Website:Online Burma Library: Refugees http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=456&lo=d&sl=0 |
If not deterred by distance, the real threat of landmines en route, the belief that they will not be granted asylum, or accounts of how 'inhumane' refugee camps have become in recent years, refugees from Burma arrive in Thailand. Along the Thai-Burma border there are four main groups of refugees - Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon. The Shan are not recognised as refugees and there are no Shan refugee camps. The Karenni and Karen groups live in refugee camps and some of these camps also have a significant section for Muslim refugees. The Mon have been repatriated to designated sites only a few kilometres inside Burma.
Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. However, since 1979, Thailand has been a member of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (Excom) which has reached a number of conclusions dealing specifically with the obligation not to forcibly repatriate people.
Websites:UNHCR: Myanmar-Thailand border (August 2002) http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=MEDIA&id=3d5123051f&page=publ Refugees International: Pushing Past the Definitions: Migration from Burma to Thailand http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Caouette&Pack.htm |
Since 1984 a consortium of NGOs have provided a programme to provide material assistance to refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border. This consortium, the Burma Border Consortium (BBC) meets monthly in Bangkok for co-ordination meetings. Arriving in 1984, the first refugees from Burma were Karen, with Karenni refugees arriving in 1989 and Mon refugees in 1990. As each refugee group arrived they established refugee committees in order to provide relief assistance and to negotiate with NGOs.
The total border camp population, including the three Mon resettlement sites on the Burma side, totalled around 143,000 in early 2003. The rate of arrivals has been constant since the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered the refugees in 1999, averaging fewer than 900 per month for the past 3 years. A Karen refugee camp known as Mae La houses close to a quarter of the total population of refugee along the border. The camp populations are regarded by UNHCR as prima facie refugees.
Between 1995 and 1998, the camps began to be more tightly controlled after cross-border attacks by the Burmese army and DKBA forces. Many of the smaller camps were closed and consolidated camps came under Thai military control for the first time.
Refugee camps set up to house Burmese refugees following 1997 were radically different to previous camps. They were to be more 'temporary' than previous camps, and restrictions on the materials allowed to build houses were imposed. Bamboo thatch was prohibited from use, and the space allocated for each house was well below international standards. The 'temporary shelters' were set up in rows rather than in the usual 'village style' of previous refugee camps. Fences were constructed around some of the camps, and movement into and out of the camps was restricted. It was widely considered that a form of 'humane deterrence' was in operation.
Since 1998, the Thai government has officially identified refugees as 'temporarily displaced', determined under a restricted definition of 'fleeing fighting'. Previous to 1998 no formal status-determination process existed, and entry to camps depended upon camp officials. A process of screening by the Thai government with the establishment of the Provincial Admissions Boards was set up, with the Admission Boards meeting irregularly. Also in 1998, the Thai government invited UNHCR to establish offices in three provincial towns and to act as observers in the screening process and register people residing in refugee camps. This was the first time UNHCR had a presence along the Thai-Burma border to fulfil their protection mandate. Their limited role as observers in the screening process has proved restrictive.
As of 2003, Karen and Karenni refugees are no longer accepted by Thai authorities and are often subject to refoulement (forcible repatriation) on arrival.
Unlike the Karen and Karenni populations, people fleeing persecution from Shan state have not been permitted to establish refugee camps in Thailand. As such, they are unable to receive humanitarian relief from the consortium of NGOs that provide material assistance to refugee camps along the border. Historically, Shan people entering Thailand have been viewed as seasonal labour for orchard farming and construction sites. However, in July 1996, a group of Shan volunteers in Thailand made an urgent appeal to UNHCR. They drew attention to the persecution by the Burmese army and asked to be able to set up refugee camps. In particular, they wanted to alleviate the suffering of the children, the sick, and elderly grandparents who had been forced across the border. The Thai government continues to deny that refugees from Shan state exist. It is estimated that Shan refugees have been arriving in Thailand at an average rate of at least 1,000 per month for the last few years.
A report detailing rapes of Shan women inside Burma has once again highlighted the need for some sort of recognition of Shan refugees in Thailand. Survivors of rape who managed to reach Thailand have no protection, no access to humanitarian aid or to counselling services.
Thousands of people have fled Burma, many for exactly the same reasons as refugees in camps, and have not entered refugee camps. They have instead joined the exploited and often underpaid factory workers, construction workers, domestic servants, and sex workers currently residing in Thailand.
Following a cease-fire agreement between the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Burmese authorities in 1996, some 10,000 Mon people who, under Thai military pressure, 'spontaneously repatriated' did so with no UNHCR assistance or monitoring. The 'returnees' moved to designated sites only a few kilometres inside Burma, due in part to fear of returning to their villages of origin. No international agency with a mandate for protection has access to these areas. In April 1996, at the height of the 'repatriation', there were as many as 500 new arrivals to the refugees camps on the Thai side of the border. People were fleeing forced portering, forced taxation, persecution, and forced labour on the Ye-Tavoy railway.
Thailand has made sporadic attempts at refoulement of Burmese refugees. During the 1997 military offensive by the Burmese army on the KNU, a number of the people fleeing were sent back across the border by Thai authorities. During the night of 25 February, women and children were separated from the men in a village known as Bong Ti. It is known that about 230 men were sent back to the village of Htee Khee on the Burma side of the border and were told by the Thai Ninth Division to fight or surrender. Women and children were granted access into Thailand and an arbitrary decision-making process for boys less than 13 years of age and men over 60 years of age was undertaken to allow asylum. Also on 25 February, approximately 300 women and children were loaded onto trucks from the site of Pu Nam Rawn and were taken to Ratchaburi, and from there were forcibly repatriated to Mya Pho Hta. On 26 February approximately another 600 women and children received the same treatment.
By 1 March 1997, following intense international criticism, The Nation newspaper reported the abrupt halt to the relocation and repatriation of thousands of Karen refugees. However, on 9 and 10 March further 'pushbacks' occurred on some 3,300 people.
On 29 May 1997, with the knowledge of UNHCR, some 430 people from Shan state were 'escorted' to the border by approximately 150 Thai armed personnel and were refouled. Between 2 and 5 June of the same year, a group of Mergui-Tavoyans were subjected to refoulement. Approximately 470 women, children, sick, and elderly were trucked down to an area of the border and were told to start walking back to Burma. This group of people were said to be in very poor physical condition, having been displaced inside Burma for approximately three months prior to attempting to reach the Thai border.
Maybe the most disturbing act of refoulement took place on 6 June 1997. Between 300 and 400 Mon refugees who had sought asylum in Thailand were repatriated with only two days' notice. These people were villagers under the direction of splinter group of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) known as the Mon Army Mergui District (MAMD). This splinter group had surrendered to the Burmese military regime on 24 May 1997. During the time before the surrender of MAMD, Thai authorities would not allow these people to return to their village. After the surrender, these people were told to return to Burma. UNHCR took on an 'observer' role at this repatriation. Following their return, reports were received that the men, women, and children were used as forced labourers to build an army base. Exits to their village were blocked by Burmese army troops, and freedom of movement was severely restricted within the village.
Prior to 1998, UNHCR was not permitted by the Thai authorities to establish a presence at any point along the border in order to carry out its protection mandate. UNHCR personnel were only able to visit the camps after prior agreement from the Thai authorities.
UNHCR determined whether individuals who applied at their office in Bangkok in person were 'Persons of Concern' (POC) to UNHCR. Those who were determined as being POC were then further divided into those who have a 'secondary fear of persecution' in the border camps (termed 'non-border cases') and those who did not have a 'secondary fear of persecution' (termed 'border cases'). During 1996 the categorisation of people as 'border cases' became a particularly problematic phenomenon, since it left people who were recognised as Persons of Concern with limited options. Persons of Concern from the border were only accepted into a 'safe area' in Ratchburi Province if they were ethnic Burmans or if they could provide a 'secondary fear of persecution' by non-state agents at the border. All other Burmese Persons of Concern were termed 'border cases', were denied UNHCR assistance, and were advised to return to make the illegal journey back to the border by themselves. Being a Person of Concern to UNHCR is not recognised in any meaningful way by the Thai authorities - it does not provide protections against deportation or detention.
UNHCR's lack of participation in the repatriation of Mon refugees in 1996, their reluctance to the make public statements upon acts of refoulement by Thai authorities, and their 'observer' role at repatriations that do not follow international standards have been heavily criticised by NGOs working in the field.
Since 1998, UNHCR have been allowed by the Thai authorities to have 'observer' status along the Thai-Burma border. They have opened field offices in towns along the border in order to carry out their protection mandate. However, their limited role as observers has proved restrictive.
Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. In March 1978, operation Nagamin Sit Sin Yay (King Dragon Operation) had been launched by the Burmese, targeting the Rohingya due to their citizenship status (see above section on the persecution of Muslims X). Following this, large numbers fled to Bangladesh - the Bangladesh government claimed that more than 250,000 had sought refuge and the Burmese authorities put the figure at less than 150,000. The relationship between the two countries was strained due to this event.
In 1991-2, some 250,000 Rohingyas once again fled from Burma and a further exodus from Burma to Bangladesh occurred in 1996 and 1997. The main method for 'resolving' the Rohingya issue has been through bilateral agreements directly between Burma and Bangladesh, i.e. sometimes without the desired 'tripartite' agreements that involve UNHCR.
Website:UNHCR Northern Rakhine state (May 2002) http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=MEDIA&id=3cee10f54&page=publ |
In 1978, thirteen refugee camps were established in Bangladesh for some 250,000 refugees. In 1991-2, twenty refugee camps were set up again for more than 250,000 Rohingya Muslims fleeing persecution by the Burmese army.
Refugee camps were congested, had limited water and sanitary services, and access to education was restricted. Refugees' movements were restricted and they were not allowed to seek employment or engage in any activities outside the camps. Until mid 1996, no formal schooling was allowed in some of the camps.
Towards the end of the 1970s, UNHCR became involved in a controversial repatriation of Rohingya Muslims who had fled persecution in Burma. A large UN relief programme was co-ordinated by UNHCR from May 1978. A bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Burma on repatriation was made in July 1978 and by the end of 1979 more than 180,000 people had been repatriated. With a limited presence inside Burma, UNHCR spent US$7 million on projects to assist reintegration.
Following the 1991-2 exodus from Burma, UNHCR provided the refugees with dry rations, clothes, and fuel for cooking. Another bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Burma was made in 1992. UNHCR was finally allowed to have a presence in Rakhine state in Burma in 1993, and facilitated the voluntary repatriation of refugees from 1994. Questions over the 'voluntariness' of the repatriation were posed by NGOs at the time, but in UNHCR's assessment people were better off in their homes in Burma than in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Their presence in Rakhine state to monitor the return has raised serious doubts by NGOs about their effectiveness.
A further exodus from Burma to Bangladesh occurred in 1996 and 1997. Bangladeshi forces attempted refoulement, during which time UNHCR made public statements calling for a halt to the forced repatriation.
UNHCR has a continued presence inside Burma to carry out reintegration projects and continue a dialogue with the military regime over the Rohingya citizenship issue. They have suggested that a remaining 21,000 refugees in Bangladesh should be settled temporarily as the Burmese authorities are unwilling to accept their return and donors are unwilling to fund the Rohingya operation indefinitely.
Website:Medicines Sans Frontieres (Holland): 10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future (March 2002) http://www.msf.org/source/downloads/2002/rohingya.doc |
In 1998, the USCR estimated that the number of Burmese refugees in India was around 40,000. Ethnic Chin from Chin state and the western Sagaing division in north-west Burma have fled to Mizoram state in north-east India to avoid forced labour and military persecution. Following the 1988 uprising, a number of Burmese 'students' fled to India. Several pro-democracy organisations are based in India, free from the restrictions imposed on similar groups in Thailand.
The Indian government has widespread sympathy for the Burmese pro-democracy movement in India, and in particular for Dew Aung San Suu Kyi, who spent several years in Delhi when her mother was the Burmese ambassador to India. In 1998, seventy-five members of India's parliament signed a petition supporting the NLD's call to allow the Burmese parliament elected in 1990 to meet.
An unprecedented joint military operation, known as 'Operation Golden Bird' was started in 1995 against ethnic insurgents along the border. This was, however, called off halfway through by the Burmese regime in protest at the Indian government's award of the prestigious Nehru Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi.
In recent years the Indian Government has been establishing stronger military and trade ties with Burma, which has resulted in greater pressure on refugees in India.
There are a number of Burmese 'students' and Chin in Delhi, many of whom are Persons of Concern to UNHCR. Burmese refugees in Delhi are able to study, either to go on to further education or at university level.
Website:Prospect Burma http://www.prospectburma.org/ |
Following the 1988 uprising, China was one of the countries that the military regime was able to turn to for military support. In the 1990s the Beijing government became the regime's strongest ally. Between 1990 and 1997, China furnished as much as US$3 billion's worth of military equipment to the Burmese army. This included fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, radar, signals intelligence equipment, and electronic warfare equipment. The Chinese armed forces also provided training for Burma's army, air force, and navy. This assistance was mainly in return for access to intelligence information on India's military activities and Burma becoming a market for Chinese goods. Having China as an ally in international forums such as the UN had, until the late 1990s, assisted Burma in that they avoided discussions of their own human rights record.
There is an unknown number of Burmese refugees in south-west China. Little is known about this group.
Since 1988, thousands of Burmese students have been resettled in the USA, Canada, Australia, and Europe. Several western governments have provided funding to non-violent Burmese activists and journalists in exile with the aim of strengthening the pro-democracy movement inside Burma. Two radio stations, the Democratic Voice of Burma (based in Oslo), and Radio Free Asia's Burmese section (based in Washington, DC), have been funded in this way.
Website:UNHCR: 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+AwwBmeJAIS_wwww3wwwwwwwhFqA72ZR0gRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA72ZR0gRfZNcFq1WK9WagdDVnDBodDaBnLBDzmxwwwwwww/opendoc.pdf |
The military regime in Burma commits human rights abuses with complete impunity, and it can be said that the entire population is in one way or another vulnerable. Thus, the concept of 'vulnerability' and 'vulnerable groups' inside contemporary Burma is a complex issue encompassing a number of considerations including gender, ethnicity, urban/rural location, age, and past political allegiances. What follows are some examples of why people could be considered vulnerable.
Website:Online Burma Library: Trafficking http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=505&lo=d&sl=0 |
Female children are vulnerable to being trafficked through brokers and sold into prostitution or domestic service in neighbouring countries (see next section X).
Burma is believed to have more child soldiers than any other country in the world. It is supposed that 70,000 or more of the Burmese army's estimated 350,000 soldiers may be children (Human Rights Watch, 2002). From the age of 11, male children live under the real threat of being forced into the Burmese army, where they are subjected to beatings and systematic humiliation during training. Once trained, they must engage in combat, participate in human rights abuses against civilians, and are regularly beaten and abused by their officers. They are refused contact with their families and face severe reprisals if they try to escape (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
Another method of recruitment is the Ye Nyunt system (Ye Nyunt means 'Brave Sprouts'). This is a system whereby Burmese army battalions take in young boys and send them to school from the battalion base. There are between 50 and 100 Ye Nyunt camps at battalion bases, each with 50-200 boys. Originally this system was for orphaned or displaced boys, but now boys are being kidnapped and forced into these military camps. Children aged 7 and up participate in military training with weapons wearing military uniforms. Regularly battered, allowed no contact with their families, and beaten by the entire group if caught attempting to escape, these boys must ultimately join the army once physically strong enough, usually between the ages of 12 and 16 (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
Again, no precise numbers can be obtained, but it is estimated that some 6,000-7,000 children are in the combined non-state armies (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Some children join opposition group armies to avenge past abuses by Burmese forces against their families, whilst others are forcibly conscripted. Whilst some of these groups are interested in demobilising their child soldiers, others deny their existence despite evidence to the contrary.
The military regime has to date failed to take any action to end child soldiering and has actually denied that the problem exists. Refugee camps in neighbouring countries are not open to deserters from the Burmese army, and official recognition by UNHCR is almost impossible for them to obtain.
Children within Burma are required to carry out forced labour on a regular basis (see section 2.3.1 on forced labour X).
Websites:Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org Human Rights Watch: 'My Gun Was As Tall As Me' http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/index.htm Relief Web, Myanmar (includes details of Security Council day-long debate on children and armed conflict) http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vCD/Myanmar?OpenDocument&StartKey=Myanmar&ExpandView Save the Children Fund, Regional Publications (includes child labour publications http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/development/reg_pub/index.htm Online Burma Library: Children http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=641&lo=d&sl=0 |
Amongst the ethnic groups along the Thai-Burma border it has been widely considered that rape is used by the Burmese military as a weapon of war. A past Earthrights International Report published in February 1998, School for Rape, began research into this subject as a specific theme of human rights documentation.
In July 2002, a report, Licence to Rape, was published by the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN), both based in Thailand, documenting 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence involving 625 girls and women. These rapes had been committed by Burmese troops in Shan state alone, mostly between 1996 and 2001. The report revealed that the Burmese military regime is allowing its troops to 'systematically and on a widespread scale commit rape with impunity in order to terrorise and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan state'. The report gave clear evidence that rape is officially condoned as a 'weapon of war'. According to the report, officers committed 83 per cent of the rapes, often in front of their troops; 25 per cent of the rapes resulted in death; and over half were gang-rapes.
Subsequent to this report the Burmese regime claimed to have launched an investigation which concluded the allegations were unfounded. Researchers of the report received threats and were harassed in Thailand following publication. The Special Rapporteur on Mayanmar appointed by the UN High Commission on Human Rights visited Burma in November 2002, refusing to accept the junta's invitation to investigate the rape incidents, instead stating that the UN would make its own independent investigation. An investigative report published in December 2002 by the US State Department verified what was contained in the Licence to Rape report. Also, an invitation to Amnesty International to visit Burma for the first time was considered to have been a result of this report.
When forced labour is required, women and children are often the family members that undertake this task, due to the men being vulnerable to accusations of assisting insurgents, being beaten, or being taken as porters.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is considered to be the only opposition army that has women and girl soldiers. Reportedly, it still, on occasions, forcibly conscripts girls under the age of 18 (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
Undocumented migrant women from Burma are doing 'sex work' in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan. Burmese women who migrate, much like other people migrating around the world, leave their homes and families in a poor country with the goal of moving somewhere perceived as richer, with more opportunities for work. Women from Burma are also migrating from an oppressed society, run by a military regime that does not respect any human rights, let alone women's rights.
Women from Burma are also vulnerable to being trafficked through brokers and sold into prostitution or domestic service in neighbouring countries. 'Closed brothels' are venues in which sex is sold but which do not advertise; women are not allowed to leave the premises and may be paying off a 'debt' to the broker who sold her to the brothel. This practice is known as a 'modern form of slavery' and reports by Human Rights Watch have documented this practise.
Websites:Shan Human Rights Foundation Women's Desk and Shan Women's Action Network: Licence to Rape report (May 2002) http://www.shanland.org/shrf/License_to_Rape/license_to_rape.htm US State Department: Investigation of Burmese Military Rape of Ethnic Women, Trip Report http://www.three.pairlist.net/pipermail/burmanet/20021209.txt US State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report (June 2003) http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/ Online Burma Library: Women http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=642&lo=d&sl=0 |
Men, particularly in the ethnic areas, are particularly vulnerable to being taken as 'porters' for military offensives or being accused of assisting insurgents and therefore beaten, tortured, or killed. There are reports from Arakan state that men may join the army in order to avoid being taken as porters.
In some villages, the role of village headman is rotated regularly due to the dangerous nature of the role. In areas that are regularly visited by military personnel, there have been occasions when women have taken on this role in order to avoid the extreme human rights abuses received by the men.
Men are also forcibly conscripted into the army and, unless able to pay a bribe to avoid conscription, are expected to serve for fifteen years. It is thought that the majority of new recruits are forcibly conscripted. Most of the political prisoners in labour camps or jails throughout Burma are men.
The history of civil society - considered here to mean the institutions and groupings that are autonomous from government - in Burma is complex. According to Steinberg (1999), civil society died under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) from 1962-88, or 'more accurately, it was murdered'. Fink (2001) points out that following the 1988 uprising, the beginnings of a civil society re-emerged, with independent organisations springing up and unions being formed by artists, actors, civil servants, and housewives. These organisations were, however, suppressed rapidly thereafter. Liddell (1999) points out that Burmese people do not enjoy fundamental freedoms and that, as such, the development and maintenance of a civil society in contemporary Burma cannot occur.
Within contemporary Burma there is no freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or freedom of association. The media is highly regulated, with the government holding a monopoly on television, radio, and the press. All media is officially controlled and censorship is strict. It is considered that these monopolies are instruments of propaganda, and most Burmese tune in illegally to the Burmese language version of the BBC or to the exile-run Burmese section of Radio Free Asia (RFA) or the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).
Among indigenous organisations, while the government has permitted the establishment of NGOs, thus far none of those formed are independent of government control and only the churches work with limited organisational and operational freedom. In most war-affected areas, however, the churches have been effectively banned from providing assistance.
Websites:Democratic Voice of Burma http://www.communique.no/dvb/ Relief Web, International Crisis Group (ICG), 6 December 2001 http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/40B952F11ED12A4985256B1B005B1057 Civil Society for Burma http://www.csburma.org Online Burma Library: Civil society http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=582&lo=d&sl=0 |
Few international NGOs operate in Burma, although the number has increased in recent years. This is partly due to concerns about human rights abuses and corruption within the government, which make it difficult to work effectively, and partly because officials at the national and local levels are deeply suspicious of foreign assistance.
Permission to operate is dependent upon the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SPDC, and operational difficulties have been encountered by NGOs in the past. Nevertheless, some NGO assistance is provided in urban relocation sites. Among the ethnic minority areas, NGOs have been permitted to work in Arakan state, where UNHCR and three international NGOs have been permitted to assist with the return of Rohingya Muslim refugees returning from Bangladesh. These agencies have, however, been powerless to prevent the continued displacement of Muslim villagers. For these reasons, the impact of assistance by NGOs with a presence in Burma is minimal.
The ICRC withdrew from Burma in June 1995 due to lack of standard access to prisoners and reopened an office in Rangoon in 1999.
Websites:United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) http://www.mm.undp.org/ UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/myanmar/ Save the Children Fund (UK) http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/ International Rescue Committee http://www.theirc.org Jesuit Refugee Service http://www.jesref.org/ Medicines Sans Frontieres (MSF) http://www.msf.org/ Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ Human Rights Watch (HRW) http://www.hrw.org/; World Report 2003 http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asia2.html; Burma/Thailand: No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/burma/; Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/ Norwegian Refugee Council http://www.nrc.no US Committee for Refugees (USCR) http://www.refugees.org/ World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) http://www.omct.org/ |