Iraq after Saddam

Political progress

On 28 June 2004, with the declared end of occupation by U.S.-led coalition forces and the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.-led coalition transferred sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG). U.S.-led forces remain in Iraq under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on June 8, 2004, creating the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and giving the MNF-I “the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,” working with the IIG.

With the transfer of sovereignty, the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) was instigated and remained in effect until “the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution”. The TAL contained a bill of rights for Iraqi citizens, including the right to freedom of expression and association, religious beliefs, and freedom from discrimination on ethnic, religious or other grounds. The law also stipulated that all citizens are equal before the law, and enjoy freedom from arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention, unfair trials and torture.

On January 30, 2005, Iraq held elections for twenty government bodies, including a Transitional National Assembly. The U.N.-assisted elections were declared a success, but they took place under conditions of extreme insecurity and political turmoil that, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), made it impossible for every eligible voter to freely make a choice.

The parliament that emerged from elections in December 2005 re-elected Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani to a second term in April 2006. He heads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq. The first non-Arab to head an Arab state, he has promised to work with all ethnic and religious factions to rebuild Iraq. President Talabani asked Shia politican Jawad al-Maliki to form Iraq's first full-term government since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Mr Maliki was the compromise candidate of the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance, the winners of parliamentary polls in December 2005. Kurdish and Sunni parties opposed the alliance's first nominee, interim Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari, who withdrew his candidature after four months of political deadlock. Mr Maliki is the deputy leader of the Dawaa Party, a Shia Islamist grouping. Mr Maliki helped to draft Iraq's new constitution, approved by voters in October 2005.

[TOP]

A security vacuum

Despite reaching a number of political landmarks, the Iraqi Government has been unable to restore law and order and the general climate across large parts of the country is one of impunity. Growing violence and armed opposition to authority has been most pronounced in areas where there is still a degree of ethnic and religious diversity. Violence is a critical, all-pervasive characteristic in the lives of people in many parts of Iraq. Both Sunni and Shi’a armed groups carry out direct attacks against civilians through suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, abductions, extrajudicial executions, large-scale insurgency attacks, and other criminal activities. No distinction is made between combatants and civilians. Everyone is a target – young and old, rich and poor. While civilian casualties are often concentrated in and around Baghdad, violence is common across many of the southern and central governorates. In addition, the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), Iraqi Special Forces, as well as insurgents, have been implicated in serious violations of the laws of armed conflict, as well as violations of human rights. These events have seriously impeded efforts to restore a sense of normality to ordinary people’s lives.

The level of violence in different areas of Iraq does currently vary a great deal. Security in Iraqi Kurdistan is better than in other parts of the country, and reconstruction efforts there, which started in the 1990s, are also much more advanced than in the Centre and South. The insurgency - and counter-insurgency operations - is concentrated in central Iraq. Violence in the South of the country is acute but more sporadic than in the Centre.

Estimates or counts of casualty figures range from 67,000 to 655,000 deaths as a direct or indirect consequence of the US-led invasion of 2003, the majority being young men. In 2006, an average of 94 civilians was killed violently in Iraq each day. According to Iraq’s Health Minister, for every person killed about three have been wounded.

[TOP]

Critical humanitarian needs

Iraq's current needs and responses should be viewed not only in the context of the latest conflict, but also in terms of two decades of decline and suffering. The public infrastructure in Iraq, heavily damaged during the 1991 Gulf War, has been disintegrating ever since through years of neglect, due to a shortage of spare parts for maintenance and repair, and funds to pay staff salaries. Water and sanitation facilities have suffered greatly for more than a decade due to serious energy shortages caused by damage to the electricity grid.

Even prior to the latest conflict, sixteen million Iraqis were dependent on food aid under the UN Oil for Food Programme and rates of chronic malnutrition in Iraq were worrying (11 per cent in the north and 23 per cent in the centre and south of the country). Since the imposition of sanctions, healthcare in Iraq has suffered from a lack of equipment and drugs needed to treat acute and chronic illnesses. Healthcare has also become increasingly centralised - the Oil for Food Programme put the Iraqi government in control of the distribution of humanitarian supplies - and less sensitive to the specific needs of different groups of the population.

Operation Iraqi Freedom compounded the shortfalls of the already weak infrastructure that the Iraqi people have endured since sanctions were imposed. With a devastated infrastructure, and conflict and civil disorder undermining relief and reconstruction efforts, Iraqis face immediate threats to their health, nutrition, livelihoods and security. In the long-term, establishing social and economic justice and security will be essential for lasting peace in Iraq so that the lives of the Iraqi people can resume a sense of normalcy, and those that want to return can do so.

The security vacuum that has characterised post-war Iraq to date has led to a breakdown in essential services including electricity and safe water, and shortages in medical supplies and access to treatment facilities. Apart from the damage to physical infrastructure, the professional class has been targeted resulting in a dire shortage of doctors and medical specialists, as well as teachers and university staff. According to the Brookings Institution, 12,000 out of 34,000 doctors have left Iraq, 250 have been kidnapped and 200 killed since 2003.

Up to 8 million people are classified as being vulnerable, according to an estimate based on information gathered by the Iraq UN Country Team: 2 million are estimated to be refugees/asylum seekers; nearly 2 million are estimated to be IDPs; and 4 million are estimated to be acutely vulnerable due to food insecurity. There has been a severe decline in standard of living, and a massive increase in the rate of unemployment – some estimates put the figure as high as 60 percent. 54 percent of the population is living on less that 1 US Dollar a day and 15 percent of those on less that 0.5 US Dollars a day. Acute malnutrition rose from 4.4 percent in 2003 to 9 percent in 2005. Inflation stood at 70 percent in July 2006. Only 32 of the population has access to safe drinking water, even fewer people have effective sanitation, while in some parts of Iraq, levels of electricity are at an all time low. While several immunization campaigns have been successfully undertaken by the Ministry of Health, generally speaking, health services are in a catastrophic situation and even basic health needs cannot be met.

The World Food Programme’s (WFP) most recent reckoning of food insecurity in Iraq, released in May, 2006 before inter-communal violence and humanitarian access became markedly worse, estimated that over 4 million Iraqis were already food insecure and an additional 8.3 million people, or nearly 32 percent of Iraq’s population, were at risk of food insecurity if not provided with a daily ration under the Public Distribution System (PDS). This is an increase from the estimated 2.6 million which were found to be ‘extremely poor’ in WFP’s 2004 Baseline Survey. Many Iraqis are forced to sell their PDS rations to buy fresh food, medicine or pay for house rental. Research undertaken inside Iraq in November and December 2006 suggested that problems with the PDS were serious and increasingly widespread, particularly in the central governorates.

As NCCI explains, the combination of military operations, sectarian and political violence, criminality and lawlessness, has devastating humanitarian consequences for Iraq’s civilians in terms of death, injury, illness, displacement, denial of fundamental human rights, destruction of homes, vital facilities and infrastructure, as well as for humanitarian actors seeking to meet their needs – in terms of a decrease in available resources, ability to respond in a timely manner, and to access populations in need.

[TOP]

New displacement within Iraq

There had been estimates that 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' would cause displacement of more than 1 million people within Iraq and across Iraq's borders. However, while there was considerable movement of populations within Iraq, at the time relatively few people sought refuge internationally, and the majority of those that did were nationals of other countries resident in Iraq. However, displacement, both within Iraq and internationally has since spiralled.

The conflict inside Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion has resulted in the largest displacement in the region since the displacement of Palestinians in 1948. According to the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 1 in 8 Iraqis has been forcibly uprooted, and according to UNHCR estimates, 40,000-60,000 are leaving their homes on a monthly basis. Homogenization is occurring at an alarming rate in many parts of the Centre and South of Iraq and many IDPs are being displaced more than once.

A report issued by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) covering the first part of 2007 states that the number of displaced people is increasing at an average of 80,000-100,000 a month. The IRCS, the only humanitarian relief agency on the ground, said the nearly 67 percent increase in the number of displaced families since last January of 2006 "is intensifying an already unstable situation". According to the report, by the end of June 2007 there were over one million people that became displaced since the latest conflict, of whom 37.5 percent were children under 12; 32.8 percent were women and 29.7 percent were men. Topping the list of areas with most IDPs was the capital Baghdad with 41,969 families; second was Mosul Province with 15,063 families; and third was Salaheddin Province, about 200km north of Baghdad, with 12,781.

According to the Global IDP Database Project, initially the largest new population displacements were the result of fighting between the US-led Coalition Forces and Iraqi insurgents, particularly in and around Fallujah and Najaf. The US attack on Fallujah is estimated to have displaced more than 200,000 of the city's 390,000 population. In addition to Fallujah, continuing waves of displacement were caused by fighting between US-led military forces and Iraqi insurgents in the country in 2004, in and around the cities of Najaf, Kufa, Kerbala and Samarrah. Across the country, small numbers of people were also forcibly displaced by the Coalition Forces for reasons of ‘national security.’, despite the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities, Coalition Forces, and combatants, as outlined in Guiding Principle 5, to take measures to protect civilian populations to "prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons".

A second cause of displacement has been the continuing return of hundreds of thousands of Kurds to northern Iraq who are reclaiming property and land confiscated from them by the former regime under its "Arabisation" policy, without proper arrangement for the Arab tenants who currently occupy them. Either as a direct result of Kurdish return movements, or out of fear of revenge attacks, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are reported to have fled. Many have sought refuge in non-Kurdish areas north and north-east of Baghdad. At the same time, other Kurds who spontaneously returned to the north have been unable to reclaim their properties and are now secondarily displaced. Likewise, refugees from Iran and Saudi Arabia have also returned and many of them have become internally displaced in the centre and south of the country.

Since the bombing of the Shi’a Al-Askari shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006, sectarian violence has been the leading cause of displacement, in the form of indiscriminate attacks and retaliations. Other reasons for the increase in the number of IDPs are general lawlessness, lack of basic services, unresolved property disputes, and continued fighting between insurgents and the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I). The total number of people displaced inside Iraq has reached 2 million.

[TOP]

The challenge of unresolved property disputes

As of 31 May 2007, the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), an independent agency of the Government of Iraq, previously known as the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC), had received 132,038 claims, of which 34,649 have been decided. The Commission is responsible for settling claims by people who lost property as a result of actions of the former regime during the period from 1968 to April 2003. Successful claimants whose cases have been resolved have started to receive the title deeds to their properties, and the CRRPD has begun to make payments of compensation. The CRRPD has offices in every governorate in Iraq and a staff of over 1,400 to process the claims, which are decided by one of 35 Judicial Committees at first instance and, in case of appeal, by a Cassation Commission in Baghdad.

On 6 February 2007, the High Commission on the Implementation of Article 140, regarding the status of Kirkuk, announced Orders Nos. 3 and 4, which were intended to commence the process of relocating Arab families that moved to Kirkuk during the “Arabisation” campaign of Saddam Hussein. The Orders, which require approval by the executive branch, offer compensation to relocated families. The announcement by the Commission was followed by demonstrations in Kirkuk by opponents of the measure, who claimed it was tantamount to forced displacement. In response, Commissioners clarified that the relocation and compensation mechanisms were strictly voluntary and that 7,000 families had reportedly registered for relocation. More than 50,000 Kirkuk-related claims have been filed with the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes to date.

Concerns remain as to how adequately the claims can be addressed, taking into account the needs and rights of the different communities, and identifying solutions for the relocated Arabs in the north. There is also concern that prolonged delay in processing property claims could lead to an escalation of inter-ethnic violence, political instability and further displacement.

[TOP]

Refugees inside Iraq

Sectarian violence and the deteriorating humanitarian situation have severely affected Iraq’s refugee communities that number some 50,000 people. Palestinian, Syrian, and Iranian refugees have been targeted in deliberate discrimination and attacks. The refugees are reported to have faced increasing searches, destruction to property and arbitrary detention.

In particular, the situation and security of around 34,000 Palestinian refugees has deteriorated drastically. It is thought that more than 500 Palestinians have been murdered. Thousands of Palestinian refugees have been displaced inside Iraq and hundreds more have tried to flee to Jordan and Syria, where many are waiting on the border in camps. There is currently one camp on the Syrian side of the border, one in no-man's land, and one on the Iraqi side of the border. The total number of Palestinians living in these camps, some of whom are in critical need of medical attention, is estimated to be 1,400. Their condition is becoming increasingly desperate as the summer heat intensifies.

[TOP]

Exodus from Iraq

There are an estimated 1.4 million Iraqis seeking refuge in Syria, and a further 750,000 in Jordan, despite the fact that neither Syria nor Jordan is signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Jordan and Syria consider Iraqis as “guests” rather than refugees fleeing violence. By comparison, other countries with common borders with Iraq - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Iran - have allowed in very few Iraqis.

To enter Jordan, Iraqi refugees must be over 40 or under 20, must prove they have sufficient funds to support themselves in the kingdom and, most importantly, must hold a new 'G' generation passport. Iraqis in Jordan are not recognized as refugees by the Jordanian government and therefore most are living illegally in the country, unable to work lawfully and in constant fear of deportation. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for Iraqis to enter Jordan or to renew their visas to remain in country. Once in Jordan, children are not allowed to attend public schools and Iraqis have to pay for most basic services.

Syria has been the most open country to Iraqi refugees, allowing them to enter without stringent visa requirements, to come and go, to settle freely and to access basic services, although it has begun imposing restrictions, such as charges for healthcare that used to be free. Syria continues to receive about 2,000 Iraqis a day and about 30,000 a month end up staying. Some residency conditions have now been imposed: refugees can stay a maximum of three months and then they have to renew their residency by leaving the country and returning. As with Jordan, the basic entry stamp precludes legal employment, placing an increased financial burden on families. Those who have managed to find work are working in diverse fields: barbers, bakers, beauticians, imams, art dealers and others. However, many, if not most Iraqis in Syria are unemployed. Some are able to draw on Iraqi pensions, others arrange for agents in Iraq sell off property.

Up to 150,000 Iraqis have settled in Egypt. Wary of the massive influx experienced in Syria and Jordan, the Egyptian authorities have reportedly closed their door to new Iraqis and have not granted those Iraqis who have made it to Egypt any official status or access to social services. Iraqis who have made their way to Egypt have arrived on one-month tourist visas that they extend in Cairo for additional months. During 2006 it became more difficult for Iraqis to obtain Egyptian visas through travel agencies in Baghdad, forcing Iraqis to go to Jordan or Syria. Unlike Syria and Jordan, Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but it signed the Convention with reservations on all provisions granting refugees the right to work and access public services. Iraqis are able to obtain asylum seeker’s cards from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which are similar to the temporary protection cards the UNHCR offers in Lebanon. Many Iraqis in Egypt have run out of savings and have fallen into an illegal status and fear having to return to Iraq. Although one NGO provides legal aid and another provides some meagre financial assistance, Iraqis are mostly left to fend for themselves, just as in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

There may be more than 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon. Iraqi refugees find it next to impossible to obtain an entry visa to Lebanon so have entered the country illegally, often assisted by smugglers. They are thus at threat of arrest and conviction for ‘illegal entry’, regardless of their status with UNHCR. Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacks effective legislation regulating asylum.

[TOP]

Rebuilding society

National NGOs - non-existent prior to 2003, with the exception of the autonomous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan - now number in the thousands. According to Iraq’s Ministry of Civil Society (MoCS), in July 2006, 11,670 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) were working in Iraq. Of those, by November 2006, the Ministry determined that 2,775 were registered and legitimate. While perhaps only a fraction of these are humanitarian organisations, they, along with the national staff of INGOs, are continuing to strive to meet the needs of the people of Iraq, have critical knowledge of local areas and needs, and some degree of access.

Those involved in the reconstruction of Iraq must harness the capabilities, knowledge and expertise of the Iraqi population through a commitment to grass-roots approaches that strengthen and build on the capacities of Iraqi civil society. UN officials and Iraqi political groups warned against the summary dismissal of 400,000 people employed in tainted institutions, such as the military and police, without even the semblance of vetting or an explicit promise of a future in the new Iraq. These warnings were given little heed and the ensuing consequences are now being harshly felt.

There is a critical need to rebuild trust amongst Iraq's ethnic, religious, and tribal groups. The new government must overcome long-standing resentment arising from the oppression of Iraq's Kurdish ethnic minority and the Shi'a religious majority. It must bridge religious and ethnic divisions, uphold human rights and prevent further persecution of vulnerable groups. The challenge is to build a democracy that can represent all Iraq's peoples, find durable and inclusive solutions for IDPs and refugees, refrain from oppression, and ensure Iraq's wealth is more equally shared. Re-establishing policing and the rule of law, and instilling accountable and representative structures throughout all institutions, will be a central part of this process.

[TOP]

Critical areas of concern

IDP safety

Since the interim Iraqi government took power on 28 June 2004, primary responsibility for protection and assistance to IDPs lies with the national authorities, in particular the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM). The Ministry is collaborating with the UN on a strategy for the protection, care and assistance of IDPs, yet its ability to provide the necessary protection and assistance is limited by security constraints and inadequate operational capacity.

Inside Iraq, some 85 percent of the displaced are in the central and southern regions. Most of those displaced are from Baghdad and surrounding districts. Despite its severe insecurity, Baghdad hosts most of the displaced population, some 122,000 since the 22 February 2006. NGOs in southern Iraq are concerned about the fate of newly arriving IDPs, after the authorities in the southern provinces said they could not cope with any more of them. According to UNHCR, at least 10 out of the 18 governorates have closed their borders or are restricting access to new arrivals. UNHCR is receiving disturbing reports of regional authorities refusing to register new arrivals, including single women, and denying access to government services. IDPs are being targeted by militias. They are experiencing severe lack of essential supplies. There are no places for IDP children in schools, and a lack of medical care.

The majority of IDPs stay with family, friends or just those of the same community. Others squat in public buildings. Displaced people living in public buildings face the threat of eviction by authorities reclaiming public buildings, without being provided with alternative accommodation. According to the Brookings-Bern Project, while most governorates have established some camps for IDPs, they tend to be in remote areas or lack basic services and there are fewer IDPs in camps than with host families. Those in the camps are the worst off because of poor shelter and sanitation conditions.

Many of those fleeing now have little money, and those who fled earlier are running out of resources. According to UNHCR, initial coping mechanisms, both of those displaced and the host communities have been depleted as displacement has taken on a more permanent character. Combined with the general lack of resources, this has led to a growing number of impoverished shanty towns.

According to the Global IDP Database Project, one of the most pressing problems is lack of clean drinking water, proper sanitation and basic services, particularly for IDPs in public buildings and settlements. As the Project reports, IDPs displaced after 2003 in the south and centre, are particularly at risk, because they frequently lack traditional support networks in their areas of displacement. Inadequate housing has rendered IDPs more vulnerable to attack, and many groups of IDPs moving with their possessions have been targeted by looters and thieves. Certain groups of IDPs face increasing restrictions on their freedom of movement as well as harassment. Many Arab IDPs face restricted access to public services, including education and health care in Kurdish-controlled areas.

Because documentation has been required to obtain monthly food rations, some IDPs have found it difficult to access food at public food distribution centres. In central Iraq, IDPs have been excluded from food rations because their documents stated that their food distribution place was elsewhere. Of the displaced interviewed by the International Organisation for Migration in 2006, 32 percent reported no access to PDS rations. 51 percent reported receiving food rations only sometimes, and only 17 percent reported that they always received them. In addition, many of those that received rations found that they were incomplete.

Host government capacity

In both Jordan and Syria, host governments are stretched thin while NGOs and service providers do not have the adequate funding to provide support to the growing refugee population. Since it remains difficult for international NGOs to register legally with Syria and Jordan to provide services, there is little international presence responding to the needs of Iraqis. The socio-economic pressures that such population influxes are presenting are becoming overwhelming. Host governments are in urgent need of support from the international community in order to be able to meet the needs of the Iraqi populations within their borders without impinging on the lives of their own citizens.

Preliminary estimates recently released by the Jordanian Interior Ministry indicate that Iraqi nationals in the Kingdom are costing the state budget some US$1 billion a year. According to the 2007 budget, capital expenditure (mostly spending on infrastructure) is expected to exceed JD1 billion for the first time, whereas current expenditure was forecast at JD3.3 billion.

Syria, with 1.4 million Iraqis, is the only country in the region that allows free public school access for all Iraqi children. To try to cope, Syrian education officials have been forced to convert scores of public schools back to the double-shift system that the country had expected under a long-term national development plan to end by 2010. The health infrastructure is also under severe strain; while Syrian charitable organizations provide some health services, but the only real assistance that most Iraqis receive comes from the Syrian state. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and UNICEF Syria have signed a cooperation agreement providing humanitarian support to children and women refugees from Iraq.

With up to 2,000 Iraqi refugees arriving in Syria each day, economists and refugee experts warn of a looming social and economic crisis. The highest inflation has been felt in the real estate market, with the tens of thousands of extra Iraqi families buying and renting properties across Damascus and raising prices by up to 300 percent. Figures from the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment (SCB), compiled from the state-run press, found that since the Iraqi influx began in early 2005 the demand for bread in Damascus has increased by 35 percent, electricity by 27 percent, water by 20 percent and kerosene by 17 percent. Many Syrians blame the Iraqi refugees for recent rises in unemployment, the cost of basic goods and, above all, rent prices.

Syria and Jordan have still received next to nothing in bilateral help from the world community. Host communities are struggling, and resentment is building.

[TOP]

Vulnerable groups

According to a study undertaken by NCCI and Oxfam GB, those who are vulnerable and require humanitarian support can be grouped into six different categories:

• Displaced populations
• Host communities (local communities who offer shelter and support to displaced populations)
• Besieged populations (populations who are prevented from leaving zones of conflict during military operations)
• Returnee populations (populations returning to former conflict zones, or other areas of former insecurity)
• Populations of other ‘hotspot’ cities (areas experiencing high levels of sectarian and insurgency violence, reprisal attacks, and / or criminal violence)
• General population (experiencing ongoing needs – needs that could become critical and acute if violence worsens).

All of these categories need protection, shelter, food, water, medical care, as well as reconstruction and livelihood opportunities. Within these categories, three groups in particular need special attention: children, women and ethnic/religious minorities.

Children

Iraqi children are often forced to drink water that contains up to ten times the acceptable level of contamination. Damage to the public infrastructure has increased the risk of disease and illness such as diarrhoea and cholera and this could result in many deaths, especially amongst infants. According to UNHCR estimates, half of all IDPs are children, with even more limited access to health care than the general population.

According to Caritas Internationalis and Caritas Iraq, child malnutrition rates have risen in Iraq from 19 percent before the 2003 US-led invasion to a national average of 28 percent four years later. The chronic child malnutrition rate is 23 percent. Over 11 percent of newborn babies are now born underweight, compared with 4 percent in 2003. One child in 10 suffers from chronic disease or illness. The infant mortality rate (the probability of dying between birth and 1 year per 1,000 live births) in 1990 was 40. By 2005 it had risen to 102. Children in Iraq have more chance of dying before the age of five than children in any other Middle Eastern country. One survey found that 92 percent of children had learning impediments largely attributable to the current climate of fear and insecurity. More than a million Iraqi children work, often enduring hazardous conditions, very long hours, as well as being vulnerable to sexual abuse and violence.

Children's education has also suffered. Before 1991, Iraq had achieved nearly universal primary education for both girls and boys. Because of war and sanctions, the younger generation has been deprived of quality education and has not enjoyed the same opportunities as their parents, giving rise to the term 'sanction generation'. After 1991, girls' enrolment rates decreased, and in 2000, it was estimated that 31 per cent of girls were not attending school, nearly twice the number of boys who were not in school. UNICEF officials attribute this decrease mainly to poverty and inadequate education infrastructure, rather than attitudes opposing education for girls. Since the 2003 US-led invasion, the high level of insecurity has had a particularly negative impact on the ability of girls to attend school: in Iraq, the act of travelling to school itself can mean risking your life. A recent survey in Damascus indicates that 76 percent of refugee children are not in school, many of them for two or three years.

Women

Many women were in a precarious situation before the latest war, and now, as a result of recent hostilities, their situation has deteriorated even further. It will take years before women will reach the standard of living and access to services that they experienced before the first Gulf War in 1991. Economic sanctions affected women particularly harshly. Large numbers of female-headed households - women widowed by the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War - bore the brunt of the contraction of the economy and the collapse of public services, since even highly educated women lost their jobs and struggled to keep their families above water. The effect of poverty on women was compounded by their sense of insecurity.

Although data for Iraq is poor, available statistics suggest a desperate situation for women's health. Due to inadequate nutrition and limited prenatal care, between 50-70 percent of pregnant women are estimated to be anaemic, and roughly 23 per cent of infants are born with low birth weights. According to the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), since 1991 maternal mortality has almost doubled. In 1989, there were an estimated 160 deaths per 100,000 live births, while in 2000 the figure increased to 291.

UNHCR registration data and surveys indicate that at least 10 percent of Iraqi displaced families are female-headed. Thousands of Iraqis approaching UNHCR are the victims of sexual and gender-based violence, or other violent attacks and are in urgent need of medical care. Honour crimes in the northern governorates are increasing, while in the central and southern governorates, the security situation and militancy of intolerant groups are limiting women’s ability to move freely outside their homes, restricting their access to health services and education, as well as their ability to participate in public life. Young women are being abducted by armed militia and found days later, sexually abused, tortured, and murdered.

Inclusion of women in decision-making in the re-building of the Iraq state as well as their participation in government is critical to ensure that their needs are met. In the 2002 Arab Development Report, based on 1995 data, Iraq ranked highest in terms of women's empowerment. So far, the political process is not building on this obvious strength. In addition, as Human Rights Watch reports, the ability of displaced female-headed households to exercise property rights has not been effectively addressed. Under the previous regime women had the right to inherit land; however under the Iraqi Interim Constitution women were not given an equal right to inheritance, making it difficult for them to claim rights over land belonging to a deceased male family member.

Ethnic and religious minorities

According to the UNAMI Human Rights Report covering January – March 2007, “attacks against religious and ethnic minorities continued unabated in most areas or Iraq, prompting sections of these communities to seek ways to leave the country.” Religious minorities in Iraq are regular victims of discrimination, harassment, and persecution, with incidents ranging from intimidation to murder. Christians are increasingly experiencing discrimination as regards access to the labour market, or basic social services, and are particularly fearful of attacks by Islamic militias. Of the 1.5 million Assyrians living in Iraq before 2003, half have left the country and the remaining 750,000 are trying to move to safer areas. Iraqi Yazidis, numbering some 550000, are also facing violent assaults and threats, as are Iraq’s Turkomans and Kurds. At the start of 2007, Iraq came second after Somalia in a list of countries whose minorities find themselves most at risk of persecution and even mass killing.

[TOP]

The response of the international community

Since 2003 at least 88 Iraqi and international aid workers have been killed in targeted attacks. By the end of 2003 virtually all international organisations had withdrawn their expatriate staff from Iraq. The Iraqi Red Crescent Society, through its 18 branches and extensive network is the only agency able to operate openly nationwide.

Security concerns have meant that new approaches are being developed and adapted, such as remote support and partnerships with local actors, cross-border operations and dependence on local agency and partner staff. By being resourceful and flexible, NGOs, and national NGOs in particular, stress that despite the very insecure environment and the numerous constraints faced by aid workers in the field, a humanitarian response in Iraq is on-going and possible. In order to better address humanitarian needs in Iraq, NGOs have activated a field-based emergency network that will improve the quality of aid response by centralising and securing information on existing networks, improving field linkages, and easing aid workers access. The humanitarian response can be further improved with the support of all stakeholders, including the whole international community.

Political resolution to the causes of the crisis must occur in parallel with assisting the lives and livelihoods of all Iraqis. Ass NCCI explain, recognition of and actions to assist vulnerable communities are in place, but as conditions have worsened, the consistency, frequency, content and quality of assistance has not been able to keep pace. The ability to respond is also constrained by a lack of neutral and flexible funding. The 2007 Global Needs Assessment by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) ranks Iraq as among the 15 most severe humanitarian crises in the world, yet Iraq is the second least funded (per affected person) of those most severe crises. With growing acknowledgement by the international community that there is indeed a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, this issue has taken a more important place in the discussions about humanitarian aid in Iraq.

Return and resettlement

Much of UNHCR's work in the first three years since the fall of the previous Iraqi regime was based on the assumption that the domestic situation would stabilise and hundreds of thousands of previously displaced Iraqis would soon be able to go home. Between 2003 and 2005, some 300,000 Iraqis did return home, including from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and other countries. In view of the spiralling violence and increasing displacement, in 2006 UNHCR reassessed its work and priorities throughout the region – from assisting returns and aiding some 50,000 non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq, to providing more help to the thousands who are fleeing every month.

In December 2006, UNHCR’s revised Return Advisory and Position on International Protection Needs of Iraqis outside Iraq advised that “no Iraqi from Southern or Central Iraq should be forcibly returned until such time as there is substantial improvement in the security and human rights situation in the country.” Voluntary repatriation is not considered a viable option. Given the fact that the prospect for durable solutions appeared remote or absent, UNHCR strongly encouraged states to consider resettling vulnerable Iraqi refugees and stateless persons stranded in Jordan and Syria. Resettlement in no way jeopardises the right to repatriate voluntarily when conditions improve. Given the absence of conditions for voluntary repatriation to Iraq and the inability of host countries to consider local integration, UNHCR is planning to submit 20,000 Iraqis for resettlement by 31 December 2007. UNHCR has already registered 150,000 Iraqis in neighbouring states. Some 9,000 of the most vulnerable Iraqis have been referred to third countries for resettlement, including some 8,000 to the United States. More than 20 percent of those resettlement cases are classified as women at risk.

On 12 July 2007 UNHCR announced it is doubling to US$123 million its 2007 budget for hundreds of thousands of uprooted Iraqis inside their country and in nearby states. UNHCR's updated appeal will focus on activities both inside Iraq and in surrounding countries. In Iraq, the agency will boost its provision of aid supplies for up to 100,000 vulnerable people, including emergency shelter in a growing number of makeshift camps housing increasing numbers of displaced people. It will also promote the establishment of inter-agency humanitarian aid depots to support the delivery of emergency assistance and provide life-saving help to the most vulnerable refugees. This will include rental subsidies for Palestinian refugees in Baghdad and aid to those stranded at the border with Syria. The agency will maintain an aid stockpile for to 300,000 beneficiaries, including 100,000 inside Iraq.

Outside Iraq, UNHCR will focus on five areas of assistance -- education, health, food, social and legal counselling and shelter. In education, it is supporting the construction of 10 schools and the rehabilitation of 100 others. It is also working closely with UNICEF to increase the number of Iraqi children in schools in the region from 60,000 to 200,000 by the end of the 2007-08 school year. This project will be the subject of another appeal. In the health sector, the agency will increase the number of refugee medical referrals from 10,000 a month to 20,000 by the end of the year. With the World Food Programme, it will expand food distribution for vulnerable families and in schools, and promote supplementary feeding programmes for those most in need. Eight community counselling centres have already been established and 12 more will be completed by the end of 2007.

[TOP]