Colonial interventions in the Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century resulted in the formation of five distinct geographical units inhabited by Somalis: the Côte Française des Somalis in present day Djibouti; British Somaliland in the north-west; the Ogaden, which was colonised by Ethiopia; Somalia Italiana in the south and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) under British rule as part of north-eastern Kenya. The five-pointed star of the Somali flag, expressing the aspiration for a united Somalia, became the basis for the Somali independence movement after the Second World War.
Somalia is often cited as a rare example of ethnic homogeneity in Africa, with a common language and religion that provided the basis for its relatively peaceful transition to independence in 1960. This common history and identification underplays the basis of Somali society in clan networks and the ethnic and linguistic diversity within the Somali population. Despite attempts to suppress clan identities, clanship has habitually resurfaced as a basis for political organisation and identification in the post-colonial period ( see Section 3.1 ). Somalia represents a case of the superimposition of the nation-state form upon diverse and fluid clan networks. In addition, minorities with distinctive religious practices and languages, notably in the inter-riverine and coastal areas, were socially marginalised and under-represented in governmental positions in the post-colonial period. The intensification of clan divisions and the widespread suppression of minorities have been the dominant features of the last two decades in Somalia.
From the founding of the Somali Republic in 1960 there were difficulties over uniting the two areas of previously British-controlled Somaliland in the north-west, and Italian-ruled Somalia in the south. In April 1960 a joint meeting of the administrations of Somaliland and Somalia proclaimed that the two territories would be united. Discrepancies between the two administrations led to a now-independent Somalia issuing a decree of union between the two entities, although this was never legally formalised. Despite this, Somaliland and Somalia were de facto united in July 1960 as the Somali Republic. The new government was southern-dominated, one amongst several factors which quickly led to northern calls for secession. A referendum held in the north in 1961 showed clear evidence of opposition to the Union ( Drysdale 1992 ). Particular grievances arose in relation to the different administrations, legislatures, languages, and regional disparities between the north and south of the fledgling republic. An attempted coup d'etat in the north followed hard on in December 1960. Although this was unsuccessful it was a warning sign of the instability of the union and in particular of northern fears of attempted southern hegemony.
The conflict between the centralised character of the post-colonial state and the basis of Somali society in clan networks and previous colonial divisions are the central factors explaining the history of conflict and forced migration in Somalia. The multi-party democracy that was introduced with independence was particularly prone to clan factionalism. The 1960-4 period under President Abdirshid A. Shermarke consisted of a coalition of parties with the main lines of cleavage falling along both class and clan divisions. The Mohamed I. Egal and Abdirizak H. Hussein administrations of the 1964-9 period tended toward northern domination. The combination of class-based politics and clan factionalism accelerated after 1967 under the new government of Egal ( Samatar 1988 ).
A deteriorating situation, including economic stagnation, partial proletarianisation of rural areas, urban poverty, and continued dependence on overseas aid, was brought to a head with the assassination of President Shermaarke in 1969. Despite Prime Minister Egal's attempts to improve the situation, six days after the assassination the military assumed power in a bloodless coup. In many quarters the coup was seen as justifiable, given the scale of abuse and misuse of public power and resources by elected politicians ( Samatar 1992 ).
Any hopes for improvement under the military rule of Major General Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) were soon to be dashed. Suspension of the constitution and parliament, as well as curtailment of rights of association, were rapidly enforced. Barre's programme of national reconstruction under the banner of 'scientific socialism', consisted of a range of projects aimed at national revitalisation. The distinctive features of Barre's reign were the extent of militarisation first under Soviet and then US tutelage, and the centralisation of power in Barre's own hands. The negative features of the Barre regime included economic mismanagement, dependency on military aid, and a high external debt. There were some positive developments relating to Barre's social and political campaigns, in education and literacy for example ( Laitin 1977 ) and the position of women ( IRBC 1994 ). In addition to a cult of personality around Barre, there was the barely disguised hegemony of the Darod clan family in the so-called Ministry of Defence (MOD) alliance of the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante clans, which administered the state apparatus (Lewis 1994). This was despite the official campaigns condemning tribalism that Barre initiated in 1971 ( see Section 3.1 ).
The political manipulation of clanship was a central feature of the Barre regime. Competition for control of state resources intensified between the different clan factions. An abortive coup by the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darod was led against Barre during the Ogaden war of 1977 ( see Section 5.1.1 ). Barre faced a situation of combined crises on military and political fronts as opposition movements began to co-operate from the late 1970s onwards. The Majerteen Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) based in the north-east of the country was formed in the late 1970s. The Isaq-affiliated Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north-west was formed in the Gulf states and UK in the early 1980s. Both groups were singled out for persecution by Barre's MOD alliance.
While the SSDF weakened throughout the 1980s, the SNM continued to pose a threat to the dominance of the Barre regime. A peace agreement between Mengistu of Ethiopia (who supported the opposition in Somalia) and Barre meant that his forces could be safely ranged against the SNM. Pre-empting a strike by Barre, in 1988 the SNM briefly took control of Hargeisa and Burao in the north-west. In the government counter-attack, thousands of civilians were killed in aerial bombing. Non-MOD elements of the national army began to desert and form their own clan-based organisations. The Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in 1989. These three opposition groups, including the Ogaden-affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) converged on Mogadishu in January 1991. As Barre fled the capital on 27 January 1991, the dissolution of the Somali state accelerated.
From the fall of Barre to the current situation in Somalia there were four phases. The most intense period of conflict was during 1991-2 when the different clan factions (from the old regime and the newly emerged opposition militias) fought for control of land and resources in the south of the country. This resulted in the devastation of the inter-riverine areas. Increasing numbers of refugees left the country for neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia at that time, while the number of IDPs increased dramatically. The formation in 1991 of independent Somaliland in the north-west created an enclave of reconstruction and relative peace. Drought and famine in the inter-riverine areas, and the disruption of farming and livestock production as a result of conflict, caused thousands of deaths and further migration to aid camps in urban areas.
The phase of UN interventions that followed from 1993-5 was one of localised conflicts, specifically around Mogadishu. The humanitarian aim of the interventions was clouded by a lack of clarity over the role of UN forces. Their role in 'nation building' became a rallying point for united Somali opposition. Refugees continued to flee the country, and internal displacement became entrenched in particular regions of the country. The last UN troops left Somalia in 1994-5.
The post-intervention phase from 1995 to 2000 saw the emergence of regional administrations and the continued dissolution of the Somali state. Conflict continued unevenly in different regions of the country, causing internal displacement and steady refugee flows. Puntland in the north-east declared itself a regional administration in 1998, and in March 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) formed the State of Southwestern Somalia in the Bay and Bakool regions. Conflict erupted in Puntland in 2001. The southern regions remained the centre of conflict in Somalia in the late 1990s and into the new century.
The fourth phase was from the establishment of the TNG in 2000 onwards. Key warlords' opposition to the legitimacy of the TNG has resulted in renewed conflict and population displacement in particular areas in the south. By contrast, the process of reconstruction continues in Somaliland and Puntland. These issues are discussed in more detail in Section 2.
Websites:Prunier, G., Writenet, 'Somalia: Civil war, intervention and withdrawal 1990-1995' http://asylumlaw.org/countries/index.cfm?fuseaction=showDocuments&countryID=207&offset=21 Sorens, J. P., and Wantchekon, L., Department of Political Science, Yale University, 'Social Order Without the State: the Case of Somalia' http://www.yale.edu/ycias/african/papers.htm US Department of State, Background Notes http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm Foreign Policy in Focus, Somalia http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n19som.html |