrived in the Americas, another one is estimated to have died during the marches to the slave trading posts and the ocean crossing. This would bring the total number of slaves taken form Angola to 8 million, a heavier loss than any other country in Africa had to bear. The impact of the slave trade was devastating for Angolan society as the most able-bodied members of a household were taken away and decreased the production capacity of households. Authority structures were weakened and power relations changed.

The history of the slave trade is much discussed in present-day Angola and is commemorated annually in the Carnaval de Vitria around the country.

Forced labour

The other strand of Portuguese colonialism in Angola was that of the exploitation of the land and natural resources. After the official abolition of slavery in 1836, the Portuguese attempted to establish their control over the African labour force by imposing legislation that made the obligation of working for the colonialists lawful. The colonialists attempted to ensure that the development of the rubber industry and the production of coffee was advanced through the forced labour system. This system was in operation for 60 years during which as many as half a million Angolans escaped to neighbouring countries and an estimated 35% of the labour force died during the contract period. The Portuguese also tried to establish control over Angola through fragmenting traditional authority structures and appointing loyal puppet leaders. Military force against local resistance to these policies was implemented.

Lack of socio-economic development

Portuguese colonialism in Angola was also characterised by a lack of development in the socio-economic state and infrastructure of the country. The guiding policy of Portugal was to exploit the colonies for the benefit of Portugal and they therefore prevented any form of foreign investment in the country until the 1960s. The colonialists pursued a policy of segregation between the Europeans who were most privileged, the assimilados (assimilated non-whites) who were able to access some services, and the indgenas (majority of the African population) who had no political or social rights. Access to the government educational system was difficult for the general African population and access to social services, such as hospitals, was limited. Most schools and hospitals that were set up for the local population were church-based. The resentment of the Angolans towards the inequalities between the different categories of citizens grew, as did the opposition to the forced labour system and the identification card system that was imposed on them. This resistance to colonial rule led to the war of independence (Official website of the Angolan government: http://www.angola.org/referenc/history/tour2.html).

The First War: the War of Independence

Angolans refer to specific periods of the almost forty years of continuous war in their country in terms of numbers. Angola's First War was the War of Independence whose beginning was marked in 1961 by violent boycotts against the forced labour on agricultural fields and an attack on two prisons in Luanda, Angolas capital city, to hinder the movement of political prisoners to Portugal (Tvedten, 1997). African national sentiments led to the formation of three main political groups in the 1950s and 1960s which declared their goal of independence publicly, and who led military assaults on colonial targets in rural and semi-urban areas, mobilising support from amongst the peasant population. These three main groups were

The costs of the war for independence were high for Portugal in both human and material terms, and following a coup in Portugal in 1974 which resulted in a change of the countrys policies towards its African colonies, a process of rapid decolonisation was initiated (Cravinho, 1998). An agreement was signed by the three independence movements to form a transitional government and hold elections before independence in November 1975. Independence was declared on 11th November 1975 by the MPLA who went on to form a single-party socialist government.

The Second War: the Cold War

Ideological differences and mutual suspicion among the MPLA, UNITA and FLNA resulted in outbreaks of fighting between the movements in July 1975 and led to a break-down of the transitional government. This initiated the Second War, also known as the Cold War, which was to last from 1975 until 1990. Various other countries who had ideological, political and material interests in Angola gave their support to the parties, with the Soviet Union and Cuba providing arms, combat troops, pilots, advisers, and engineers to the socialist-orientated MPLA, and South Africa and the U.S. aiding UNITA with military attacks and with covert financial assistance respectively. Angola became a cold war battleground for influence of the world powers in southern Africa, bound up with the liberation struggles of its neighbours such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The war was initially confined to the south-eastern part of the country, but UNITA tactics created insecurity in around 80 percent of the country, severely affecting the productive life and the socio-economic situation of the population. During these years UNITA increasingly depicted themselves as anti-Marxist and pro-western but also as truly Angolan, juxtapositioning the MPLA as a party of assimilados [urban, educated, Portuguese-orientated non-white Angolans], mesticos [mixed race] and Marxists (CCR, 2000). The MPLA, on the other hand, portrayed UNITA as power-hungry tribalists who were not interested in the welfare of all Angolans but only in that of the Ovimbundu. Negotiations involving South Africa, Cuba, the U.S., Portugal and the warring factions finally culminated in the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord in 1991.

The Third War: the Election War

The Bicesse Accord stipulated a timetable for demobilisation of both sides of the conflict and fixed a date for multiparty elections. However, the United Nations mission to Angola (UNAVEM II) which was to oversee the ceasefire and monitor the demobilisation was severely underfunded and inadequate (Anstee, 1996), failing to implement the agreements of the Accord. Elections were held on the last days of September 1992, and the UN and other foreign observers concluded that they were generally free and fair. There was a turnout of 91% for the elections with President Dos Santos receiving 49,6% and Jonas Savimbi receiving 40,7% of the vote. In the election for the legislature the MPLA won 54% of the vote compared to UNITAs 34% (CCR, 2000). Savimbi rejected the results as biased and manipulated and returned to war with largely intact troops. This marked the beginning of the Third War or the Election War, which lasted from October 1992 until November 1994. This war proved to be more destructive and all-encompassing than the first two wars, and became known for its systematic violations of the laws of war by both the government and UNITA (Human Rights Watch, 1994). UNITA went on the offensive in provinces throughout the country, and indiscriminate bombings by the government, the laying of landmines and the entrapment of civilians in cities under prolonged siege resulted in extremely high losses of civilian lives (Tvedten, 1997). The UN estimated that some 1000 people were dying every day in Angola during 1993, more than in any other conflict in the world at the time (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Tens of thousands of people were displaced from the countryside, fleeing to towns and cities where they lived in conditions of abject poverty, cut off from food supplies and from basic sanitary and hygienic provisions.

New peace talks began towards the end of 1993 and the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994 formally marked the end of the Third War (The Lusaka Protocol: website: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/lusaka_11151994.htm). Paul Hare (1998) provides an account of some of the major issues that influenced the Lusaka peace process as well as some of its short-comings.

The Fourth War: the Lusaka War

Almost from the start UNITA failed to comply with the obligations of the Protocol such as demilitarisation and demobilisation of soldiers, and small scale conflict continued to flare up in various parts of the country, increasing to incidents of serious violations of the cease-fire in 1997 (CCR, 2000). Throughout 1998 both the government and UNITA prepared for a new war which broke out in December of that year. UNITA, which had been financing its military exploits through its diamond revenues from its territories in the north and the east of the country, found itself increasingly isolated internationally, experiencing the effect of the UN sanction packages imposed on it. The MPLA government used the countrys oil resources and diamonds to fund its war efforts, confident that their capacity to purchase military equipment would surpass that of UNITA. This Fourth War continued until the killing of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002.

Political developments and concerns

Emerging from decades of war, Angola faces numerous serious political challenges. Amongst these are:

Humanitarian crisis: The humanitarian crisis in Angola continues to dominate the national and international response to Angolas political situation (Angola Peace Monitor: http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0810.htm). The signing of the ceasefire opened access to large parts of the country that had previously been war zones and has led to the uncovering of an estimated half-a-million people living in a desperate situation. In July 2002, the UN launched an international crisis appeal to meet the need for emergency assistance for the approximately 4 million people they estimated to be highly vulnerable, an appeal that has met with a poor response from the donor community. Donor scepticism is high in light of Angolas natural wealth with questions being asked as to why the government is not able to finance its own reconstruction and humanitarian aid programme (Global IDP Project: http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Angola)

Cabinda

The enclave of Cabinda, separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of land belonging to the DRC, has experienced armed conflict that has predominantly been fuelled by the fight for self-determination and separation from the Luanda-based government. The history of Cabinda is that it was the subject of a treaty between Britain and Portugal where Portugal obtained sovereignty over Cabinda in return for the granting of certain privilege to the British in that territory. Cabinda was incorporated into Angola in 1956 and remained under the Angolan colonial administration until Angolas independence in 1975. Cabindans viewed themselves as geographically, linguistically and ethnically separate from the rest of Angola and in the early 1960s several movements advocating independence for Cabinda were formed. They united in 1963 as the Frente para a Libertao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) and have been waging low-level insurgency since then (Pitsch: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/angcabin.htm). FLEC has targeted government installations and oil personnel, including foreigners, and the FAA has been accused of killing large numbers of civilians in their fight against FLEC.

A large part of Angolas oil production takes place offshore from Cabinda, the enclave thus serving a vital and strategic need for the Angolan government which has no intention of granting secession rights to the territory. Despite the wealth produced through oil production, Cabinda has remained underdeveloped which has fuelled resentment against the Luanda government amongst Cabindans. Since the signing of the peace agreement between UNITA and the government in 2002 several senior FLEC leaders have surrendered to the government or have been captured (Angola Peace Monitor: http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm1011.htm). A report by the South African-based Institute for Security Studies entitled "Cabinda: Notes on a soon to be forgotten war", suggests that the way to end the conflict is to implement a negotiated autonomy in Cabinda which depends on the separatists downgrading their demands for independence, and for the Angolan government to allow humanitarian assistance to reach civilians who are facing hunger, disease and loss of livelihood. The future of Cabinda remains unclear. Human Rights Watch (2003: website: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa1.html) reports that widespread abuses against the civilian population continue to be reported, including killings and displacement.

IDP centres

Living conditions in the IDP centres are difficult. They are often situated in rural areas, described by an Angolan journalist as desolate landscapes (NRC, 2001 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Angola), removed from major transport routes and more easily controlled by the government. Huts are traditionally constructed from wood and mud but, since there is usually no adequate roofing material available, the huts do not provide adequate shelter from the wind, cold nor the heavy downpours which can last for up to eight months of the year. Close proximity to neighbours result in infectious diseases being passed on quickly. A report from an Angolan NGO also highlights the difficult and slow adaptation to the new physical environment in which the deslocados find themselves: people who were accustomed to having their own houses and living in kimbus (household of an extended family, sometimes consisting of up to 20 huts) with their relatives found it strenuous to live in such close proximity to people who were strangers to them (Andrade, 2001). In centres where the deslocados came from the same area and therefore knew each other prior to displacement, it is possible to create a sense of cohesion and communal support. This is largely absent in centres where the deslocados came from many different municipalities and where people were less willing to assist each other and more inclined to think primarily of the well-being of their own immediate families.

Economic survival is a constant concern and high priority in IDP centres. The deslocados usually do not have access to farming land around the centres, and are thus deprived of their previous methods of subsistence through agriculture and animal husbandry. Many IDP centres were largely dependent on the food provisions of the World Food Programme (WFP), consisting of 10 kg maize meal, 1.2 kg beans, 0.75 kg cooking oil and 0,15 kg salt per person per month, which is barely enough to sustain a person for two weeks. Additional sources of income thus have to be sought and a combination of kinship exchange, petty-commodity production, collecting and selling firewood, and food and beverage preparation are employed. Women also labour in the fields of local farmers in exchange for food, usually paid in the form of small quantities of maize. Assets such as emergency items and food provided by aid agencies are routinely exchanged or sold as a coping strategy of the population, and it is common to see WFP sacks of maize meal in the marketplaces of surrounding villages after food distribution has taken place in an area (NRC, 2001 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Angola). Despite these initiatives, people live in a state of acute poverty, unable to cope with disruptions to their survival strategies through illness or other events. Households headed by elderly widows seemed particularly vulnerable and fragile with high rates of malnutrition and visible destitution common among them (OCHA, 2001).

An additional hardship in the lives of the deslocados residing in the centres is personal security. Relations with local residents around the centres are at times strained over matters such as the collection of firewood, with residents claiming that deslocados strip their surrounding countryside of suitable firewood at a rapid rate which forces them to walk greater distances than before. Incidents of women deslocados being raped by locals while collecting firewood have been reported, for instance, near centres in Huila province in July 2000. Local bandidos [criminals, thieves] may also lay in wait for deslocados after food distribution has taken place in an area, ambushing them and stealing their goods (NRC, 2001 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Angola). The constant threat of attacks from UNITA forces even in areas supposedly designated as safe havens was a further concern for deslocados living in IDP centres during the conflict.

Following the signing of the ceasefire in April 2002, many deslocados started to leave the IDP centres and return to their home areas on their own accord, rather than waiting for a co-ordinated campaign. This increased towards the harvesting season later on in the year with an estimated 1.1 million deslocados making their way home by the end of 2002 (Angola Peace Monitor: http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0901.htm). By June 2003, an estimated 2.5 million IDPs had returned home (Global IDP Project: http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Angola). Despite this spontaneous return, 1.4 million people remain displaced within Angola with approximately 300,000 living in IDP centres around the country. Conditions for return remain difficult with little assistance being provided to help the IDPs make the transition of moving to areas that were devastated during the conflict. There have also been reports of forced and coerced return by government forces to areas that have not yet been de-mined and where no medical and educational facilities exist (Human Rights Watch, website: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/angola0803/angola0803.pdf).

Self-settled IDPs

The lives of the self-settled deslocados in urban areas are challenging in different ways. In many towns the number of displaced far outnumbers the indigenous population. Great variations exist in the economic circumstances between different groups of deslocados, the single most important factor being whether or not the arriving deslocados have kinship networks in the town that they can draw upon for initial support (Andrade, 2001). However, not even highly effective kinship networks can cope with the massive levels of displacement that have occurred since 1992, and host households quickly found themselves depleted if they were expected to cope with large numbers of additional people:

With the majority of the Angolan population living at, or below, the poverty line resources in most households are limited and can be extended very little without creating further hardship. During the past eight years, agencies estimate that a majority of host households have become destitute as scarce assets are shared among larger numbers of people (United Nations Security Council, 2000: 10).

The same problem, of lack of access to farming land, is faced by self-settled IDPs as those people settled in centres. In urban areas the peripheral areas around the towns are all owned and farmed by residents who rely on the produce for their livelihood. However, other opportunities and possibilities exist for those making a living in urban areas, some of which have already been mentioned. It has been widely suggested that those IDPs most likely to attempt life in urban areas are those who are best educated and most resourceful, leaving behind the more vulnerable and less influential people in the centres (Tvedten, 1997). Former community leaders and intellectuals, for instance, migrated to the towns in order to make a living for themselves there. Despite this, however, many deslocados found it very difficult to survive in urban centres, the competition in the informal trading market already being strained to maximum capacity. Some worked long hours in order to make enough for just one bread roll and a teabag at the end of the day, living constantly and precariously on the brink of destitution. Others who were not able to work lived on the streets of Luanda, Huambo, Lubango and other smaller towns, surviving on begging and stealing what little they can get. Many of the self-settled deslocados have also made the journey back home to their farming areas.

Angolans in Zambia

The Angolan refugees in Zambia have been the focus of research over the past three decades. The movement of Angolan refugees into Zambia started in the 1960s (Barrett, 1998). The majority of the refugees settled in rural areas independent of international and national agencies and gradually integrated into Zambian villages, as they were viewed as kin or distant relatives by their hosts (Hansen, 1979). The majority of self-settled refugees now consider Zambia their home and did not plan returning home to Angola once the war was over (Hansen, 1990). The successful integration of Angolan refugees in north-western Zambia has been heralded as a success story by refugee agencies who saw this process as a possible model for resolving other long-term protracted refugee situations.

The Angolans who were not self-settled were accommodated in organised settlements, for instance in the Meheba settlement in north-western Zambia (Barrettt, 1998). For these refugees it has not been possible to forge new Zambian-Angolan identities and their attitude towards possible repatriation to Angola, once peace is established, is more complex, wishing to be repatriated through UN-organised mass repatriation when judged appropriate (Barrett, 1998).

Repatriation programmes

The UNHCR launched its two-year repatriation programme of Angolan refugees from neighbouring countries in June 2003 with a convoy of 543 refugees leaving the DRC for Angola. The Angola Peace Monitor reports that the refugees were given a warm welcome in the reception centres (website: http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0811.htm). The refugees were provided with reintegration packages (which include blankets and basic supplies for 3 months) and also received mine-awareness education and information about HIV/AIDS. Repatriation of refugees in Namibia and Zambia also started in July 2003.

By August 2003, agencies estimated that approximately 130,000 refugees had returned of their own accord since the signing of the peace agreement, predominantly to the provinces of Cuando Cubango, Moxico, Uige and Zaire. A continuing concern is the lack of basic standards for water, health, schooling and the presence of local administration in areas to which refugees are returning. A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch stated that while most IDPs and refugees have now returned home or have decided to stay in the host communities, many experience difficulties in accessing identity documents which provide them with the right to work, to vote and to an education. ( http://hrw.org/reports/2005/angola0305/angola0305.pdf). HRW suggests that three years after peace had arrived, many displaced Angolans continue to suffer.

Diamond mining

The history of Angolas diamond mining is a chequered one, with international attention focusing in recent years on illegal trading of conflict diamonds through UNITA-controlled areas such as Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte in the north-east of the country. Illegal diamond digging and diamond smuggling through the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia sustained UNITAs war efforts during the third and fourth wars, despite UN sanctions imposed on this trade in 1998 (Amnesty International: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR010112001?open&of=ENG-AGO). A UN sanctions monitoring mechanism was set up to try and halt the flow of cash and arms to UNITA during the final years of the war, by making it illegal to buy diamonds from UNITA or to sell them weapons. Although UNITAs diamond trade was reduced through these sanctions, it never ceased completely and independent observers believe that UNITA continued to benefit from the trade right up to the last months of war (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/1108dia.htm). After the signing of the peace agreement in April 2002, the UN sanctions monitoring committee accused UNITA of retaining cashes of illicit diamonds (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/1122denies.htm). Sanctions were only officially lifted in December 2002 by the UN Security Council who declared UNITA no longer to be a threat to national or regional interests.

The Angolan government subscribed to the global certification scheme to block the sale of illicit diamonds in late 2000. In 2001, the Angolan Deputy Minister of Mining, Antonio Sumbula, admitted that $1 million worth of diamonds were leaving Angola illegally each day. While substantial efforts have been under way to stem the flow of illegal diamonds from Angola since the signing of the peace agreement in 2002, observers have noted that illicit diamond mining has started up again in areas that had lain dormant due to the war, for instance in the Capembe region in Cuando Cubango (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/1108dia.htm). Controlling the diamond trade will continue to prove challenging to the Angolan government. In the meantime, the government is pursuing new diamond mining projects with international mining companies ( O Pensador: http://www.angola.org/news/pensador/april03.pdf).

Website:

Diamonds in conflict: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/index.htm

Oil production

During the almost 40 years of conflict in Angola, the only sector of the economy that consistently performed well was the oil sector which was under the control of the Angolan government. It is run by the Ministry of Oil and Energy and the parastatal company SONANGOL, and 80% of the oil production takes place off the coast of Cabinda (see section 1.5.2. above). Angola is currently the second-largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria (Hodges, 2003: http://www.c-r.org/accord/ang/accord15/10.shtml).

The Angolan economy is heavily dependant on oil production. Although the oil sector is a vital source of income, during the war years the earnings were used predominantly for non-productive purposes such as military and food imports and to repay Angolas rising foreign debt (Hodges, 2003). As a percentage of GDP, defence and security expenditure peaked at 26 percent (by far the highest level in the world) in 1999, but then fell back to 7 percent in 2001 and 2002, although this is still very high by international standards. Hodges (2003) notes that it is also worrying that the government is continuing to give high priority to defence and security, which were allocated 32 percent of the budget for 2004. In addition, the strong dependence on this one particular export meant that the Angolan economy was dependent on world oil prices, its revenue rising and falling with external variations in price levels (Hodges, 2003: http://www.c-r.org/accord/ang/accord15/10.shtml).

The Angolan governments financing of its military efforts led to a situation where they raised loans from Swiss and French banks using oil as a collateral, borrowing cash against future exports (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2003/0226elite.htm). It is unclear to what extent Angolas future oil wealth has already been mortgaged but the Angolan government has declared itself broke and called for an international donor conference in 2003, being unable to fund the post-war reconstruction needs of the country. Angolas foreign debt is estimated to be about 12 billion USD, of which about half is owed to Russian arms manufacturers. Some financial analysts suspect the amount of foreign debt to much higher than this (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2003/0226elite.htm).

In addition, observers have commented on the missing billions that are suspected to have been siphoned off by the Angolan political elite through corrupt contracting methods providing substantial commissions for key government officials. A report by Global Witness, entitled All the presidents men (website: http://www.globalwitness.org/), accuses top government officials of benefiting financially from the oil sector and calls upon the government as well as on international oil companies to adopt a policy of transparency (see also Human Rights Watch, 2004 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/).

Due to the increase in oil production, government oil revenues, which had been less than $1 billion a year for most of the 1980s, were running at an average of just over $2.5 billion per year during the period 1995-2001 (Hodges, 2003: http://www.c-r.org/accord/ang/accord15/10.shtml). Following major new oil discoveries in deep water off the Angolan coast in the mid-1990s, investments currently underway will more than double oil production in the next few years, to 2.2 billion b/d in 2008. This will take Angola's oil production to about the same level as Nigeria's, transforming Angola into the single largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa by 2008 (Global Policy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2003/0226elite.htm).