Early and colonial history

The original inhabitants of Algeria were Imazighen (singular, Amazigh), the preferred self-description of Berbers. The ethnic make-up of modern Algeria has its origins in the westward movement of Arabic people across North Africa in the eighth century. The Imazighen subsequently converted to Islam, and their society gradually merged with Arabic society except in more remote or inaccessible areas, where traditional Amazigh social structures still survive. In Algeria there are four significant Amazigh groups: the Kabyles, originally from the Atlas Mountains close to the capital; the Chaouia from the Aures Mountains; the Mzab from the south; and the Touareg from the Sahara in the far south of the country.

The foundations of Algeria's political system were laid during the period of Ottoman rule from 1525 to 1830. In 1830 France took control of the coastal areas and gradually extended its influence through an active settlement policy, which gathered pace from 1872 onwards. France did not administer Algeria as a colonial territory but, uniquely in the French empire, as an integral part of France. The intensity of the relationship between France and Algeria has had a lasting effect on both countries. The Algerian independence movement originated in France, in 1926, away from the stricter controls on the Muslim population in Algeria itself (Stora 1992). The movement evolved through various coalitions and disputes to form a united Front de Liberation National (FLN) which organised the war against France and later formed the machinery of the Algerian state.

Algeria gained independence on 5 July 1962, following the brutal 1954-62 war in which a million people are considered to have lost their lives (Horne 1996). The intensity of this war can best be explained by the status of Algeria within the French consciousness. It was not simply a war to eject a colonising power (though it is often called the 'Algerian war of independence' in English), but a struggle between two groups for recognition and ownership of a country to which they believed they had an equal right. In Algeria it is simply called 'the revolution', and the continued significance of this event can be seen from the fact that Algeria's national holiday is not 5 July, the date on which independence was achieved in 1962, but 1 November, when the first shots of the war were fired in 1954. Even today, though the vast majority of the population was not even born when independence was achieved, the legitimacy of political leaders and parties continues to draw directly on the extent of their participation in the revolution. Commentators, such as Martinez (1998) have looked to the almost ritualised significance of violent struggle in Algerian history, particularly the revolution, for an explanation of the continued violence in Algeria today.

Post-independence Algeria

Independence left Algeria in turmoil. Much of the European population, known as the pieds noirs, had been resident in the country for three or even four generations (Stora 1991). The huge majority of pieds noirs left the country in the months surrounding independence. Algerian state bureaucracy and the most profitable companies and agricultural estates were all run by pieds noirs, and their hasty departure left Algeria without anywhere near the necessary personnel to operate the state machinery or support economic development. Algerians who had fought for the French army, known as harkis, were severely persecuted by the rest of the population. As many as 100,000 harkis were killed, and those who could joined the pieds noirs in fleeing the country. More than a million people, mainly pieds noirs, left Algeria during 1962. In 1961, a small faction of pieds noirs and French military personnel formed the extremist right-wing Secret Armed Organisation (OAS). The OAS carried out violent attacks against both French and Algerian targets with the aim of destabilising Algeria, and operated a scorched-earth policy to ensure that the new country was left with as few resources as possible (Kauffer 2002). In addition to the severity of these problems, the newly independent Algeria had also been exhausted by eight years of war, more than 70 per cent of the population were unemployed, and disease and poverty caused widespread suffering. On independence, the FLN effectively formed the state. Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben-Bella, was formerly elected in 1963, the year following independence. The situation remained unstable during 1963, and several significant leaders of the 1954-62 war mounted challenges to Ben-Bella's leadership, including Hocine Ait Ahmed (who led an armed rebellion of his Front des Forces Socialists [FFS]), and Mohammed Boudiaf. Both of these leaders went into exile, from where Ait Ahmed continued his political opposition through the FFS.

Ben-Bella's increasingly dictatorial style provoked widespread popular resentment. He was deposed in a bloodless coup in June 1965 by Houari Boumediène. Ben-Bella was initially imprisoned and then went into exile, where he too organised an anti-government opposition party from his French home, continuing the tradition of powerful expatriate groups operating from France which had begun with the independence movement itself. Boumediène is really the only Algerian head of state to have been fully in charge, rather than under the significant control of powerful figures in the army. He cancelled the 1963 constitution, and until 1976 he ruled through the Council of the Revolution. In 1976 he introduced a new constitution and was elected president. His unexpected death in 1978 left his socialist projects unfinished, and these were largely abandoned by his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, who was elected in 1979.

The Chadli regime saw popular unrest by the Kabyle minority. In 1980, the cancellation of a cultural lecture in Tizi Ouzou, the most significant town in Kabylia, provoked rioting that was brutally repressed by the gendarmerie. The Kabyle minority has celebrated this event annually ever since as the 'Berber Spring'. Agitation by radical Islamists provoked more widespread unrest throughout the early 1980s. In 1984 the government passed the controversial Family Code in an attempt to placate Islamist opinion. This legislation formalises gender inequality in matters of private law. It remains in force, and its abrogation is demanded by many civil society groups. In the early 1980s the Chadli government also introduced a number of measures to liberalise the economy, which resulted in significant price rises on basic foodstuffs. By 1988 popular discontent at the corruption and ineffectiveness of the regime spilled over, and in October, riots in Algiers lasted several days and spread to other cities. They were violently suppressed by the army, and unofficial figures estimate the death toll to have been 500. In 1989 Chadli introduced a new constitution, which legalised political parties, downgraded the role of the army, and introduced significant new freedoms.

For a short time the new constitution seemed to herald a more positive era, and Algeria was viewed as a model of success of freedom and democracy (Entelis 1992; Willis 1996). Greater freedom of the press encouraged the establishment of new independent newspapers and magazines. More than 150 were launched between 1990 and 1994 (Merril 1995, quoted in Lloyd 2003:30). Civil society flourished, new groups were established, and those that had been operating for some time were allowed a greater degree of freedom, particularly affecting women's organisations that had developed in opposition to the Family Code, and human rights organisations such as the Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH). Trades unions also developed as the monopoly of the FLN-sponsored General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) was relaxed. More than sixty political parties were legalised, including a loose federation of diverse Islam-based groups, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), which quickly attained a massive base of support. The FIS won the 1990 local elections extremely convincingly and, although their leaders were imprisoned and the following general elections delayed, they also dominated the first round of the general elections finally held in December 1991 and looked certain to achieve a huge majority in the second round. In January 1992 the army cancelled the second round, forced Chadli to resign, and set up a High State Committee (HCE) to take over his functions. This is considered by most observers to mark the beginning of the conflict, and on his election in 1999 President Bouteflika declared the army's actions to be the first 'violence' that had been committed.

The current conflict

Reliable information, and therefore real analysis, of the current conflict is unusual. There is not even any significant consensus amongst commentators over the fundamental causes of the conflict or how it should be characterised. The unrest stems from the army's decision to cancel the elections in an effort to prevent the certain victory the FIS. Although many commentators agree that the political situation in Algeria had been growing increasingly delicate throughout the 1980s, the cancellation of the elections created the climate of instability that allowed the crisis to deepen further (Volpi 2003). The army violently suppressed any further activity by FIS activists and supporters, imprisoning thousands in specially constructed internment camps in the Sahara. Since the FIS represented such a diverse range of opinions, the various currents soon began to diverge. Some of their members fled the country in an effort to escape or continue a politically based combat; others began organising an armed guerrilla struggle against the army and, increasingly, the civilian population. In July 1992 Mohammed Boudiaf, who had been brought back from exile by the army to head the HCE, was assassinated. This event really confirmed the severity of the crisis.

The nature of the armed groups is also very diverse, and there have been at least seven identifiably different groups involved in the fighting (Khelassi 1998). Some, such as the armed wing of the FIS, the AIS, targeted only members of the armed forces and declared a unilateral cease-fire in 1997. More extreme factions, such as the diverse Groupe Islamique Armée ( Al Jama'a Al Islamia Al Musallah) (GIA) undertook a far more vicious campaign against the civilian population. From 1993 onwards, prominent intellectuals were assassinated in attacks generally claimed in the name of the GIA. By 1993, armed groups were the de facto authority in significant parts of the country, including the suburbs of Algiers. They administered justice, maintained prisons, and operated freely.

A significant amount of international aid began to arrive in 1994, most notably from France (Esprit 1995). This included considerable amounts of military hardware, which permitted the army to gradually reassert their position, though the violence escalated considerably towards the end of the year. In November 1995, presidential elections confirmed Liamine Zeroual, the former defence minister, as the new head of state, and in 1996 he issued a revised constitution which was confirmed by a significant majority of the population in elections in November.

In 1994 and 1995, armed groups attempted to involve France directly in the conflict. In December 1994, an Air France plane was hijacked at Algiers airport, and over the summer of 1995 there were a number of explosions in Paris, in which twenty-six people were killed. All were claimed by the GIA. France responded severely, and initiated a dramatic security clamp-down, stopping and searching thousands of individuals of North African origin. The French government openly criticised other European states who did not respond similarly, particularly the UK and Germany, where it was thought that radical Islamists were allowed a greater degree of freedom for organisation and fundraising activities. In 1995 a group of eight opposition parties, including the FIS, agreed a joint platform for a peaceful solution to the crisis at the community of St Egidio in Rome. This was considered by some observers as the best opportunity for resolving the crisis at the time, but it was rejected by the Algerian government.

During 1997, massacres of the civilian population became increasingly serious. In August and September, and again in January 1998, hundreds of individuals were slaughtered in villages and towns of the Mitidja, an area lying between Algiers and the Atlas Mountains to the South. These events increased pressure for an international enquiry into events in Algeria from international NGOs such as Amnesty International, as well as significant personalities amongst the Algerian community in Europe. The Algerian government resisted this pressure, but did permit visits of the European Union troika, a European Parliament delegation and a UN Panel of Eminent Persons. All three reported only moderate criticisms of the Algerian government.

In April 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected as head of state, though the elections were widely criticised as fraudulent and the six other candidates withdrew in protest. Bouteflika presented a far more open style of government, which was initially greeted optimistically. He introduced a law on 'civil concord', which was put to national referendum in September. The centrepiece of this legislation was an amnesty for members of armed groups who had not committed serious violent crimes. This met with some success, but when the amnesty expired in January 2000, the GIA and the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) continued their guerrilla strategy, and the army resumed operations against them. The Algerian strategy for tackling these groups focuses on eliminating them with only peripheral concern for human rights abuses and civilian casualties. In the international environment that has prevailed since 11 September 2001, this strategy has met with increased international approval, and in December 2002 Algeria signed a significant new arms deal with the US government.

April 2001 marked the twenty-first anniversary of the 'Berber Spring'. Police responded to disturbances in Kabylia with excessive force, and an estimated eighty people were killed over the next few months in an event that has become known as the 'Black Spring' (see Disturbances in Kabylia). Two official enquiries were especially critical of the police and the government's response. The violence in the region has eased, but tensions remain extremely high, and there were further deaths in April 2002.

Websites:

UNHCR/ACCORD European Country of Origin Reports: Algeria (M. François Burgat 2001) http://www.ecoi.net/pub/mv99_cois2001-alg.pdf

Library of Congress Country Studies: Algeria http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html

Text of St Egidio Platform of 13 January 1995 (in French) http://members.tripod.com/~AlgeriaWatch/rome.html

The origins of the violence

Essentially the conflict is between the Algerian army and a diverse range of armed guerrilla groups who claim to act for an ill-defined conception of an Islamic state. The significant Kabyle minority has periodically entered this conflict as a third force, generally political but occasionally by taking up-or threatening to take up-arms themselves. The conflict has been further complicated by internecine struggles within and between different armed groups. In addition to this, the goal and strategy of the army are not static, but evolve in relation to political conflicts between different factions of the Algerian regime. The obvious complexity of this situation, combined with the inadequacy and unreliability of available information, most significantly due to government-imposed restrictions, ensures that explanations can only really be tentative.

Human rights abuses

The majority of civilian deaths have resulted from the activities of armed groups. Sporadic attacks on the army and civilians from armed groups have occurred periodically since the early 1970s, but after 1992 they became an endemic aspect of the conflict. In the early stages of the conflict, specific individuals were targeted. These were frequently prominent liberal figures-writers, journalists or musicians-and this provoked a significant exodus of those people who were threatened. False roadblocks were also widely used early in the conflict and continue to cause fear on more remote stretches of road. Members of the armed groups, often dressed in official police or army uniforms, stop vehicles and rob, abduct, or kill their occupants. The most terrible aspect of the conflict, which caused international outrage in 1997 and 1998, has been large-scale massacres of the civilian population. These activities created a climate of terror in the area south of Algiers where the most brutal massacres were carried out during 1997. In the most serious events, groups of men armed with knives and axes spent hours killing hundreds of inhabitants of certain neighbourhoods or villages such as Raïs, Beni Messous, and Bentalha. Armed groups have also regularly set bombs in public places, indiscriminately killing civilians; in 2002, a bomb in the crowded market of Larba, south of Algiers, killed more than forty people.

A key part of the government's response, particularly in the light of massacres of the civilian population, has been the formation of 'legitimate defence groups' (GLD), also known as 'patriots'. In 1998 the government referred to the existence of 5,000 of these paramilitary militias. They typically go far beyond their self-defence remit and carry out attacks or ambushes of armed groups, either alone or in support of the army. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International have continually expressed concern that the activities of these paramilitaries are unregulated and that they have been allowed to carry out extra-judicial killings with impunity.

Under the provisions of the state of emergency, which has been in force since February 1992, the army is virtually unconstrained by legal controls. The army's brutal counter-terrorism strategy has resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, according to national and international human rights groups. In 1992 a special anti-terrorism unit was formed, which went into service in 1994 and has had tremendous powers to detain and punish suspects. Extra-judicial executions are widespread and are regularly criticised in the annual reports of Amnesty International, the US State Department, and Human Rights Watch. Torture is also widely used, and remains 'prevalent and systematic' for individuals suspected of involvement with armed groups, according to Amnesty's report from their 2003 visit (Amnesty International 2003a).

Although most organisations have welcomed improvements in Algeria's human rights record, in recent years there are a number of continuing problems which are referred to in a range of reports (US State Department 2003; Amnesty International 2003b; Human Rights Watch 2003). A number of organisations express concern that few people are brought to trial from either guerrilla groups or the armed forces for established patterns of human rights abuses. A degree of impunity for membership of guerrilla groups was established in Bouteflika's civil concord law in 1999, but details of those pardoned is not public, and there is widespread concern that this has been extended even to those who have committed serious crimes. It is also extremely rare that anyone from the armed forces or police is brought to trial for serious crimes they are alleged to have committed.

Websites:

US Department of State: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18272pf.htm

Human Rights Watch Report, 2003 http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast1.html

Amnesty International Report, 2002 (AI Index: POL 10/003/2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org

Disappearances

One of the greatest areas of concern for human rights groups is the situation of 'disappeared' people. Although there have been very few cases of disappearances reported recently, estimates of the number of individuals who have been 'disappeared' by security forces in Algeria between 1992 and 1998 range from 3,500 to 10,000. This is certainly one of the highest rates of disappearances anywhere in the world over the last decade. The government's attitude to disappearances has evolved considerably over the last few years, though the situation has yet to find a consistent response. As recently as 1997, government officials argued that all of the people considered as 'disappeared' by their families could be accounted for. They claimed that the individuals had either been killed by armed groups, or had actually left to join armed groups and were wanted by the government; whereas, in many cases, their families had witnessed their arrests by agents of the state and had not seen them since.

The government first acknowledged that there was a problem in 1998, but claimed that most of the cases had already been solved; very little was done about it. Soon after his election in April 1999, Bouteflika underlined his determination to tackle the situation and spoke of 10,000 disappearances, a much higher figure than that given by human rights groups. Within a year, his enthusiasm appeared to be waning and, although many cases of disappearance were cited as solved by the government, these were largely unverifiable. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has pursued 1,133 cases with the Algerian government over the last decade, but its most recent report lists only thirteen cases as 'clarified'.

The government's response to NGOs campaigning for effective treatment of the issue of the 'disappeared' has not matched advances in other areas. Neither the National Association for Families of the Disappeared, nor the Association for Families of the Disappeared in Constantine or Somoutou, have received official recognition. Demonstrations by these organisations are frequently broken up by the police, and an international conference they organised in January 2003 was disrupted by the refusal to grant visas to foreign participants. Although there are virtually no new cases of disappearances reported, human rights groups are concerned about prolonged 'secret' detention, which has a similar effect.

Websites:

Collectif des families des disparu(e)s en Algérie (in French) http://www.maghreb-ddh.sgdg.org/cfda/index.html

Human Rights Watch: 'Neither among the living nor the dead: state sponsored "disappearances" in Algeria', 1998 http://www.hrw.org/reports98/algeria2/; 'Time for reckoning: enforced disappearances in Algeria', 2003 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria0203/

UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Report, 2002 http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/f5cefa4dfb6ad460c1256ba0004bb8d3?Opendocument

Armed groups

Guerrilla groups claiming inspiration from Islamic principles have caused tremendous suffering and loss of life in the current conflict. They are sometimes referred to as Islamic groups, but this is something of a misnomer in a country where they represent the views of such a tiny minority of the overwhelmingly Islamic population. They have gained notoriety over the last decade, but similar groups have existed before. The association Al Qiyam, formed in the mid 1960s, was perhaps the forerunner of radical Islam, establishing the style and concerns that would be taken up by the contemporary radical Islamist movement (Roberts 2003; Euzière 1999). From 1982 to 1987, Mustapha Bouyali led a group known as the Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA) in the Atlas Mountains, which stole money and arms and killed a number of police officers in their attempts to evade arrest (Martinez 1998).

Soon after the cancellations of the 1992 elections, the MIA was resuscitated under new leadership. It was rapidly joined by a diverse range of organisations such as Al Takfir w'al Hijra (Excommunication and Hegire) or the armed wing of the FIS, the AIS. These groups were committed to guerrilla warfare, though their strategies soon began to diverge, and further groups formed from disputes or the arrival of individuals sufficiently disillusioned and desperate to become involved. The GIA is one of the most well known of these groups. It appeared early in 1993, and has claimed the majority of the most violent attacks. It is extremely difficult to follow the changing fortunes and internal disputes of these groups. For many years, journalists were absent from large areas of the country, faced with government-imposed restrictions and threats from armed groups who deliberately targeted them for assassination; so virtually the only available information comes from the groups' own irregular and self-serving communiqués. Khelassi (1998) has pieced together various available sources of information, and cites at least seven separate factions of guerrilla groups.

In 1997 the AIS agreed to abandon their fight, though this was not announced until 1999 (Stora 2001). The GIA did not approve of this strategy, and as early as 1996 there were accusations that the GIA was responsible for the assassination of political figures in the FIS (Martinez 1998:361). The most terrible massacres of 1997 were in areas that had traditionally been loyal to the FIS in the Mitidja, south of Algiers, and in the mountains near Relizane. The continued struggle between the FIS and the GIA is one explanation for this. Indeed, this is a pattern that has continued; for example, the town of Larba, the site of a serious bomb attack on the fortieth anniversary of independence in 2002, has always been considered as strongly supportive of political Islam.

Soon after election in 1999, Bouteflika announced a wide-ranging amnesty for guerrilla fighters who gave themselves up, and an early-release programme for prisoners, as part of his civil harmony law. Although a significant number of fighters did leave the armed groups (400, according to Le Monde, 13 January 2000) this amnesty was generally considered a failure since it was soon apparent that it had had little effect on the level of violence ( Le Monde, 11 April 2000). Some commentators even point to the amnesty and early-release programme to explain the rise of one of the more recent armed groups, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GPSC), which, along with the GIA, refused the amnesty (Addi 2001). Throughout the conflict these groups have been linked to organised crime and strategies for the personal enrichment of their leaders. This seems the most likely explanation for their continued struggle, since in the current situation it is impossible to imagine the violent overthrow of the Algerian state.

Website:

Civil harmony law (in French) http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/algerie/histoire/loi_sur_la_concorde_civile.htm

The armed forces

There can be little doubt that the real power of the Algerian state lies not with the elected representatives, but with the high-ranking military officials who have remained in place for the duration of the conflict. The conflicts at the heart of the regime are played out between different factions in this arena, rather than in the more transparent context of party politics and the democratic institutions of the national and regional assemblies. The legitimacy of these powerful figures in the Algerian regime rests on the legitimacy of the armed forces, and any criticism of the armed forces is a delicate and difficult matter. Despite widespread evidence for the involvement of the armed forces in regular and serious human rights abuses, including torture, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances, it is extremely rare for any individuals to receive any punishment or even official sanction. Where the government has acknowledged the abusive activities of the armed forces, they have been explained as the transgressions of over-zealous individuals, though human rights groups have been unable to verify claims that any members of the armed forces have been punished.

Throughout the conflict, much more serious allegations have been made of the more organised involvement of the armed forces in human rights abuses. Perhaps the most significant of these allegations were made in two book-length eyewitness accounts that related particularly to the involvement of the army in massacres of the civilian population (Yous 2000; Souadia 2001). The claims of these books have been picked over in great detail, and a whole range of factual inaccuracies has been found. They have met with a particularly aggressive reaction from certain sectors in France, who have robustly rejected the implications that Islamist armed groups should be relieved of a certain degree of responsibility for acts that have been committed (Sifaoui 2002). However, the allegations of involvement of the army have not altogether disappeared, and several more books making similar accusations have appeared (Aboud 2002; Samraoui 2003). The political significance of the accusations, the continued appetite for books of this type, and the scarcity of information on Algeria create ideal conditions for this type of information to circulate. The history of these events will no doubt continue to be written and re-written for years, if not decades, to come.

These allegations are significant since they automatically implicate senior members of the Algerian regime in human rights abuses. They have therefore always been dismissed by the regime as groundless and politically motivated, but they have found favour with a significant proportion of the population. The former minister of defence, Khaled Nezzar, was forced to flee France in 2001 to avoid a prosecution for crimes against humanity brought against him by Algerian exiles. In a later high-profile case, Nezzar sued Habib Souadia, a former officer in the Algerian army, for repeating such accusations, but a Paris court significantly found that there was not sufficient evidence to reach a decision. Ironically the restrictions placed on information by the Algerian government are largely to blame for the vacuum of information in which such theories thrive (Silverstein 2000). In addition to the limited availability of information, the task of determining the role of the armed forces in the current conflict is made even more difficult by the fact that members of the armed groups frequently carry out attacks on the civilian population in military uniforms (such as the notorious false roadblocks), and members of the special forces may engage with the armed groups dressed as civilians or with the support of the civilian militias, the 'patriots'.

A number of organisations, such as Amnesty International, have consistently called for an international enquiry into the allegations of high-level involvement in human rights abuses. The Algerian government has always rejected such claims as international interference in its internal affairs, and the majority of political parties, including opposition parties, support the government position. A number of commentators highlight the fact that any changes imposed from outside Algeria would be unlikely to lead to a sustainable solution to the conflict, and genuine reform can only emerge from within. In addition to this, the widespread opposition to international involvement in the crisis would mean that any enquiry would not find sufficient co-operation to be useful anyway, even if there were more long-term possibility for it to be effective.

Internal displacement

All reports on internal displacement in Algeria highlight the difficulty of making any estimate of the numbers of people affected, due to inadequate information. The most widely quoted figure is that of the US Committee for Refugees, which refers to between 100,000 and 200,000 internally displaced (USCR 2002). The Global IDP Project monitors reports of displacement from various sources, including the Algerian press, and their data supports USCR's figure, though they provide more detailed geographical information. The most significant cause of displacement is violent attacks, or threat or fear of violence. This was particularly severe during the terrible massacres of 1997 and 1998. Since 2000, direct attacks have become less widespread, though reports have increased of armed groups destroying crops in rural areas and forcing the population to leave (Global IDP Project 2003). A series of natural disasters have also provoked significant population movement.

Although human rights reports highlight that no area of the country can be considered completely free from the danger of attack from armed groups (Amnesty International 2003b), attacks have affected certain areas disproportionately. The Mitidja plain, between Algiers and the mountains to the south, has been particularly seriously affected. This area, corresponding roughly to the wilayat of Bejaia and Médéa, is sometimes referred to as the 'triangle of death' (Dammers 1998) due to the concentration of massacres and violent attacks that have occurred there. Some commentators have referred to an 'exodus' from the Mitidja plain (Stora 2001), and a report cited by the Global IDP Project refers to 5,000 villages which have been deserted in the wilayat of Bejaia and Médéa alone.

Overall, the trend of movement has been from vulnerable rural areas, such as the Mitidja, to the towns. It is unusual for individuals to migrate internationally directly from more remote rural areas, and the move to the towns facilitates contacts that may lead to international migration. The growth of the urban population also places further strains on already scarce housing stock, and internally displaced people may have to cope with extremely precarious living conditions which may, in turn, make them more vulnerable to natural disasters.

Website:

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project: Profile of Internal Displacement, Algeria http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Algeria

Disturbances in Kabylia

The Kabyle population is the largest and most vocal of the four main Amazigh minority groups in Algeria. Kabyles have a long history of migration. They are over-represented amongst the emigrant population, and have historically been very significant in the political life of Algeria (Roberts 1982; 2003). Despite significant migration, the greatest number of Kabyles remain in their region of origin, Kabylia, a largely mountainous area east and south-east of the capital that does not correspond to any current administrative divisions. Kabylia has always been one of the poorest areas of the country, and today the population suffer from high levels of unemployment (approaching 90 per cent locally amongst people aged under 25), extremely high population densities in what remains a predominantly rural area, and minimal inward investment. Kabyles have a long tradition of political activism, and the Amazight movement, both in Algeria and internationally, is dominated by Kabyles, sometimes to the irritation of the smaller groups of non-Kabyles.

The current disturbances in Kabylia date from the twenty-first anniversary of the 'Berber Spring' (see The current conflict). In April 2001, shortly before the annual commemoration of the events of 1980, a 19-year-old student was killed by the gendarmerie. This triggered widespread rioting across the region. The gendarmes responded with excessive violence, including the use of live ammunition. The excessive response of the gendarmerie provoked continued violence and huge protests, such as the march on 21 May in Tizi Ouzou, which attracted a million people: the largest demonstration in Algerian history. Since the 'Black Spring' the situation in Kabylia has never been fully calmed. In total, over 100 people have been killed and many more injured (ICG 2003).

Initially there was some confusion over how the disturbances should be interpreted. A number of politicians, particularly the RCD, claimed that they derived exclusively from cultural demands of the Kabyle population; however, it soon became clear that these were not central to the concerns of the protestors in Kabylia. Both the FFS and the RCD attempted to channel the protests themselves, but neither was particularly successful, and a defining feature of the protests has been the rejection of the established political process. A collective of local people was rapidly formed, known by the name of the traditional village-level political structures of Kabylia: the 'Archs', or alternatively, simply the 'citizen's movement'. Although the initial demands that were expressed included recognition of cultural claims of the Kabyles, including the official recognition of the Tamazight language, the socio-economic situation and the general lack of concern expressed by politicians about the growing suffering of people in the region was equally significant. In this sense Kabylia represents a more severe example of conditions than can be found elsewhere around the country.

Both of these elements appear in the list of demands of the Archs, the El Kseur Platform. The government has made some progress addressing the culturally based demands and has recognised Tamazight as a national language, though not yet an official language (which would allow court proceedings to be conducted in Tamazight, for example). However, the government faces similar barriers to the implementation of the more general socio-economic demands as elsewhere in the country. Very little progress has been made in this direction, and this is commonly interpreted as a further indication of the government's lack of concern for these matters. The Collective of Archs has become increasingly intransigent in its demands, and according to a recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG 2003) based on considerable research in the region, has gradually cut itself off from its popular bases of support, particularly through its occasionally violent attempts to prevent voting in the elections of May and October 2002. The government met with this group several times in 2003, but there still seems to be little prospect of reaching any agreement. Most recently, dialogue with the government has produced divisions in the group, and El Watan reported that the Collective of Archs has divided over this issue ( El Watan, 31 October 2003; 1 November 2003).

Websites:

International Crisis Group: 'Algeria: Unrest and impasse in Kabylia', 2003 http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/middleeast/egypt_northafrica/reports/A400996_10062003.pdf

Algeria Watch: Chronology of events in Kabylia, April-August 2001 (in French) http://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/revolte/chronologie.htm ; National Commission of Enquiry Report into events in Kabylia, July 2001 (in French) http://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/revolte/issad_rapport.htm; National Commission of Enquiry Report into events in Kabylia, December 2001 (in French) http://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/revolte/issad_complement.htm

UK Amnesty: El Kseur Platform (some of the demands of this platform have now been met) http://www.amnesty-volunteer.org/uk/algeria/ElKseurPlatform.php

The legal framework

Algeria is party to all major international human rights treaties, including the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. It submits regular reports to the UN Economic and Social Council (see Civil society). Perhaps the most controversial piece of national legislation is the 1984 Family Code, which governs aspects of private law. A number of groups campaign for its abrogation, and although some modifications were made in 1998 and a national commission has been established to examine further changes, these are considered insufficient, as the entire text re-enforces gender inequality (FIDH 1999; Hadid 2003). It is seen as contrary to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which Algeria ratified in 1996.

Websites:

Full text of Family Code (in French) http://membres.lycos.fr/lexalgeria/droit%20de%20la%20famille.htm

LexAlgeria home page - full text links to major public and private Algerian legislation http://membres.lycos.fr/lexalgeria/

Full list of treaties and agreements signed or ratified by Algeria http://www.algeria-un.org/default.asp?doc=-treaty

OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa http://www.achpr.org/OAU_Convention_on_Refugee_Rights.eng.pdf

France

In 1990, 97 per cent of Algerians outside of Algeria were resident in France. There were over 600,000 Algerian nationals resident in France, and 200,000 more who were born in Algeria but had acquired French nationality. France imposed a visa requirement on Algerians in 1986, and in 1987 granted 571,993 visas to Algerians. By 1994, two years after the beginning of the conflict, this had fallen to just over 100,000. In August 1994, all French consulates in Algeria were closed, following a bomb attack, and Algerians had to apply directly to France. In 1996 only 40,000 visas were granted to Algerians, a fall of over 90 per cent over ten years. This figure has slowly risen since then, particularly since 2000, when the French embassy in Algiers reopened. Nevertheless, during the most difficult period of the conflict France clearly granted substantially fewer visas to Algerians than at other times.

The situation for Algerians requesting asylum in France was little better. From 1992 to 2002 17,172 Algerians requested asylum in France, though less than 500 were granted full refugee status (OFPRA, unpublished data). France also introduced a secondary form of protection called 'territorial asylum', which was designed specifically for Algerians. An estimated 12,000 Algerians have applied for territorial asylum since it was officially introduced in 1998, but a similarly tiny percentage has been recognised (exact figures are not available). It is clear that, despite introducing temporary exceptions to strict immigration legislation for Bosnians, Kurds, and Kosovans, successive French administrations from across the political spectrum have not been prepared to do the same for Algerians.

Germany

In the early 1990s, Germany received the overwhelming majority of refugees from the Algerian conflict. Applications in Germany peaked in 1993, when 11,262 Algerians requested asylum, almost 90 per cent of all the Algerians who requested asylum anywhere in that year. Germany received the majority of asylum applications in the EU from all nationalities at this time, but even by this standard the concentration of Algerian applications is surprising. A number of well-known FIS politicians were granted asylum in Germany in 1992, and Germany quickly acquired a reputation in Algeria for granting asylum to Islamists. This fact was often used by the Algerian government as evidence of an individual's involvement with terrorism. Like France, Germany did not recognise persecution from non-state agents, so people fleeing Algerian armed groups were rarely granted asylum, but unlike France, Germany was prepared to grant asylum to Islamist politicians who were fleeing the government but who were typically excluded from protection in France, simply on political grounds. France was very keen to prevent the arrival of individuals who may have been able to stir up radical political sentiments amongst the large Muslim population in France. From 1993 onwards, the number of Algerians claiming asylum in Germany fell off very steeply, with applications averaging barely more than 2,000 a year over the next ten years.

UK

In 1992, no Algerians requested asylum in the UK, but from 1993 onwards this began to rise slowly. By 2002 a total of 11,085 Algerians had requested asylum in the UK, the third-highest total anywhere in the world after Germany and France. This is surprising, since the movement of Algerians to the UK cannot be explained by an existing community, as in France and, to a lesser extent, Germany; in 1991 the UK had an Algerian population of just over 3,000. Nor can it be explained by the generous application of the UK asylum policy, since, until 1998, Algerians had no more chance of receiving asylum in the UK than in France, and even when the recognition rate increased dramatically in 1998, this did not translate into more applications in the following years.

In contrast to France and Germany, the UK does recognise persecution by non-state agents and, though this is unlikely to have provided an attraction since it remains virtually unknown, Algerians are one of the groups particularly affected by this difference. The UK also granted asylum to several prominent Islamist leaders, and in the mid 1990s it gained a reputation, similar to Germany's, as a key centre for Islamist politics, and in some circles has been connected with terrorism. This is largely unwarranted, since the UK courts have demonstrated their willingness to use the exclusion clause, Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, to refuse asylum to individuals considered to be dangerous. A key case in the application of Article 1F involves an Algerian, 'T', who was a member of the GIA and who was refused asylum by the British House of Lords in 1996 on the grounds that he had taken part in a 'serious non-political crime'.

Movement to the UK is also a result of interest and ability in the English language, though it is not the case that most Algerians coming to the UK speak English (Collyer 2003a). Although there have traditionally been very few links between Algeria and the UK, since 1995 a number of significant business deals have been agreed between British and Algerian companies, most notably between Sonatrach and British Petroleum in December 1995 (Aïssaoui 2001); and official delegations of British companies make regular visits to Algeria, most recently in December 2003 ( Quotidien d'Oran, 8 December 2003).

Websites:

Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK: 'Refugee populations in the UK: Algerians', (Michael Collyer, 2003) http://www.icar.org.uk/pdf/ng003.pdf

UK Amnesty: Algeria Newsletter http://www.amnesty-volunteer.org/uk/algeria/Newsletter.php

Rest of the European Union

Other EU countries have periodically received significant numbers of asylum seekers from Algeria over the past decade, though none approach the total numbers received in France, Germany, and the UK. Before the current conflict, small communities of Algerians existed in Belgium and the Netherlands, and both of these countries have received a total of around 5,000 asylum applications each from Algerians. Spain and Italy are both significant new destinations, although apart from 1998 and 1999 when Spain received over a thousand applications, they have both received only a hundred or so applications per year.

North America

There has long been a sizeable Algerian population in Quebec, and Canada is the only country outside of Europe recorded as receiving a significant number of Algerian refugees, a total of 5,769 in the decade from 1992 to 2002. It is obviously far more difficult to return to Algeria from North America, and research suggests that Algerians who hope to return to Algeria prefer to seek refuge in Europe. More recently Algerians have reached the USA, although the number of asylum applications there is really not significant. It seems that Canada and especially the USA are more often destinations for the wealthy elite, who may even travel there initially for the purposes of education.

Rest of the world

There is anecdotal evidence of small Algerian communities in a wide range of countries. There appears to be a significant community in francophone West Africa, particularly Senegal. Eastern Europe is another destination confirmed by a number of reports. Unfortunately, no figures exist to judge the size of these groups, and they are likely to be very small. However, they do illustrate the urgency of departure for certain sectors of the Algerian population and the direct results of the increased stringency of immigration and asylum policy throughout the European Union.

Saharawi refugees

There is remarkable disagreement over the precise number of Saharawi refugees in Algeria. They all live in camps in the area of Tindouf, extremely isolated in the far south-west of the country, near the Moroccan border. The Algerian government consistently cites a figure of 165,000 Saharawis in the camps, and UNHCR also uses this figure. The Moroccan government, on the other hand, argues that this figure is inflated for political reasons, and has come up with a (doubtless equally political) figure of 20,000 to 30,000. The US Committee for Refugees visited the camps in 2000 and, although they were unable to carry out anything like an ordered count, they refer to 80,000 Saharawis. Amnesty International also use a figure midway between the Moroccan and Algerian governments: 100,000. For a population that is so clearly demarcated by their isolation in an otherwise virtually deserted corner of Algeria, this range of estimates is surprising, but gives some indication of the political significance of the Saharwi refugees in Algeria for relations between Algeria and Morocco as well as for the future of the Western Sahara. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has pre-registered 129,863 refugees from the camps for the purposes of voting, so it seems likely that the true figure is closer to the upper end of these estimates.

There are four main areas of settlement for Saharwis south of the town of Tindouf. These areas are a considerable distance apart, and each contains a number of separate camps. The camps are all administered by the Polisario Front ( Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro) and effectively form a mini-state as part of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, which also covers the areas of the Western Sahara that are not occupied by Morocco. The Algerian government is totally open about the control of the Polisario over this area of Algeria, a unique situation in global refugee assistance. The camps date from 1975, when indigenous groups fled from Moroccan and Mauritanian forces entering the Western Sahara as Spanish colonial forces withdrew. The Polisario reached agreement with Mauritania in 1979, but the dispute with Morocco over the sovereignty of the Western Sahara has continued to sour relations between Morocco and Algeria.

Algeria has had observer status in the continuing UN-sponsored negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and the tremendous influence that Algeria is able to exert over the Polisario has given it a key role in these negotiations. Since 1999 MINURSO has attempted to negotiate an agreement to identify those people who would be eligible to vote in a referendum to determine the future of the disputed territory. The most recent plan, published in May 2003, abandoned the idea of a referendum entirely after repeated failure to reach agreement on the issue of voter eligibility. Instead it put forward the idea of an initial period of autonomy for the Western Sahara within Morocco. This was rejected by Morocco, the Polisario, and Algeria, but, following what most Algerian newspapers considered to be extensive US pressure on Algeria (Ouazani 2003), Algeria and the Polisario accepted this plan. It was officially passed by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2003 (Resolution 1495), though Morocco remains firmly opposed. The technique of using Algeria as an intermediary in this manner is likely to remain important given the renewed importance of relations with the USA for the current Algerian administration.

Local integration is not an option for the Saharawi refugees, since conditions locally do not allow them to be self-sufficient and they are likely to remain dependent on international assistance until other solutions can be found. UNHCR reports that the vast majority of people in the camps are women, children, and elderly people (UNHCR 2003). Though disease, malnutrition, and access to water are vastly improved since the dramatic situation in the 1970s, life in the camps remains extremely harsh, and concerns have recently been expressed about the quality of water and supplies of food ( BBC News, 29 August 2002). Amnesty International has raised concerns about the freedom of movement of Saharawis within Algeria. They are certainly constrained by resources, since the camps operate a virtually money-free society; and, given the employment situation in the rest of Algeria, it is virtually impossible for them to find work elsewhere. However, there are also reports of restrictions imposed on their movement by both the Algerian authorities and the Polisario leaders, who are obviously keen that as many people as possible remain in the camps (Amnesty International 2003c).

Websites:

US Committee for Refugees: Algeria country report http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/2003/algeria.cfm

Western Sahara Online http://www.wsahara.net/

Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic http://www.arso.org/03-0.htm

CIA Factbook: Western Sahara http://www.cia.gov/cia/publication/factbook/geos/wi.html

Algerian ministry of foreign affairs: chronology of Western Sahara http://www.mae.dz/index.asp?rub=2&ntitre=218

UN Security Council Resolution 1495 http://ods-dds-ny.org/doc.UNDOC/GEN/N03/447/80/PDF/N0344780.pdf

Other refugee groups

In addition to the Saharawis, there are an estimated 4,000 Palestinian refugees living in Algeria. Because of their tiny number, they do not face the same barriers to integrating into mainstream society as they do in the Middle East. Over the last few years, Algeria has also become a significant transit country for refugees from further south attempting to reach Europe. The difficulties of crossing the Sahara are highlighted by occasional reports of the death of groups of refugees in the Sahara from hunger or thirst. UNHCR is the asylum-granting authority in Algeria, and all refugees recognised by UNHCR are also recognised by the Algerian government. Despite the prolonged insecurity in the country, about a hundred refugees per year have been claiming asylum to UNHCR Algeria in recent years. In 2000, 90 per cent were recognised (UNHCR 2001). It seems likely that this represents only a tiny fraction of the potential numbers of refugees, since, due to the conflict, UNHCR has only a tiny presence outside of the Tindouf camps and works mainly through local partners. The inclusion of non-Algerian nationals in the recent EU readmission agreement with Algeria also indicates that Algeria is considered to be a significant transit country for migrants to the EU. Reports from Algerian NGOs suggest some concern that individuals wishing to claim asylum are treated as illegal immigrants and deported. UNHCR's Country Operations Plan for Algeria for 2003 prioritises the effective application of the 1951 Convention and the establishment of national refugee legislation (UNHCR 2003).

Women

Women have been targeted throughout the conflict by armed groups. Women with a more western lifestyle, or exercising professions of responsibility, such as school teachers, have been particularly targeted for individual attacks (USCR 1999). Attacks on women, especially rape, have also been used by armed groups as a weapon to terrorise entire populations (Lalami-Fates 1995). Although armed groups have been the most severe perpetrators of violence against women, government forces have dealt very severely with any women they consider associated with armed groups. Mobilisations in defence of the 'disappeared' typically involve female relatives, and there have been many reports of demonstrations being violently broken up. This tendency was increasing at the end of 2003. Algeria signed and ratified the UN Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1996. The Family Code was widely considered to be in breach of this convention (FIDH 1999). In November 2003, President Bouteflika announced a new national commission to 're-examine' the Family Code, but a number of observers have interpreted this move in the light of presidential elections in 2004 rather than any serious intention of reform (Hadid 2003).

Websites:

Rassemblement Algerien Contre la Hogra et pour les Droits des Algeriennes (RACHDA) (in French, Spanish, and Italian) http://www.nodo50.org/mujeresred/RACHDA.html

Algerian government's report to UNDAW 1999 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/algeria.htm

Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), alternative report to the Algerian government's above, 1999 (in French) http://www.fidh.imaginet.fr/rapports/r273.htm

'Intellectuals'

From 1993 onwards, the GIA began a policy of targeting journalists, academics, artists, writers, and any other prominent intellectual figure who criticised them in any way. The International Committee of Support for Algerian Intellectuals (CISIA) was set up in Paris to provide support to people targeted in this way. By the end of the 1990s, the CISIA offered a more general support role to Algerian refugees. A whole range of smaller-scale, locally based solidarity organisations have also developed, mainly in France, over the last decade (Lloyd 1999a; 1999b). Many of these, such as the association ' Acceuil et Soutien des Exilés Algériens', founded in Marseille, have been set up, often by recently arrived Algerians, to offer assistance to newly arrived refugees. Many Algerians who have left Algeria during the conflict describe themselves as 'exiles', a term that effectively captures their feelings of distance from Algeria and simultaneous alienation from the long-established community of Algerians, particularly in France. There are also solidarity organisations that campaign and collect financial or material support directly for those in Algeria (such as Solimed, in Paris); cultural associations (such as Planet DZ); and political campaigning groups focused on Algeria (such as Verité et Justice pour l'Algérie, founded by Nesroullah Yous). Many of these groups have been founded by 'intellectuals' recently arrived from Algeria who have brought a new dynamism and urgency to Algerian-focused associations in France, and have spread concerns across Europe and further afield.

Imazighen

Imazighen have always been an economically deprived minority in Algeria. Although they have not suffered a systematic pattern of social disadvantage and have occupied many top government positions, the way in which their socio-economic and cultural grievances have been treated by the Algerian regime provoked the rioting of spring 2001. Since then, Kabyles in particular have received ill-treatment at the hands of security forces and police.

Members and family of security forces and police

The security forces and police have been amongst the first victims of the armed groups from the beginning of the conflict. Even comparatively moderate groups such as the AIS focused their fighting on agents of the state, and more extreme groups (GIA, GSPC) deliberately targeted their families as well.

Homosexuals

In Algeria homosexuality is punishable by a prison term of up to two years and a fine. Homosexuals may suffer harassment from security forces or society in general (Amnesty International 2003b). UNHCR has recognised that homosexuals who suffer ill-treatment and whose government is unwilling to offer protection should receive refugee status as members of a particular social group (UNHCR 2002).

Members and suspected members of armed groups and their families

Torture and ill-treatment remain widespread for those who are, or are suspected of being, involved with armed groups. Both Amnesty International and UNHCR have advised against the return of individuals linked to these groups (Amnesty International 2003b; UNHCR 1997).

Le Monde

Le Quotidien d'Oran

El Watan