Causes and consequences

The business of war

The protracted nature of Liberia's civil war is explained in large part by economics, or perhaps better stated: greed. Various warlords emerged during the course of the war, all scrambling for opportunities to control and profit from Liberia's rich natural resources ( Reno 1996 ). Of all the warlords, Taylor proved most adept at cultivating sources of foreign exchange, allowing him to arm his soldiers and conquer areas with easily exploitable resources. He encouraged business as usual in territories that he controlled, exporting iron ore, diamonds, and timber from his zone in return for taxes, which were paid to him personally.

In addition, during the war rebel leaders promised new recruits the opportunity for personal enrichment through looting. The United Nations estimated that there were 60,000 combatants in the civil war of whom few had received any formal military training and none of whom was paid ( Kamara 1999 ). Guns provided rebel soldiers with a livelihood during the war, giving them a chance to seize resources they could not get legitimately in a system so long corrupted by patronage and clienteleism. As the war progressed, vengeance, hatred, self-defence, and survival undoubtedly motivated rebel fighters, but economic motivations were a chief catalyst to the fighting.

Since the civil war, Charles Taylor has been implicated for using his resources to support the brutal rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. For this reason, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia in May 2001 to block Liberian diamond sales, to restrict international travel by top Liberian officials, and to sustain the arms embargo (UN Security Council, Resolution 1343). A UN investigation found, however, that Liberian officials were effectively circumventing the arms embargo, which led the UN to extend sanctions for another year until May 2003. In addition, groups such as Global Witness have raised concerns that the Liberian government is utilising profits from its timber industry, to finance regional conflict..

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Regional involvement

Calling Liberia's 1989-96 war a 'civil' war is perhaps misleading, in that the word 'civil' implies that all actors in the conflict were internal, which is far from the truth. Taylor made alliances with Libya, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire that made it possible for him to train and arm his forces; Côte d'Ivoire was also complicit in permitting him to launch his 1989 attack from their border. In addition, some of the ethnic Krahn and Mandingo in Doe's armed forces formed alliances with the government of Sierra Leone, allowing them to escape into Sierra Leone to flee Taylor's forces and to regroup as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) before entering the fray once again.

Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) formed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), supplying a peacekeeping force comprised primarily of Nigerian and Ghanaian soldiers who remained in Monrovia from 1990 to the end of the war. ECOWAS was headed by Nigeria's President Babangida, a friend and ally of President Doe, which contributed to Taylor's unwillingness to recognise the interim government that ECOWAS set up in Monrovia in the early 1990s. As the conflict became more protracted, reports are that ECOMOG soldiers who were underpaid and understaffed entered into deals with warring factions, thus also benefiting from the 'business of war'.

More recently, Taylor has accused the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea of supporting LURD rebels. In an effort to deal with the situation, the Liberian government expelled the ambassadors and diplomats from those two countries and closed its borders with them for a time. LURD is reportedly composed of former fighters from the 1989-96 civil war, many of whom became refugees in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea after the war.

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Continuing conflict

Since 1999, LURD has engaged in rebel activity, primarily in Liberia's northern Lofa County. However, the violence has slowly made its way closer to Monrovia. In February 2002, the government of Liberia declared a state of emergency, blaming its failure to defeat the rebels on the UN arms embargo placed on the country.

Rather than responding with support for the Liberian government, the international community has displayed a general distrust of and lack of sympathy toward Charles Taylor. For example, a number of conspiracy theories have been postulated regarding the events leading to the February 2002 state of emergency. Many diplomats, aid workers, and Liberian journalists believed that the Taylor government may have engineered or manipulated the conflict in northern Liberia in order to create another humanitarian crisis that would win international sympathy and lead to a re-evaluation of the arms embargo placed on Liberia. However, suspicions of duplicity lack solid evidence, and LURD has continued to attack government forces closer to the capital, suggesting that Taylor has limited control over the situation. LURD does not appear to the have the military strength to take the capital, but tensions remain high and any attack on Monrovia would likely cause widespread panic and trigger more internal displacement.

The general consensus of most reports coming from Liberia is that the country is on the brink of returning to war and violence that would jeopardise the fragile peace in Sierra Leone and further destabilise the region. Human rights groups and aid agencies are calling for the international community to engage with the Liberia problem rather than ignore it and hope it will go away. There is need to prioritise stricter monitoring of violations of the arms embargo, to extend the arms embargo to the LURD rebel forces, to broker a cease-fire agreement with LURD, and to limit Charles Taylor's ongoing negative influence in the region.

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Conflict-induced displacement

The extent of indiscriminate violence and civil unrest during the civil war was such that virtually all of the country's approximately 3 million people had to flee their homes at one time or another, sometimes for a few weeks and in many cases for several years. However, official figures estimate that 1.2 million were internally displaced and 700,000 were refugees at the war's end. Now, with continuing conflict and resulting displacement in Liberia, efforts to categorise and count Liberia's displaced populations are complicated by the fact that old caseload and new caseload refugees cohabit in exile. In addition, within Liberia's borders, returnees mingle with IDPs, some of whom have been displaced for years and others who have recently left their homes in search of safety. Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees are also added to the mix of displaced people within Liberia's borders.

Refugees

The first refugees to flee Liberia escaped on evacuation flights and ships sent to Liberia by Sierra Leone and Ghana to transport their nationals. However, as the situation worsened, thousands of Liberians fled by land and sea to safety using whatever resources they had to pay their passage or to bribe their way to safety. Many endured gruelling journeys on foot through the bush or by ship. The most publicised of these journeys was the voyage of some 2,250 Liberian refugees on the Bulk Challenge ship in May 1996. Denied admission to Côte d'Ivoire, the ship was forced to continue on its way to Ghana where it was also not welcomed until promises of European Union and United Nations assistance were made, which finally led the Ghanaian government to allow refugees to disembark. This incident challenged the notion of African hospitality, highlighting the realities of growing host-fatigue and concerns of the national security threat that could be posed if Liberian rebels were included among the new arrivals (USCR, 'Liberia's Refugee Crisis').

Liberian refugees were granted refugee status en masse, or on a prima facie basis, in surrounding West African states, all signatories of the UN Convention and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) refugee conventions. While the UN definition of a refugee is orientated to the individual, the OAU Convention applies to the Liberia case, offering protection for people in cases of 'external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disrupting the public order' (emphasis added).

At the beginning of the crisis, when the refugees first arrived in host countries they were typically assisted by the local populations. However, host governments quickly invited UNHCR to assist the refugees. In Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria, refugees were primarily assisted in camps. However, in Côte d'Ivoire, the government invited UNHCR assistance but was opposed to camps, preferring refugees to settle freely among the local population in a restricted region in the western part of the country known as the Zone d'Accueil des Refugies (ZAR). In addition, in each of the host countries, an unrecorded number of refugees settled outside of the camps and restricted areas, fending for themselves rather than relying on UNHCR assistance.

At the conclusion of the civil war, UNHCR began a repatriation program to assist Liberians wishing to return home. From 1997 to 1999, about 350,000 to 400,000 Liberian refugees repatriated with at least 40,000 more returnees joining them during 2000. However, by 2000 reports of renewed violence, particularly in Lofa County, discouraged more refugees from returning home, and only 2,000 refugees were repatriated during 2001 (USCR). Recognising that conditions were worsening in Liberia, the UNHCR suspended its formal repatriation program and ceased most reintegration projects in late 2000 and 2001 ( see 3.1 Refugees in exile ).

IDPs

The UN estimated that by 1997, after seven years of civil war in Liberia, there were 750,000 persons displaced within the country. By the end of 1999, an estimated 90 per cent of Liberia's IDPs had returned home (USCR). UNDP funded an IDP reintegration programme, and the agency assisted over 130,000 IDPs to return to their homes from 1997 to early 2000. Many other IDPs returned home on their own, unassisted.

However, conflict between pro- and anti-government forces in Lofa County from 2000 to the present has resulted in large numbers of newly displaced Liberians. Though the number of newly internally placed people in Liberia is hard to pin down, August 2002 estimates ranged between 90,000 and 200,000. By October 2000, WFP reported that they were assisting 183,900 IDPs living in fourteen camps for IDPs primarily located in the suburbs of Monrovia, Totota, and CARI (Global IDP Database).

Several factors have converged to make assistance for Liberian IDPs less than adequate. First, aid agencies have repeatedly been unable to access people displaced inside conflict zones. By the end of 2000, there was no non-governmental organisation (NGO) or UN agency working in Lofa County. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) had been assisting Kolahun Hospital in Upper Lofa, but pulled out because of fighting in the area. In addition, rebel activity on the road to Monrovia has made it impossible to reach certain areas (ICRC).

Second, concerns have been raised that international opposition against Liberia's government has translated into inadequate provision of assistance for Liberia's IDPs. Potential donors are very wary of Taylor's regime and reluctant to support it, which unfortunately has meant that food, medicines, clean drinking water, and adequate shelter are typically in short supply. Since 1989, development assistance to Liberia declined by approximately $100 million a year to less than $30 million in 2001. As a result, Medecins Sans Frontieres Belgium had to reduce support to Monrovia's main hospital, Save the Children UK was unable to fund nine out of nineteen health clinics, and UNICEF's funding dropped from $9.3 million in 1998 to $3.7 million in 2000 (OCHA News 2001).

Third, until February 2002, the lack of a Humanitarian Co-ordinator weakened the effectiveness of aid agency responses to IDP needs. Efforts are currently being made to set better institutional arrangements and co-ordination mechanisms, building on lessons learned in Sierra Leone. The OCHA IDP Unit that went to Liberia in April 2002 has facilitated this process by assessing protection issues and making recommendations for improving assistance.

Sierra Leonean refugees

Ironically, not only has Liberia produced large numbers of refugees, but it has simultaneously hosted large numbers of refugees. Tens of thousands of refugees fled from Sierra Leone to Liberia during the 1990s to escape civil war, but found Liberia to be a worse option than their own war-ravaged country, causing thousands of them to repatriate. About 30,000 Sierra Leonean refugees live in Lofa County, many of them on their own; about 8,000 are being hosted in camps near the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, which have repeatedly been inaccessible to aid workers due to outbreaks of violence in the area. Four refugee camps closer to Monrovia - Banjor, Samukai, VOA-1, and Zuannah - host another 30,000 to 35,000 Sierra Leoneans who receive assistance from the UN and other aid agencies. Recent Liberian IDPs are now being assisted in these camps along with Sierra Leoneans.

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Vulnerable populations

During Liberia's civil war, everyone was vulnerable to acts of indiscriminate violence. However, women and children were especially susceptible to serious abuse.

Child soldiers

Rebel groups recruited as many as 10,000 child soldiers under the age of 18. Many of them were forcibly taken from their families and fought in order to survive. These children were typically from war zones and were economically disadvantaged and deprived of educational opportunities. High on drugs to inoculate them against fear and armed with submachine guns, they became perpetrators of violence. After the war, around 4,300 child soldiers were demobilised and disarmed, and reintegration programmes for them were introduced. However, lack of adequate employment and educational opportunities has left them vulnerable to reverting back to violence as a way to survive. Reports are that once again rebel groups are re-arming some of these child soldiers and forcibly conscripting new IDP children to fight against Taylor's government.

Women

Women in Liberia and those in exile have also endured much injustice. The frequency of rape by both rebel and government forces in the civil war and in the current conflict suggest that it has been used as a tool of war to intimidate the civilian population. In some cases, girls have identified high-ranking government officials as rapists (Amnesty International 2001). Little has been done to bring perpetrators to justice, giving license to others to continue the practice unchecked.

In addition, desperate economic conditions in Liberia and in refugee camps have led many women to engage in concubinage ( Kaiser 2001 , Dick 2002 )While prostitution does go on, the more common scenario is for women, particularly those who are heads of households or young girls who lack adequate familial support, to enter into a relationship with a man providing him with sexual favours in exchange for his economic support for herself and her children.

In refugee camps in West Africa, it was discovered that aid workers exchanged food rations for sex with children, causing an international scandal. An unspecified number of interviewees complained that they or their children had to have sex in order to get food and favours. Those implicated included over 40 aid agencies, including the UNHCR itself, and sixty-seven individuals, mostly local staff named by the children. UNHCR responded with various measures to curtail this behaviour, including greater security measures in the camp, hiring an increased number of female staff, and improving the system for hearing refugee complaints.

NGO and UNHCR workers in IDP camps have made efforts to address the issue of domestic violence, which while not new in Liberia is perhaps exacerbated by the difficult conditions of living in an economically and politically unstable environment. In November 2002, a sixteen-day UNHCR-sponsored programme brought together more than 200 refugees, both men and women, as well as other war-affected persons from the Samukai Town, Zuanah Town, Banjor, and VOA refugee camps to address ways of improving domestic situations for women in a way that is culturally relevant (allAfrica.com News). These efforts, while important, have involved a very small proportion of the population, thus limiting the impact of interventions.

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Legal framework

As one of the founding members of the UN, Liberia is signatory to a number of treaties which include the following: the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Liberia was also one of the principal countries supporting the founding of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the days when Liberia's presidents acted as international spokespersons and contributed to the formation of international legal standards have seemingly come to an end. Although a variety of legal instruments have been signed and the internationally accepted freedoms for citizens are protected in law, all too often what happens in practice is another story.

In his victory and inauguration speeches, President Taylor declared his intention to head a government that respected human rights. In 1997, he put actions to his words by setting up the Human Rights Commission. However, the effectiveness of the Commission has been hijacked by the fact that the Commission's mandate was hastily drafted with little external input from experts in the field. A group of NGOs protested and submitted amendments for consideration, which were promptly dismissed. Taylor described their revised bill as 'an attempt to tie the hands of the President'. The Commission lacks the power of subpoena and enforcement powers, and funding for the Commission is up to the President's discretion, giving him significant control over the Commission.

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Human rights

Liberia's human rights record, both during the war and after, is sullied with reports of extra-judicial killings, rape, illegal detentions, and torture. Human Rights Watch investigations (2002) of the Liberian government revealed that human rights violations were being perpetrated with impunity. Thousands of men and boys accused of being 'dissidents' have been illegally detained, and some executed, by the government. Women fleeing fighting have reportedly been caught at checkpoints and raped by soldiers. Using the rebel threat as an excuse, the government is re-arming combatants and encouraging local militias. Men and boys are being recruited coercively without receiving proper military training. In addition, since the February 2002 state of emergency, a number of journalists have been illegally detained in Taylor's efforts to muzzle the press.

Though not to the same extent as the government, the rebel group LURD has also been implicated for human rights abuses, raping, killing, and detaining supposed government-supporters.

Outside groups have made efforts to address the situation, but with little success. In 2000, the Carter Center closed down their offices in Liberia due to 'prevailing conditions' in the country and the actions of the Liberian government that impeded their human rights work. The European Union invited the Liberian government to engage in a human rights consultation in 2001. Changes needed in the realm of politics, the judicial system, economics, and finance were agreed upon, but implementation of changes has been slow in coming, and the extent of human rights violations perpetrated has not been convincingly reduced.

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